The Rise of Algorithmic Work: Implications for Organizational Control and Worker Autonomy by Cameron, Lindsey
 





A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
 of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Business Administration) 




Professor Gerald F. Davis, Chair  
Professor Beth Bechky, New York University  
Associate Professor Seth Carnahan, Washington University in St Louis  
Assistant Professor Tawanna Dillahunt  






































Addie Doll. Allie Feldberg. Aliza Torok. Alex Lu. Alex Rosenblat. Amy Loder. Amy Jessica. 
Amy Wrzenewski. Anna Marx. Ananda Village. Angela Ewing-Boyd. Anna-Lisa Adelberg. 
Anoni Rogers. Anne Smith. Alex Murphy. Alex Rosenblat. Al Young. Alison Krueger. Ann 
Thomas. Areh Howell. Ashleigh Eldemire-Pointdexter. Ashley Erb. Aum Yoga. Babalawoo. Ben 
Seshatakofsky. Beth Bechky. Bob Duggan. Bob Gordon. Bob Bonner. Bouchet Society. Bounce 
Gymnastics. Bridgit (Turkey) Wald. Brian Jones. Bryce Widom. Carol Ann Carr. Carol (Sudha) 
Lundbeen. Carol Coley. Carrie Oelberger. Cassandra Aceves. Cecile Dolle. Courtney Cameron.  
Courtney Payne. Courtney McCluney. Callen Anthony. Coby Kozowlski. Channing Matthews. 
Charity Matthews. Chelsea Wahl. Christina Bryza. Christine Feak. Chen Zhang. Cindy Raine.  
Curtis Chen. Curtis McCloud. David Mayer. Declan McCloud. Denise Cameron. Devarshi 
(Steve) Hartman. Delight Bowsky Matthews. Diane Fu. Drew Carton. Djaoudia Assaoui. 
Easton’s Nook. Egun. Ellen Porter. Elena Rutyer. Emma Flores. Emilio Estevez. Emily Doll. 
Emily Heaphy. Eric Lutz. Erin-Ashley Kerti. Esalen. Esther Kyte. Ethan Kross. Ethan Molinsky. 
George Washington Williams, Jr. George Washington Williams, Sr. Greg Ascue. Greg 
Kowolski. Spreitzer. Giovanna Luminious. Harriet. Hatim Rahman. Hilary Hendricks. Ian 
Sterne. Irene Ford Cameron. Ines Hadzergic. Inner-group dialogue relations. Jackie Mattis. Jake 
Cameron. Jane Dutton. Jane Yoga. Jen Anon. Jean Bartunek. Jerry Davis. Jesse Williams. Jim 
Walsh. Jonathan (Sudhir) Foust. Jordanna Eyre. Jose Uribe. Jirs Meuris. Julia Lee. Julia Ticona. 
Judy Dyer. Jurian Hughes. Justin Berg. Kali. Kashi Nivas. Katerina Gonzalez. Katherine Klein. 
 
 iii 
Katy Decelles. Kealia Bonacci. Kevin Lee. Kevin Jackson. Kenneth Rogers. Karen Locke.  Katie 
Powell. Kila Garcia. Kira Schram. Kisha Lashley. Kristen Greco. Kristen Brunello. Kristen 
Roupenian. Kristin McGuire. Krishna Das. Kripalu. Laura Muschello. Leila Seradj. Leslie 
Blackburn. Leslie Cullins. Leslie Rogers. Lakshimi. Lorraine (Raina) DeLear. Luminious. 
Lyndon Garrett. Lynn Wooten. Margie Forbes. Mark Felton. Mark Tanka. Marissa Scott. Mary 
Starich. Matt Alemu. Matthew Bidwell. May Meaning Meeting. Melanie Sobocinski. Melissa 
Valentine. Melissa Wooten. Michael Parke. Michel Anteby. Michelle Gelfand. Michelle Smith. 
Mihai Banalescu. Mike Mohica. Mike Pratt. Monica Worline. Natalie Cotton-Nessler. NCFDD. 
Neha Jha. Oscar Jerome Stewart. Oshun. Obatla. Orunmilla. Oya. OWN. Ouida Coley. Paul 
Starosciak. Peggy Sue Brydie. Peter Cappelli. Perelandra. Phoebe Ellsworth. Phil Carpenter. 
Ph.D. Project. QLC. Rackham Reading Room. Radically Sacred. Ramblewood. Ren Li. Richard 
(Shoban) Faulds. Riley Grant. Robin D’Avignon. Robin Ely. Rory Grant. Rohini Jalan. Ruth 
Behar. Ryan Cameron. Sally Mercedes. Samantha Meyer. Sarah Cruse. Sarah Huff. Sean Dew. 
Seth Carnahan. Sharon Niv. Shango. Shiva. Sita. Stacey Blake-Beard. Skylar (Turkey) 
VanDersen. Stephanie Creary. Stephanie Kraft. Sue Ashford. Suntae Kim. Sydney Cameron. 
Talia Gutin. Talia Anders. Tani Thole. Tanya (Tatiana) Thunberg. Tawanna Dillahunt. TeaHaus. 
Teddy Dewitt. Theo St. Mane. Tiffany Darabi. Tiffany Johnson. Todd Ewing. Validia Williams. 
Verenice. Veronica Rabelo. Vicky Rain. Vidishia Hermani. Winston Boddie. Wilson Jones. 
Winnie Jiang. Women of Color in the Academy. YTT Blue. Yvonne Bowsky. 
 
And all those who remain unnamed. 
 
 
Financially this research has been supported by: The savings of Kenny Rogers and Lindsey 
Cameron, the Rackham School of Graduate Studies and the Ross School of Business at the 
 
 iv 
University of Michigan, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and the ride 
hailing companies for which I drove. 
 
 v 





LIST OF TABLES vi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES vii 
 








1. Introduction 1 
 
2. The Workplace of Today: The On-Demand Economy 10 
 
3. Perspectives on Algorithms Across the Social Sciences 26 
 
4. The Ride-hailing Industry: Research Setting, Design, and Methods 49 
 
5. Allies or Adversaries?:  
 Making Meaning of the “New” Gig Employment Relationship 63 
 
6. Choice without Freedom: Autonomy and Control in the  
 Algorithmic Workplace 112 
 
7. Conclusion and Future Directions 183 
 
 vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 3-1: Perspectives on Algorithms and Work in the Social Sciences 40 
 
Table 4-1: Participant Inventory 58 
 
Table 6-1: Algorithmic Tactics  162 
 
Table 6-2: Algorithms Coordinating the Work Process 164 
 








Figure 3-1: Algorithmic Work Triangle 39 
 
Figure 5-1: Alliance and Adversarial Modes toward Work Arrangements 104 
 
Figure 6-1: Algorithms and the Work Cycle 161 
 
Figure 6-2: Inferences and Responses to Algorithms 




LIST OF IMAGES 
 
 
Image 5-1: Snacks and Drinks for Customers 103 
 
Image 5-2: Party Car on a Friday Night for Customers to Enjoy 103 
 
Image 5-3: Shared Media about Driver’s Metaphysical  
Work and Artifacts to Spark a Conversation 103 
  
Image 5-4: Shared Media to Spark Conversation  
around Social Justice Issues 103 
 
Image 5-5: Backpack as Object to Enforce Physical  
Distance between Drivers and Customers 103 
 
Image 5-6: Sign Reminding Customers of Boundaries 
in Backseat Pocket 103 
 
Image 6-1: Surge Alert to Driver’s Phone 167 
 
Image 6-2: Heat Map for New York City 167 
 
Image 6-3: Text Notification of Bonus Offers 167 
 
Image 6-4: Deactivation Notice (Accessed via Link in Email) 
for Declining Rides 167 
 
Image 6-5: Sign on Driver’s Backseat Encouraging Riders  
to Rate Five Stars 168 
 
Image 6-6: Sign on Driver’s Backseat Encouraging Drivers to Rate 168 
 
Image 6-7: Signs Available for Purchase on Website to Encourage  
Riders to Rate Five Stars 168 
 
Image 6-8: Notification from Ride-hailing Company about  
Driver’s Ratings 168 
 
Image 6-9: Compliments and Badges are Always Available  




Image 6-10: Driver’s Account Deactivated for Low Ratings  
with Potential for Reinstallment 169 
 
Image 6-11: Driver Account Temporarily 
 Suspended for Cancelling too Many Rides 169  
 
Image 6-12: On-Screen Navigation Instructions 169 
 
Image 6-13: Instructions for a Shared Ride, Showing Driver has  
Arrived and the Timer Counting Down 170 
 
Image 6-14: Nudge to Keep Driving when Trying to Sign Off 170 
 











In less than a decade the on-demand economy, a labor market characterized by short-term 
contracts where work is coordinated through algorithms, has radically reshaped organizations, 
employment relationships, workers’ lives, and consumer behaviors. Despite optimistic and 
pessimistic predictions, few studies have examined how algorithms affect work and workers in 
practice. This dissertation focuses on understanding the impact of algorithms on workers in an 
environment where the entire human resource cycle is coordinated by algorithms. Existing 
organizational theories suggest that algorithmic systems will tighten the iron cage by providing 
more comprehensive and invasive methods of control. This dissertation, however, reveals the 
myriad ways that workers find autonomy in an algorithmic work environment.  
To theorize this central finding, I draw upon field work collected from the ride hailing 
industry, the largest sector in the on-demand economy. I begin with an overview of some of the 
changes in the contemporary workplace highlighting how they may challenge and extend 
mainstream organizational theories. I follow with a review of the on-demand economy, including 
its predecessors of production and service work, and how it affects workers, consumers, and 
communities. Next, I describe how algorithm-based control systems differ from prior systems 
and conceptualize algorithmic work—a set of job-related activities that are structured by 
algorithms—drawing on a synthesis of literature across six social science disciplines. I conclude 
this chapter with unexplored questions at the nexus of work, workers, and algorithms.   
 
 xi 
In the two empirical papers, I draw on participant observation (including three years as a 
driver and a rider), longitudinal interviews, online archival data and focus groups. In the first 
study, I examine how workers interpret the insecure work conditions inherent in the on-demand 
economy. Focusing on the practices and perspectives of the two most salient features of their 
work environment—customers and technology—I explore how these interactions lead drivers to 
understand their work. Seeing their relationship with work as either an alliance or as adversarial, 
workers tend to view features of the work environment as either working on their behalf or 
against them. Over time these practices and perspectives culminate in different outcomes.  
In the second study, I begin by describing how algorithm-based control systems differ 
from prior systems and conceptualize algorithmic work. Algorithms manage by structuring 
choice at each human-algorithm interaction, to which drivers respond with a set of tactics: 
compliance, engagement, or deviance. While these tactics appear to be at odds, drivers describe 
their responses as evidence of their personal autonomy, in that the system allows them to 
maximize earnings and create a continuous stream of work from a discontinuous set of tasks. 
This autonomy demonstrates that although the algorithmic-manager may be an unforgiving 
taskmaster, workers perceive otherwise, thus suggesting that workers feel they have more 
autonomy in algorithmic rather than traditional work.  
This dissertation provides several theoretical and empirical contributions. First, I 
summarize perspectives of algorithms across the social sciences laying out several unanswered 
questions at the intersection of work, organizations, and algorithms. Further, I propose a 
definition of how algorithms operate in the workplace which I expand on. In contrast to iron cage 
metaphors, this dissertation suggests that workers do indeed experience a great deal of autonomy 
 
 xii 
in the algorithmic workplace. This study thus has implications for our understanding of 
algorithms, organizational control, autonomy and the meaning of work. 
 
 





In less than a decade the on-demand economy,1 a labor market characterized by short-
term assignments where work is coordinated through platforms, has radically reshaped 
organizations, employment relationships, workers’ lives, and consumer behaviors. Jason Tanz, 
editor of Wired, notes, “many of these companies have us engaging in behaviors that would have 
been seen as foolhardy five years ago. We are hopping into strangers’ cars (Lyft), welcoming 
them into our spare rooms (Airbnb), dropping our dogs off at their houses (DogVacay), and 
eating food in their dining rooms (Feastly).” Not since the industrial revolution have more people 
chosen to work outside of traditional organizations, moving between short-term assignments 
(Katz & Krueger, 2019). The rise of the on-demand economy is coupled with the increasing role 
of algorithms in our lives. Already we rely on algorithms to direct public transport (Hodson, 
2014), recommend books, films, music, and vacation spots (Gomez-Urive & Kent, 2016; 
Orlikowski & Scott, 2014; Seavers, 2014), help us find romantic partners (Devendorf & 
Goodman, 2014), and protect our homes and neighborhoods (Benlian, Klompe & Hinz, 2019; 
                                                
1 This phenomenon can go by a number of names including: gig economy (Friedman, 2014), sharing or gifting 
economy (Hyde, 1983; Stephany, 2015), hybrid economy (Lessig, 2008), collaborative economy (Botsman & 
Rogers, 2010), crowd-based capitalism (Sundarajan, 2016), peer economy (Bauwen, 2005), 1099 economy (Hill, 
2015), and the renting economy (Trikha, 2014). I am unaware of any consensus on a definition on any of these terms 
leading to further clarity. Gig economy, a term commonly used by the media, is misleading as gigs could apply to 
work assignments that are not enabled by a web platform (e.g., a musician’s gig). Sharing implies the loaning of 
personal resources, typically with minimal (if any) financial gain, and applies more to organizations on the gift 
economy of the spectrum, such as CouchSurfing, where consumers make friends with the person whose couch they 
stay on, as opposed to OneFineDay, a competitor to Hyatt where customers rent out luxury villas and have no 
contact with homeowners. Therefore, in the interests of greater precision and clarity, as well to be inclusive to the 
myriad of on-demand platforms, I’ve chosen to use the word on-demand economy. 
 
 2  
Saunder, Hunt & Hollywood, 2016). Indeed, algorithms, and their sophisticated cousin, artificial 
intelligence, are already substituting for the work of journalists (Smith, 2015), human resource 
managers (Miller, 2015), medical lab technicians (Tufecki, 2015), and equities traders (Popper, 
2016). Multiple forecasts predict that nearly half of US occupations are at risk of becoming 
automated over the next 20 years and that 70% will require interaction with digital technology by 
2020 (Frey & Osborne, 2013; Muro et al., 2017, 2019). Summing up these trends in the changing 
relationship between employment and technology in their book, The Four Global Forces, Dobbs, 
Manyinka and Woetzel (2015) asses that “compared with the Industrial Revolution, we estimate 
that this change is happening ten times faster and at 300 times the scale, or roughly 3,000 times 
the impact.”  
Short-term work assignments, aka gigs, are not new. Nor are the questions that arise with 
the integration of algorithms in the workplace. With the introduction of new technologies, 
scholars have questioned how technology will change organizational practices and workers’ lives 
(Barley, 1986; Mann & Hoffman, 1960; Orlikowski, 2007; Zuboff, 1989). Take, for example, the 
transition from an agricultural to an industrial society. Despite fears that automation would make 
workers obsolete, job loss was eventually offset by gains in manufacturing and services (Autor, 
2015). The introduction of innovative technologies to manufacturing processes intensified the 
physical labor required for production in and around new machines (Samuel, 1977). For 
example, when power looms automated an estimated 98% of the labor required to weave a yard 
of cloth, consumer demand increased so sharply that the number of weaving jobs actually rose 
and workers’ skills became increasingly valuable (Bessen, 2015). Further, for workers, the shift 
from life-long employment to short-term tasks may make the experience of work closer to what 
is was like in the agricultural age (Barley & Kunda, 2001). In sum, the effects of technology on 
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work are nonlinear and complex; understanding the conditions that give rise to variable 
configurations of work, workers, and technologies requires examination of the organizations in 
which they are embedded. 
Vivid portrayals of the “doing of work” have always aided scholars in staking out the 
contours of organizational processes, especially in light of widescale societal change. In-depth 
accounts of the Tennessee Valley Authority, Forest Service, shop floor, gypsum mine, corporate 
boardroom, and technicians’ labs, for example, led to some of the foundational theories on 
organizational processes. These thick descriptions reflecting the challenges individuals face at 
work and in their daily lives force researchers to grapple with the relationships between 
organizations, workers, and society at-large, often bringing overlooked issues to the public’s 
attention (Desmond, 2016; Edin & Schaefer, 2015; Goffman, 2015; Hochschild, 2018). Although 
widely optimistic and pessimistic projections on the algorithms and the future of work abound 
(e.g., Daugherty & Wilson, 2018; Domingos, 2015; Pasquale, 2015; Sundarajan, 2016), 
grounded accounts about the relationship between technology and work are the exception rather 
the norm (Barley et al., 2017). Accounts such as these would encourage researchers to move 
beyond the simple binary that algorithms are either good or bad and to think about the entwined 
relationship between technological advancements, organizations, workers, and society. 
In this vein this dissertation aims to vividly depict how work gets accomplished and is 
experienced in the context of a workplace riddled with algorithms. Specifically, I ask two 
questions: “How do workers navigate the tensions between organizational control and individual 
needs for autonomy in an algorithmic workplace?” and “How do workers make meaning of their 
work in such a sterile environment?” I explore these contexts in the ride hailing industry, the 
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largest employer in the on-demand economy where work is coordinated by algorithms largely 
with no direct contact with managers or co-workers. 
 To ground my findings, I begin in Chapter 2 by describing a sector where these changes 
are at the forefront—the on-demand economy. I start by discussing two forms of work that 
preceded and shaped the on-demand economy, namely production and customer service. I then 
layout the main features of the on-demand economy and review the literature that discusses how 
the on-demand economy affects workers, consumers, and communities. 
In Chapter 3, I delve deeper into the coordinating mechanism of the on-demand 
economy—algorithms. Algorithms coordinate on-demand work in that they assign tasks, set pay 
rates, and evaluate work. I begin with a broad definition of the term algorithm, drawing from its 
roots in the mathematical and physical sciences, before explaining the limitations of this 
definition for the social sciences. I then provide an overview of how six major social science 
disciplines (economics, law, information science, communications/cultural media studies, 
organizational studies) define the term before concluding with a definition of algorithms that is 
more applicable for studies on the world of work. I conceptualize the idea of algorithmic work as 
a set of job-related activities that are structured by algorithms which are, in turn, a set of logic 
steps, typically written in software code, that are set to maximize a predictive outcome. I then 
review the recent literature about how algorithms are embedded in different stages of the work 
process. 
In Chapter 4, I describe my empirical context of the ride hailing industry, the largest 
industry in the on-demand economy. I begin by tracing the history of the industry, the challenges 
it faces, and the hiring, evaluation, and firing process workers undergo. Next I describe my four 
data sources (observation, interviews, focus group, social media data) collected over a three-year 
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period that inform the following two empirical chapters. I conclude with an inventory of all my 
research participants including their demographics, prior work experience, motivation for 
entering ride hailing, and their current work status. 
In Chapter 5, the empirical companion to the literature review in Chapter 2, I explore 
how workers interpret the precarious work conditions inherent in the on-demand economy that 
ultimately shape their perspectives to their working arrangements. Drawing on my qualitative 
data, in particular the longitudinal interviews (n=117), I examine how these workers make 
meaning of their work by focusing on the practices and perspectives of the two most salient 
features of their work environment—customers and technology. I explore how these interactions 
lead drivers to understand their relationship with their work as either an alliance or as adversarial 
in that workers believe the features of the work environment are working on behalf or against 
drivers. Over time these work practices and perspectives culminate in different expected 
psychological, emotional, and behavioral outcomes. This paper contributes to the understanding 
of how workers make meaning of their work in the contemporary workplace. 
In Chapter 6, the empirical companion to the literature review in Chapter 3, I explore 
how workers navigate the tensions between organizational control and individual needs for 
autonomy in an algorithmic workplace. Algorithms manage by structuring choice at each human-
algorithm interaction, to which drivers respond with a set of tactics: compliance, engagement, or 
deviance. While these tactics appear to be at odds, drivers describe their responses as evidence of 
their personal autonomy, in that the choices allow them to maximize earnings and create a 
continuous stream of work from a discontinuous set of tasks. This autonomy that is conditional 
on time and the work demonstrates that though algorithms may be seen as an unforgiving 
taskmaster, workers perceive otherwise. Further, by continually offering choice and requesting 
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consent from workers at each stage of the work process, algorithmic systems enact control 
without authority. This paper contributes to the understanding of the tension between control and 
autonomy in organizations by describing a new control system and theorizing how algorithms 
can be a means of exercising control through enabling autonomy. 
Finally, in Chapter 7 I conclude with a brief overview of how the findings in this 
dissertation address some long-standing questions in organizational theory and organizational 
behavior around control and autonomy. I then consider further questions that this study raises 
and future avenues of research to be explored.   
Lastly, it should be noted this work is neither critical nor laudatory of algorithms in the 
workplace or the on-demand economy more generally. Instead, my desire is to present the 
experiences, interactions, and meaning-making around work in the algorithmic workplace as 
vividly as both I and workers I interviewed lived it. As James Spradley noted in The 
Ethnographic Interview (1979/2016):  
I want to understand the world from your point of view. I want to know what you know 
in the way you know it. I want to understand the meaning of your experience, to walk in 
your shoes, to feel things as you feel them, to explain things as you explain them. Will 
you become my teacher and help me understand? 
 
It is to the workers and the algorithms themselves that I ask these questions. Ultimately, I 
hope to prove Kranzberg’s (1986) last law of technology, “Technology is a very human activity.” 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The Workplace of Today: The On-Demand Economy 
 
The emergence of internet-enabled platform technology has accelerated the speed and 
reach of information flows bringing together participants on both the demand and supply side of 
labor. A key feature of the on-demand economy is that work and workers are continually 
available, i.e., on-demand. Freed from the contractual obligations of life-long employment, 
contract employers are able to hire workers to complete tasks only when needed, saving on labor 
costs, and workers have greater flexibility in choosing their assignments and designing their 
schedules. The on-demand economy combines features of two older types of work: production 
and customer service work. Similar to production work, on-demand work tends to be repetitive, 
narrow in scope, paid at piece-rate, and have minimal autonomy. The work is highly visible, 
making it possible for workers to be surveilled—in this age, by cameras and algorithms as 
opposed to by a foreman. On-demand work is facilitated by a digital platform forming a tri-party 
employment relationship between worker, employer, and the platform. As with other types of 
service work, customers evaluate work with ratings that serve as reputation signals for future 
employers and the platform at-large. As the platform only brokers work, without human 
managers, customers have more power as their ratings substitute for performance appraisals. 
This novel way of organizing affects how work is structured, evaluated, and experienced. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I give greater context to the on-demand economy first by looking at its 
historical predecessors and then through a detailed description of what has come to constitute the 
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on-demand economy. In the final section I explore how the on-demand economy affects 
consumers, workers, and communities. 
 
Predecessors to the On-Demand Economy 
 
Production Work. Three defining features of production work include 1) its narrow task scope, 2) 
highly visible tasks that make the work easily monitorable, and 3) a system of pay coupled with 
output. The manufacturing industry, the exemplar of production work, is the birthplace of many 
foundational organizational theories (e.g., Taylor, 1911; Mayo, 1933; Roethlisberger & Dickson, 
1939; Roy, 1952). In the mid 1800s, most manufacturing operations were small with owner-
entrepreneurs living and working close to workers. For such firms, control and motivation were 
handled through informal relationships as it was easy for owner-entrepreneurs to observe and 
correct workers (Smith, 1850; Edwards, 1974). As firms grew in size, control structures evolved 
to compensate for the absence of personal relationships. Foremen oversaw production (Roy, 
1952), wages were linked to output (Burawaoy, 1974), and technology, such as the assembly 
line, regulated the production process (Taylor, 1911; 1947). The narrow and discrete nature of 
the task further allowed work to be easily monitored, tracked, and paced. With the rise of non-
unionized and non-production work in the mid-twentieth century, managerial interest turned to 
how to absorb workers into organizations through bureaucratic processes and structures 
(Gouldner, 1954; Blau, 1956). Edwards’s (1974) categories of control provide a useful typology 
to understand production work. Workers are expected to march under the overseer’s gaze (simple 
control), dance at the pace of assembly lines (technical control), and toe the line following 
procedures and processes laid out by management (bureaucratic). Even jobs that were enriched 
through optimizing the task variety, task identity, task significance, feedback, and autonomy 
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available within the job were ultimately another tool to control workers (Hackham & Oldham 
1975; 1976). Recent advances in technology have enabled more invasive and fine-grained 
surveillance, such as real-time location tracking through counters (Pierce, Snow, & McAfee 
2013), RFID trackers (Boyce, 2011), and GPS systems (Levy, 2015). 
 
Customer Service Work. Three defining features of service work are its 1) interactions with 
customers, 2) reliance on routines and scripts, and 3) emotional labor. As of 1980, the service 
industry overtook manufacturing as the largest industry in the US (Westcott and Bednarzik, 
1980). Unlike manufacturing, service work entails a complex three-way interaction, dubbed the 
service triangle or triangle of power, between workers, employers, and customers (McCammon 
& Griffon, 2000). The presence of the customer in the service interaction produces more 
uncertainty than is typical in manufacturing jobs. To manage this uncertainty, employers try to 
structure service encounters to elicit specific, predictable reactions to promote what they view as 
quality service. At Disneyland, for example, supervisors can watch employees from multiple 
attractions at blind observation posts (Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989). Grocery store registers and 
check-out lines regulate the speed of worker-customer interactions (Tolich, 1993). And, in a 
form of bureaucratic control, McDonald’s tightly scripts exchanges between workers and 
customers in what Liedner (1993) calls routinized service work. Emotional labor, or the process 
of managing feelings and expressions for economic value (i.e., to fulfill the emotional 
requirements of a job), are integral to service work (Hochschild, 1983). To provide “authentic”—
i.e. friendly, caring, and smiling— service encounters, employers select, train, and socialize to 
meet management’s desires (Hochschild, 1983; Gittell, 2003). Customer service interactions can 
be empowering or alienating for workers (Korczynski, 2009; Korczynski & Ott, 2004;). When 
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workers have repeated contact with the same customer, emotionally fulfilling, generative 
relationships may develop. On the other hand, pseudo-relationships or one-off exchanges with 
customers may lead to alienation and burnout (Gutek, 1995; Gutek & Bhuppa, 1999). In sum, the 
service triangle raises new questions about how control dynamics evolve and sustain themselves 
that are still under investigation by scholars (Lopez, 2010). With an emphasis on technical 
control and customer interaction, the on-demand economy combines elements of both the 
production and customer service industry.2  
 
The On-Demand Economy 
 
The on-demand economy is a hybrid of production and customer service work. In 2016 
the US Commerce Department proposed the first governmental definition of the on-demand 
economy, identifying four characteristics: 1) the use of information technology to facilitate peer-
to-peer transactions, 2) the use of ratings systems, 3) flexibility for workers to choose hours, and 
4) worker-provided tools and assets necessary to do the job (Telles, 2016). While helpful, these 
criteria can be criticized on the grounds of being too broad as they ignore the traditional sharing 
and market exchanges on which the on-demand economy is based. Anthropologists and 
sociologists, who emphasize its shared consumption practices, define the on-demand economy as 
a form of access-based consumption where economic transactions may be market-mediated but 
where no transfer of ownership takes place (e.g., Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012; Schor & Fitzmaurice, 
2014; Belk, 2014). In contrast, economists and management scholars, who emphasize its market-
                                                
2 A distant cousin to the on-demand economy is the sharing economy. Although there are key distinctions between 
the sharing and the on-demand economy, with the largest being that exchanges in the sharing economy are not 
economic based, the sharing economy socialized the public to sharing what were typically thought of as private 
goods such as cars and homes, which the on-demand economy then built upon (see Sundarahan, 2016; Schor, 2014; 
2019 for extensive reviews of the sharing economy). 
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based practices, view the on-demand economy as a new form of capitalism (Sundarajan, 2016) 
that heightens economic efficiencies (Horton & Zeckhauser, 2016), increases consumers’ buying 
power (Zervas, Proserpio & Byers, 2016; Cohen, Hahn, Hall, Levitt & Metcalfe, 2016), and 
improves labor conditions, often describing the work as micro-entrepreneurship (Ravenelle, 
2017). Both perspectives recognize what is innovative about the on-demand economy: that 
strangers—rather than kin and communities—exchange goods and services, and that the 
exchanges are made possible by technology. More recent work has sought to categorize the on-
demand economy based on organizational control and wages (Kalleberg & Dunn, 2017), services 
offered and clientele (Schor, 2013), and sector, size, and intended consumers (Sundarajan, 2016). 
Platforms or apps are a defining feature of the on-demand economy, serving as 
workplaces and storefronts where employers, workers, and customers connect. These apps 
enable short-term employment contracts, or gigs, ranging in length from minutes to months. 
Across apps there is a wide range of tasks, so that workers can build a “task portfolio” based on 
their resources, availability, and skills. A lower-skilled worker without a car, for example, could 
dog walk, copy-edit, or mystery shop all within a single day. Within an app, task variety 
fluctuates, with platforms providing extremely (e.g., mystery shopping on Gigwalk), moderately 
(e.g., household tasks on TaskRabbit), or minimally varied work (e.g., driving on Via). Pay rates 
can be set by the employer (e.g, HourlyNerd) or the on-demand organization (e.g., Lyft). 
Performance is evaluated through customer ratings. Some platforms require minimum rating for 
continued access (e.g., Uber) while in other platforms prior customer ratings serve as a 
reputation system signaling work quality that can be used by future clients (e.g., Upwork). 
Shifting evaluations from managers to customers places even more pressure on worker-customer 
interactions. Workers may feel pressured to make all interactions, even one-time, 30-second 
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interactions, an “experience,” increasing emotional labor (Hoschild, 1983; Van Maneen & 
Kunda, 1998; Liedner, 1996). While customer ratings have always influenced service workers’ 
performance evaluations, sometimes disproportionally (McCammon & Griffon, 2000), final 
authority has rested in the hands of managers who provided some protections, legal and/or 
otherwise, for workers.  
 
How the On-Demand Economy Affects Consumers, Workers, and Communities 
 
Over 90% of Americans have heard of the on-demand economy (Pew Research, 2019) 
and a 2016 study showed that over 70% of adults in the US had purchased on-demand goods or 
services (Smith, 2016a). An important line of recent research, crossing information sciences, 
media studies, economics, and sociology, examines the behavior of these consumers. A number 
of factors motivate consumers to participate in the on-demand economy, including the enjoyment 
of sharing (Hamari, Sjoklint, & Ukkonen, 2016), economic gain (Eckhardt & Bardhi, 2015), 
lifestyle improvement (Catulli, Lindley, Reed, Green & Hyseni, 2013), cost saving (Neoh, 
Chipulu, & Marshall, 2015), community belonging, (Milanova & Mass, 2017), novelty 
(Milanova & Mass, 2017), and familiarity, utility, and trust (Mohlmann, 2015). Many studies 
have found that even in the context of the same service, for example, car sharing (Akbar et al., 
2016; Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012; Benkler, 2004; Hellwig et al., 2015; Lamberton & Rose, 2012; 
Mohlmann, 2015; Meijkamp, 1998), the motives for using the on-demand economy seem to 
vary. These mixed motivations, as well as rotating sets of platform companies, may explain the 
fickle consumer behavior that is typical in the on-demand economy. Compared to consumers of 
traditional products, they have less brand loyalty and are more likely to jump between platforms 
(Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012). The on-demand economy is often portrayed as a buyer’s market, yet 
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consumers still face discrimination as workers sometimes prefer certain assignments (e.g., Nsoko 
& Tadelis, 2015; Zhang & Wang, 2016) or prioritize work for those in majority racial groups 
(e.g., Ge, MacKenzie, Knittel & Zopef, 2016; Edelman, Luca, & Svirsky, 2017). 
Another line of inquiry looks at the experiences, motivations, and behaviors of workers, 
ultimately offering critiques on whether on-demand work is good or bad. While estimates of the 
number of on-demand workers vary, recent reports suggest a range between 0.4% and 0.8% of 
the US workforce (Harris & Krueger, 2015; Katz & Krueger, 2016; 2019), which represents 
between 650,000 and 1 million workers in the United States.3 Although a relatively small part of 
the overall US workforce, participation in on-demand work has increased more than 300% in 
less than five years (Farrell & Greig, 2016), and venture capital funding for these types of 
businesses has increased fivefold (Hartnett, 2017; Manning, 2017). Given that workers may 
juggle multiple work-assignments across apps alongside traditional employment, labels such as 
“full-time” or “part-time” have become less meaningful. Workers are increasingly dependent on 
income from on-demand employment, and some estimates suggest that as many as 40% of on-
demand workers depend on these wages to meet basic needs (Farrell & Greig, 2016; Schor et al., 
2017). 
The on-demand workforce is constantly in flux and thus it is challenging to present an 
accurate portrait of the “average” on-demand worker. Media exposés, survey polls, and research-
based consulting reports do provide insights, however, and popular press and survey polls have 
highlighted that on-demand workers value autonomy, flexibility, and task variety (e.g., Smith, 
2016b; MBO Associates, 2016; Kelly Report, 2015). Qualitative studies provide further insights 
about workers’ motivations. Manyika and colleagues (2016) propose a four-part typology of on-
                                                
3 Survey polls are more generous, suggesting that in the mid-2000s, between eight and 28% of the US population 
earned income in the on-demand economy, and up to 30 million adults worldwide (Smith, 2016b; Manyika et al.; 
2016; MBO Associates, 2016). 
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demand workers: free agents (who prefer and rely on on-demand work as primary income), 
casual earners (who do not rely on on-demand work as primary income), reluctants (who work 
full-time in the on-demand economy yet would prefer traditional employment), and the 
financially strapped (who do on-demand work out of necessity). Avery and colleagues (2016) 
developed a similar typology that distinguishes between those who choose on-demand work 
based on values (e.g., autonomy), life history (e.g., criminal background and unable to find 
traditional employment), and career objectives (e.g., entrepreneurs who are using platform to 
launch their own venture). Looking across domestic and international surveys, white-collar 
workers and those in the Global North (e.g., Smith, 2016b; MBO Associates, 2016; Kelly 
Report, 2015) tend to report higher levels of satisfaction than blue-collar workers and those in 
the Global South (e.g., George & Chattopadhyay, 2015; Kuek et al., 2015). As expected, those 
who enter the on-demand economy by choice, regardless of number of hours worked, report 
higher levels of job satisfaction (Manyika et al., 2016; Smith, 2016b). Correspondingly, 
Rockmann and Ballinger (2017) find that when individual needs (e.g., autonomy) are met, 
workers are more likely to experience intrinsic motivation and identify with the organization. In 
contrast, those who are unable to meet basic needs through platform-work report more stress and 
uncertainty (Schor et al., 2017). 
Yet another line of inquiry considers how the on-demand economy affects labor and 
working conditions. Some researchers concur with popular discourse and marketing materials 
and highlight the positive aspects of this work, noting the increases in employment opportunities 
(Azevedo, 2016), the possibility for flexible hours (Sherk, 2016), the formalization of informal 
labor (Mahesh, 2014), and the potential for greater inclusion of those with disabilities (Avery et 
al., 2016). Others have shown that in spite of the discourse of open access and equality of 
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opportunity, patterns of bias, discrimination, and inequality remain (Schor et al., 2016). Unstable 
work schedules (Hodson, 2014), opacity about job requirements and pay (Martin, O’Neill, 
Gupta, & Hanrahan, 2016), invisibility (Irani & Silberman, 2016), minimal access to benefits 
(Cato & Rosenblat, 2017), and confusion around taxes (Donovan, Bradley, & Shimabukro, 2016) 
heighten the power asymmetry between organizations and workers. Workers must be radically 
responsible (Fleming, 2017), bearing the cost of their own labor investment. Furthermore, on-
demand workers are not protected by national labor laws, such as the Fair Labor Acts and 
National Labor Relations Act (Donovan et al., 2016), leading to additional opportunities for 
racial and gender biases and discrimination (e.g., Hannak et al., 2017). Ultimately, it is unwise to 
label the on-demand economy as good or bad as it produces both good (e.g., stable) and bad 
(e.g., exploitive) jobs (Kalleberg & Dunn, 2016). It does, however, remain clear that even in such 
a decentralized working context organizations retain significant control over work processes and 
worker behavior. 
Similarly, there is ongoing debate about the broader implications of the on-demand 
economy on geographic-based communities. On-demand services are hypothesized to reduce 
overall consumption and environmental impact as well as increase leisure time (Jarrenpaa & 
Majchrzak, 2016), yet empirical evidence is limited, with the majority of evidence from studies 
in the ride-hailing industry. The introduction of ride-hailing platforms within a city is associated 
with more successful entrepreneurship (Burtch, Carnahan & Greenwood, 2017), lower 
incidences of rape (Park, Kim, & Lee; 2016), and a reduction of alcohol-related homicide 
(Greenwood & Wattal, 2017). In a study of ride-hailing riders and drivers, Dillahunt and 
colleagues find that driving facilitates the accumulation of economic, social, and cultural capital 
for riders living in neighborhoods with low SES (Dillahunt, 2014; Kameswaran, Cameron, & 
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Dillahunt, 2017). On the other hand, the ride-hailing industry depresses the wages of taxi drivers 
(Morris, 2017) and is also associated with an increase in road congestion (Fitzsimmons & Hu, 
2017) and traffic accidents (Emeterio, 2016). 
 
Unexplored Questions about On-Demand Work 
 
 Taking into account the previous points, studying the on-demand economy raises the 
following questions. From the production work lens, questions arise about how work is being 
structured, controlled, and coordinated in light of new technologies. From the service work lens, 
questions arise about how workers will experience and navigate these new technology control 
structures, especially as they place more power in the hands of customers. In the next section I 
will explore the technology that enables coordination in on-demand work, algorithms, with a 
focus of how algorithms may affect work and workers.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Perspectives on Algorithms Across the Social Sciences 
 
Though algorithms have become more and more integrated into the human resource 
cycles, the theoretical work in the corresponding literature has struggled to keep pace. In part, 
this is due to the many ways algorithms can be 1) integrated throughout the human resources 
cycle (hiring, evaluation, firing) and 2) studied across levels, below and above the application 
programming interface (API). The API specifies the computer program’s  “rules of engagement” 
providing instructions of how the algorithm is to communicate to users through a common 
language. Existing research on algorithms in the workplace focuses on the two ends of the 
human resource cycle, hiring and firing, and the two extremes of the API, back-end coders and 
individual experience decontextualized of algorithms. This research aims to address this dual gap 
by focusing on the “messy middle” of the execution of the work itself, exploring how workers 
experience actually working with an algorithm. Not only is this an underexplored area of 
research, but it also offers important insights about how perceptions, or the social construction of 
technology, affect work practices and organizations. In this section, I first cover how algorithms 
are explored from a number of different perspectives in the social sciences before reviewing how 
algorithms have been studied in workplace contexts. I conclude with unexplored questions of 
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The Conceptual Landscape: Theoretical Perspective on Algorithms 
 
To begin I provide a definition of the word algorithm as it has been widely used by both 
academics and the popular press. The Oxford dictionary defines an algorithm as a “process or a 
set of rules to be followed in calculations or other problem-solving operations, especially by a 
computer.” Similarly, Gillespie (2014:167), a communication scholar, defines an algorithm as 
“transforming input data into a desired output, based on specified calculations.” Reflecting the 
roots of the algorithm in the mathematical and physical sciences, both of these definitions view 
the algorithm as an organized and finite set of instructions that can be followed to solve a 
problem (Chabert & Barbin, 1999).4 These logic steps of the algorithm are all observable and, 
once identified, can be verified and reproduced by others. A computer hacker working at the 
National Security Agency in 2019, a lab manager setting a budget in 1980, a university 
mathematician working on a proof in 1940, and a doctor establishing treatment procedures in 
1890 might have all claimed, correctly, to be working on algorithms. However, when applied to 
social phenomena, this definition of the algorithm is lacking as the logic steps between entities is 
not as easily defined. Social science is based on probability or estimated co-occurrence of 
relationships between individuals, their psychological states and social practices. This limits the 
understanding and the interpretability of algorithms and their intended effects due to their 
opacity. 
First, algorithms are designed and maintained by organizations, specifically data 
scientists, who code the algorithm and often have proprietary knowledge of that code and what it 
                                                
4 The term algorithm was initially defined and named after eighth-century Persian mathematician Muhammad ibn 
Musa al-Khwarizmi. The concept of algorithms and symbolic logic were further developed by the 17th-century 
mathematician Gottfried Leibniz, who designed the first calculating machine, and later by mathematicians George 
Boole, Charles Babbage, and Ada Lovelace. It was not until the Allied and Cold War defense strategists that 
symbolic logic and programming acquired great practical purpose. See Brezina (2006), Chabert & Barbin (1999), 
and Dourish (2016) for a more detailed history on algorithms. 
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is supposed to do. A form of intellectual property, this opacity is intentional corporate secrecy 
limiting how much those outside the organization can understand about the algorithm itself 
(Burrell, 2016). Yelp, for example, not only hides how its algorithms decide what to filter, but 
also the fact there is a review-filtering algorithm at all (Eslami et al., 2019). A second level of 
opacity stems from the capacity to write (and read) code. The design of algorithms is a 
specialized skill that is inaccessible to the majority of the population; thus, even if code became 
public, it would be uninterpretable. The closed nature of these algorithms raises questions about 
the degree to which algorithms are indeed fair and efficient. Emerging research suggests that 
algorithm-based pricing mechanisms disproportionately benefit early adopters in the industry and 
the organization as opposed to the workers (e.g., Chen, Mislove, & Wilson, 2015b).  
Further heightening opacity is that algorithms take into consideration many shifting 
environmental inputs, further limiting the interpretability of the algorithm. In a study of music 
recommendation systems, Seavers (2014, 2017) demonstrates there is rarely one algorithm that 
results in, say, a particular song playing on Pandora, as results are personalized based on a 
“technological ecology” of interlocking inputs from advertising networks, users, and moderators. 
In another example, geography interacts with pricing algorithms. Consumers on on-demand 
platforms, such as GigWalker and TaskRabbit, pay higher rates to complete tasks in areas that 
are less dense or of lower socio-economic status (Thebault-Spiekier, Terveen, & Hecht, 2015; 
2017). 
Even seemingly objective algorithms—such as search algorithms, performance ratings, 
and resumés—are prone to human biases. In a field test of how an algorithm promoted job 
opportunities in the STEM field, Lambrecht & Tucker (2019) found that the ad was shown 
disproportionally to men although the ad was gender-neutral. This study suggests that simply 
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optimizing cost-effectiveness in ad delivery will deliver ads that were intended to be gender-
neutral in an apparently discriminatory way, as women are a prized demographic and more 
expensive to show ads to.5 Likewise, Google images for some careers support gender 
underrepresentation (i.e., although 56% of authors are women, only 25% of the images are of 
women) and gender stereotypes (e.g., a woman construction worker being shown in a bikini 
posed over a jackhammer), which influence unconscious bias (Kay, Matuszek & Munson, 2015). 
These examples show how algorithms in practice can produce an output independent of and 
regardless of its intent. More directly linked to employment, women and minorities are given 
lower ratings by clients on online labor markets (Chan & Wang, 2017; Hannack et al., 2017; 
Luca & Zervas, 2016), which affects their placement in search results. Taken together these 
studies suggest a technical illiteracy, both on behalf of the general public, which cannot decipher 
code, and even programmers, who cannot possibly know all of the output of a given algorithmic 
sequence. 
Lastly, and perhaps more fundamentally, behavior is challenging to model as human 
behaviors and the organizations they design are not perfectly rational (March & Simon, 1958). In 
other words, their behaviors cannot be composed of discrete components in which the 
relationship can be easily specified. Take, for example, an algorithm determining whether to 
offer a loan through computing a score based on variables such as race, gender, whether the 
person owns a home or rents, income, earnings potential, and credit history. The algorithm is 
making a prediction based on a certain set of items that were (likely) true at one moment in time. 
                                                
5 In another example of algorithms not being able to program away bias regardless of the programmer’s intent, in 
2015, Google apologized for its image AI for categorizing images of black people as monkeys or chimpanzees 
(Alcine, 2015). As of 2018, Google had not “fixed” the algorithm, instead restricting the algorithm from identifying 
monkeys, chimpanzees, and black people at all—i.e., a search on black women will return images of women 
wearing black and white clothes, but not sorted on race (Vincent, 2018). Similar fixes have been reported at Amazon 
(Marr, 2019) and Xerox (O’Neil, 2016). 
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While the code could be run again with the same input and (likely) the same outcome, there is, of 
course, a gap between the actual variable, what can be measured about the variable of interest, 
and what is actually programmed. Even when algorithms learn, such as in machine learning, 
there is still a probabilistic reasoning on what would occur between the given inputs and outputs 
(Burrell, 2016; O’Neil, 2016). This opacity arises from the characteristics of the algorithm itself 
and is inherent in the way algorithms operate.  
Given these endemic challenges in examining algorithms in relation to social phenomena, 
social science disciplines have developed their own definitions of algorithms to apply to their 
research settings. (See Table 3-1 for an overview.) Economists’ view of algorithms are most 
closely aligned with definitions in the mathematical and physical sciences, seeing algorithms as 
an equilibrium mechanism to forecast demand (Cohen, 2016), set prices (Borg, Candogan, 
Chayes, Lobel, & Nazerzadah, 2014), optimize capacity rates (Matsubara & Kagifuku, 2016), 
and eliminate discrimination (Horton & Zeckhauser 2016; Schweitzer & Cachon, 2000). Legal 
scholarship examines algorithms in relation to transparency and employment. Legal 
technologists suggest ways that algorithms and platforms can improve legal processes, such as 
calculating income-variable fines (O’Neill & Prescott, 2019), combatting police discrimination 
(Goel, Perelman, Shroff, Sklansky, 2018), identifying tenants at risk of landlord harassment 
(Johnson et al., 2019), and providing information for individuals to resolve their disputes in the 
local courts (Prescott, 2017). Employment law debates whether algorithms are merely 
monitoring or coordinating work or are controlling work and substituting for managers and, if 
the latter, determining if workers are properly classified as independent contractors (Cato & 
Rosenblat, 2016; Dubal, 2017b; Harris & Krueger, 2015). Information sciences, communications 
and media studies, and organizational studies have more seriously considered social practices 
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surrounding algorithms. As a whole the information sciences, which has both more 
computational (economic, computer science) and relational (human-computer interaction, user 
design) subdisciplines, broadly tries to identify how technology can improve efficiencies both in 
markets, code, and for workers (e.g., Chen & Wilson, 2017; Dillahunt, Kameswaran, Li & 
Rosenblat, 2017; Kameswaran, Cameron, & Dillahunt, 2018; Wei, Wang, Wo, Liu, & Xu, 2016).  
In contrast, communication studies focus on how algorithms are being used in cultural and 
communication practices. One line of study looks at folk tales or stories individuals make up 
about the algorithms (DeVito, Hancock, French & Liu, 2018; DeVito et al., 2018; French & 
Hancock, 2017), while another describes how online forums can facilitate information sharing 
and informational arbitrage (e.g., Irani & Silberman, 2016; Rosenblat & Stark, 2016). Lastly, 
psychological studies focus on the conditions necessary for people to trust decisions made by an 
algorithm (e.g., Eslami et al., 2018; Jugo, 2019). Compared to the other social science 
disciplines, research on algorithms in organizational science is less developed, primarily focused 
on algorithms as reputation systems (e.g., Curchod et al., 2019; Rahm, 2019) with more recent 
work looking at how algorithms affect employment processes.6 
 
                                                
6 While a complete discussion of the relationship between technology, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and 
algorithms are beyond the scope of this dissertation, I would like to offer some distinctions. Technology is an 
umbrella term and includes medical systems (Barley, 1986), cameras (Sewell, Barker & Nyberg; 2012), 
smartphones (Mazmanian, Orkilowski & Yates, 2013), and software (Anthony, 2018). Thus, while a specific 
technology might include an algorithm, an algorithm is not necessarily in all technology. For example, a surveillance 
camera viewed by a security guard would not involve an algorithm, but a surveillance camera whose output is fed to 
an algorithm for screening any suspicious events would be an example of algorithms being integrated in the work 
process. Algorithms vary in their complexity, performing everything from simple calculations to forecasting budgets 
(Mazmanian, Beckman & Harmon 2017) to high-frequency trading (Yadav, 2015). Both machine learning and 
artificial intelligence (AI) signify more complex processes. Artificial intelligence is the broader concept of machines 
being able to carry out tasks in a way that we would consider as smarter or more efficient than humans. Most AI-
developments are applied, such as to sell stocks, as opposed to general “readiness” to handle any task. Machine 
learning, which is mostly closely aligned with the latter, is a current application of AI based on the idea that by 
giving machines access to data they can learn for themselves. An example is giving an algorithm a number of faces 
to discern sexual orientation (Wang & Kosinski, 2018) or criminality (O’Neill, 2019). See Brynjolfsson & McAffee 
(2014) for a more detailed review. 
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The Empirical Landscape: Review of Algorithms in the Workplace 
 
Algorithms in Hiring, Scheduling, and Firing. Recognizing that algorithms, as they relate to 
social phenomena, are inherently opaque and based on probability, I go on to explore the 
consequences of algorithms throughout the human resources cycle with a focus on selection, 
assigning and assessing work, and firing. From the organization’s perspective, algorithms can be 
embedded in all three stages of the hiring process: planning for what skills to hire, searching for 
potential employees, and screening and evaluation of candidates’ skills.7 Shifts in technology 
mean that jobs are continually being redesigned making it more challenging for employers to 
identify suitable candidates. Using data about the tasks that compose these news jobs, Dewitt 
(2019) shows that companies can advertise for jobs by identifying similarity between the new 
jobs’ tasks and tasks for already familiarl jobs. On online labor markets, such as Upwork and 
Care.com, algorithms rank workers based on skills and customer evaluations, making high-
ranked workers more visible to potential employers (Ticona & Mateescu, 2018). Automated 
hiring platforms solicit increasingly personal information from applicants (e.g., personality 
assessments for hourly workers), and in turn, the algorithms use this information to perpetuate 
human biases and cull “riskier” job-seekers (Ajunwa & Greene, 2019). Consequently, those 
being evaluated by hiring algorithms report the hiring process as lacking procedural justice, as it 
lacks contextual information about the applicants (Newman, Fast, & Harmon, 2019). Further, 
hiring algorithms are prone to gender and racial bias. Textio, a platform that screens for gender-
hostile language in job advertisements, was launched after a series of complaints about the 
gender and racial biases encoded within hiring algorithms and platforms (EEOC, 2007). 
                                                
7 For job seekers another part of the process is job searching or the act of looking for employment/work. This, too, 
can be influenced by algorithms, such as the types of jobs advertised to seekers (Kay, Matuszek & Munson, 2015; 
Lambrecht & Tucker, 2019). 
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Increasingly, retail and other service workers are subject to predictive scheduling—being told 
when to show up for work based on algorithms that are optimizing on traffic, weather patterns, 
and consumer demand, among other factors (Ho & Vaughn, 2012; Hodson, 2014; O’Neil, 2016). 
Workers have complained that these algorithmically-derived schedules can be inhumane, 
spreading shifts too far apart so workers cannot work enough hours to make a living or bunching 
the shifts too close together, not leaving enough time to rest in-between (Kantor, 2014; 
Greenhouse, 2015). 
A related line of research examines how algorithms can coordinate on-demand workers 
into computationally-created teams of crowd experts (e.g., Retelny et al., 2014). By encoding the 
crowd’s division of labor into de-individualized roles and continually reassembling these 
structures, flash organizing allows for the development of complicated open-ended and complex 
products, including product design, online course development, software development, and game 
production (e.g., Valentine et al., 2017). 
Algorithms also measure and monitor work to evaluate performance, comparing work 
output to a benchmark that, if not met, leads to termination. Dubbed “replacement algorithms,” 
these computations quickly identify low-accuracy workers (Ramesh et al., 2012). Documents 
from Amazon warehouses detail hundreds of firings: “Amazon's system tracks the rates of each 
individual associate's productivity and automatically generates any warnings or terminations 
regarding quality or productivity without input from supervisors” (Lecher, 2019). A quantifiable, 
objective, and publicly available measure of reputation, ratings are a proxy for performance. 
Scholars have argued that public ratings allow for market transactions to be more efficient as 
employers can quickly assess prior work performance, which can serve as a “shadow of the 
future” (Heide & Miner, 1992; Resnick, Zeckhauder, Kuwabara & Friedman, 2000).  In online 
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labor markets, such as Upwork, client ratings are vital and often the primary criterion for hiring 
decisions, serving as a signal of work quality (Gao, Liu, Li & Fang, 2016). These ratings are 
particularly crucial for being selected for assignments that are outside workers’ primary skill set 
(Leung, 2014). Similarly, in the context of web journalism, Chrétien (2018) found that managers 
make significant decisions based on metrics or “web clicks.” In closed labor markets, such as 
Uber and Lyft, ratings serve as an evaluation of work quality, but do not influence future hiring 
decisions, as workers are assigned tasks automatically by algorithms (Rosenblat, 2018). A small 
and growing stream of research highlights how the algorithms governing reputational ratings can 
also lead to systematic discrimination, inflation, and other drawbacks that threaten to challenge 
the effectiveness of rating systems and digital platforms (Cato & Rosenblat, 2017; Horton & 
Golden, 2015; Luca & Zervas 2016; Rahm, 2019). For example, Hannak and colleagues (2017) 
found that algorithms used for workers on TaskRabbit and Fiverr consistently display minorities 
(women, black, and Asians) lower than whites in search results, making it less likely that they 
would be selected for assignments.  
 
Algorithms Embedded in Work. How humans and algorithms interact in the context of work is 
relatively unexplored, leaving open questions about how workers interpret and respond to the 
algorithm. I begin with an assumption and a definition. First, I use the term algorithmic not in the 
mathematical sense, but instead as a set of logic steps, typically encoded in software code, based 
on a set of variables that are set to maximize a predictive outcome. Thus, algorithms are in 
themselves not fixed entities but probability equations suggesting an outcome. Second, I limit 
my interest in algorithms to how they shape social interactions within the workplace relating to 
the actual doing of the work. Thus, I define algorithmic work as a set of job-related activities 
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that are structured by algorithms which are, in turn, a set of logic steps, typically written in 
software code, that are set to maximize a predictive outcome. 
The information sciences and communications disciplines have done the most research to 
begin to explore the concept of algorithmic work. These scholars have explored workers’ 
complex emotions in response to the algorithms, generally drawing the conclusion that the 
algorithms are an exploitative agent that workers counter and manipulate. In one of the first case 
studies, Lee et al. (2015) explore how drivers counter an algorithm’s nudges by declining less 
profitable work or hiding “in plain sight” so the algorithm will not assign them work, but they 
can earn a guaranteed hourly wage. Other information studies explore how workers use online 
forms to perform information arbitrage by workers sharing information about how to “outsmart” 
the algorithms. Workers on the MTurk platform, for example, can use the TurkOptican forum to 
share complaints about assignments that are insufficiently compensated for their time/effort, or 
not paid at all (Irani & Silberman, 2016). Similarly, driver forums allow drivers to share 
information about high-demand areas, changes in pay structures, and how to navigate remote 
support (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016; Rosenblat, 2018). Studying an online food delivery company, 
Shapiro (2018) finds workers becoming disgruntled by falling wages and exiting for other work. 
A common theme across this research is that algorithms systematically exacerbate the power 
asymmetry between organization and workers, and disadvantages workers, such that “the 
wealthy and informed get the edge, and the poor are more likely to lose out (O’Neil, 2016:114). 
More broadly, psychologists have explored how workers interpret and respond to 
algorithms. Interactions with technology and humans is a different psychological experience, 
even when the tasks and objectives are the same, as they experience less social evaluation 
concerns when interacting with technology (Raveendhran & Fast, 2019b). Individuals generally 
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agree that algorithms make more accurate, objective, and quicker decisions than humans (Logg, 
Minson, & Moore, 2019a), especially for more mechanical tasks such as predicting when 
machinery will malfunction (Lee, 2018). However, individuals tend to lose trust in algorithms 
when they see they make an error, even if overall they are more accurate than humans (Dietvorst, 
Simmons & Massey, 2015). This aversion is only overcome if individuals are given some ability 
to modify, even slightly, the algorithm (Dietvorst, Simmons, & Massey, 2016). While humans 
are averse to algorithms making subjective (Lee, 2018) or ethical/moral decisions (Jago, 2019) as 
they lack a human mind (Bigman & Gray, 2018), recent advancements help make people more 
comfortable trusting algorithms. Anthropomorphizing algorithms—such as naming a search 
algorithm “Siri,” “Alexa,” or “Ask Jeeves”—increases humans’ ability to rapidly build trust in 
algorithm-based services, such as autonomous cars (Waytz, Heafner & Epley, 2014), smart home 
assistants (Benlian, Klumpe & Hinz, 2019), or avatars (Lucas, Gratch, King & Morency, 
2014). Yet this trust comes at a cost as the rise of products and services built around algorithms 
make privacy more vulnerable (Fast & Jago, 2019). Fast & Jago (2019) suggest that diffusion 
and convenience of algorithms erode people’s capacity and psychological motivation to take 
meaningful action against algorithms, as they are rationalizing their potential harm and believe 
privacy loss is inevitibile. And, in some cases, individuals may prefer to interact with an 
algorithm than a person, due to the perceived lack of social judgement and anonymity (e.g., 
Raveendran & Fast, 2019b). 
 
Unexplored Questions about Algorithmic Work 
 
Overall, this literature reveals many exciting unexplored questions about the algorithmic 
work at varying levels of analysis. The two major sub-questions are: Where in the organizational 
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structure are we studying algorithms? And with whom are the algorithms interacting? Let us 
address the second question as it has insights for the first. Similar to the customer service triangle 
in the service workplace (Liedner, 1996, 1999; Lopez 2010), the algorithmic workplace has 
various constituents or users—managers, data scientists, employees/workers, customers, and 
consumers—that interact with the algorithms. One helpful way to categorize these workers is if 
they interact with the algorithm above or below the application programming interface or API. 
The API specifies the computer program’s “rules of engagement” with those on the back-end 
designing, programming, and directly modifying the algorithms. Front-end users interact with the 
output of, respond to, and may indirectly modify the algorithms. This rich web of interactions 
illustrates how a wide variety of users think about and respond to algorithms and how this 
influences other levels and processes in the triangle. (See Figure 3-1.) Some of the questions to 
be explored in the dissertation and in future research are described below.   
Worker ←→ Algorithm. How do workers interact with and communicate with the 
algorithm and vice versa. How do these interactions matter? What are the psychological 
and behavioral outcomes of working with algorithms? How does the algorithm 
communicate with workers and how does it modify itself based on these interactions? Do 
workers see the algorithms as a contract, suggestion, or a promise? What are the 
consequences if the algorithm breaks the agreement? 
Customer ←→ Algorithm. How can customers interact with and communicate 
with the algorithm and vice versa? How do these interactions matter? What are the 
psychological and behavioral outcomes of interacting with algorithms? How does the 
algorithm communicate with customers and how does it modify itself based on these 
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interactions? Do customers see the algorithms as a contract, suggestion, or a promise? 
What are the consequences if the algorithm breaks the agreement?  
 
Organization ←→ Algorithm. How are algorithms designed, modified, and 
monitored? Does having access to the code matter for organizational managers? How are 
managerial suggestions about the algorithms encoded by programmers and interpreted by 
data scientists? Does the organization see the algorithms as a contract, suggestion, or a 
promise? What are the consequences to the organization if the algorithm breaks the 
agreement? 
Algorithmic Work Triangle System Dynamics. How is power and control 
exercised in this four-way interaction? How do customers affect the organization and/or 
workers via the algorithm, or vice versa? How do the algorithms communicate with the 
different constituents? How do different users interpret the algorithms? What happens 
when these interpretations differ? 
This dissertation takes on several of these challenging questions, focusing on the human-
algorithm interactions in the “messy middle,” or the execution of work. I explore these questions 
in the ride-hailing industry, a context where work is coordinated completely by algorithms, using 
qualitative methods that are the most well-suited to emerging phenomena and theory-building in 
nascent literatures. In the next section, I detail my research setting and data collection methods in 
greater detail.  
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Figure 3-1: Algorithmic Work Triangle 
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 Table 3-1: Perspectives on Algorithms and Work  
in the Social Sciences 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The Ride-hailing Industry: Research Settings, Design, and Methods 
 
As of 2019, at the publication of this dissertation, ride-hailing services were available in 
more than 170 countries. The industry includes companies that are both global (e.g., Uber, Lyft, 
Via) and regional (e.g., Kareem in the Middle East, Didi in China, Juno in New York City) in 
scope. In this section, I provide a brief overview of the ride-hailing industry, focusing on the four 
largest companies in the United States: Uber, Lyft, Via, and Juno. 
The early ride-hailing industry arose from the sharing economy, an economy where 
goods or services are shared among a group of users (Sundarajan, 2016). Precursors to the ride-
hailing industry include Zipcar, a car sharing service founded in 2000, and BlahBlah car, an 
online marketplace for carpooling founded in 2006.8 Advances in smartphone technology 
enabled the rise of app services, such as Taximagic, an app-based service for hailing taxis 
founded 2008). Uber, then called Ubercab, was incorporated in 2009 and launched in May 2010, 
offering luxury sedan services in San Francisco at 1.5 times the price of a cab. As of mid 2019, 
Uber was in over 600 cities in 60 countries and began offering lower-cost services with economy 
cars, Uber X (Iqbal, 2019). In the same year Via, a shared ride service where multiple riders 
share the same car, launched with the two largest companies, Uber and Lyft, quickly following 
                                                
8 In contrast to Uber, Lyft, Juno, and Via which are on-demand access platforms, BlahBlah is a true sharing platform 
with a community-based ridesharing model. Other variants of the shared car model include Zimride, a service where 
an organization-sponsored ridesharing platform. See Acquier, Daudigeous, and Pinkse (2017), Schor (2013), and 
Sundarajan (2016) for further theoretical and empirical distinctions between platform types. It is due to these 
distinctions that I refer to Uber, Lyft and other companies as ride-hailing companies as opposed to ridesharing. 
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suit offering shared rides. As part of a strategy to attract and retain workers, Juno launched in 
New York City in 2016 taking smaller commissions and offering drivers equity. Over the years 
ride-hailing companies have added additional services including, food and pet delivery, bus-like 
services with designated pick-ups and drops, and helicopter service. A 2019 study from Pew 
Research states that 97% of Americans have heard of ride hailing and 36% of have taken a ride -- 
more than double from 2015 - and as of 2018 there were around 830,000 drivers in the US 
(Jiang, 2019). 
Since inception, the ride-hailing industry has faced many challenges, including 
allegations of misrepresenting workers as independent contractors (Mischel & Nicholas, 2019), 
artificially hiking customer rates (Sidiqui, 2017), deliberately shortchanging drivers’ pay 
(Scheiber, 2017), circumventing local regulations (Issac, 2017), and fostering divisive internal 
company cultures (Fowler, 2017). The most serious challenge faced during the duration of this 
study (2016-2019) was the removal of the Uber CEO after a video of him verbally harassing a 
driver went viral. This was followed by an internal review and a series of actions meant to 
promote drivers’ rights, including the institution of employee-like protections for drivers 
required by the city of New York, such as guaranteed hourly wages, which resulted in both Lyft 
and Uber starting driver caps. In spite of these challenges, both Lyft and Uber successfully went 
public in early 2019, with valuations of $24 billion and $82 billion (de la Merced & Conger, 
2019; Ungarino, 2019). 
Several factors distinguish ride-hailing companies from liveries, resulting in their 
classification and regulation as technology companies. While both ride-hailing drivers and taxi 
drivers are independent contractors, ride-hailing drivers own or lease vehicles from an approved 
third-party vendor as opposed to owning a medallion. More importantly, the app coordinates the 
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entire work process including hiring, assigning rides, setting wages, directing drivers, and 
evaluating performance. Unlike taxis, ride-hailing cars only pick up riders who request a ride and 
are matched by the app. Thus, the ride-hailing company has demographic and financial 
information about customers, leading drivers to believe that passengers are “safer” than street 
pick-ups. Lastly, ride-hailing work is even more decentralized and isolating than taxicab work as 
there are no dispatchers, taxi stands, or garages for maintenance. Further, taxicab drivers often 
are required to complete additional exams and knowledge checks (i.e., “the knowledge,” a course 
of study for prospective London drivers which consists of 320 routes). As a result, ride-hailing 
drivers typically report lower levels of occupational identity than taxi drivers (Dubal, 2017). 
Taken together, these factors lower the barrier for work entry, so that anyone with a car and 
clean driving record can begin working. In the next section, I describe the process of how drivers 
complete the employment process. 
 
The Employment Process 
Drivers complete an on-line application providing information about their vehicle (make, model, 
year) and current insurance and inspection documents. Motor vehicle, and sometimes criminal, 
background checks, are requested through a third-party, with most ride-hailing companies 
requiring a record free of moving violations in the past three years. Some platforms require 
reference checks9 or an in-person meeting with a fellow driver. Once all documents are 
approved, which can take from three days to three weeks, workers can start working. 
The organization communicates with drivers through the app. From the app, drivers can 
go “on-line” and begin work, view high-demand areas, see upcoming promotions, navigate to 
past work history (e.g., hours driven, wages). Once drivers go “online” they are matched with 
                                                
9 My mother and sisters were sent a text, “Is Lindsey a good driver?” with a J and L as possible responses.  
 
 52  
riders and given directions to the pick-up location and destination. Drivers are required to rate 
the ride before being matched with the next ride. More on this process is described in Chapter 6.  
 Customer ratings are the most visible form of performance evaluation. All platforms use 
a 5-star rating scale and drivers need to maintain a score of 4.5 or above to remain active on the 
platform, although drivers may be immediately blocked from the app after an incident. Some 
platforms also track acceleration and deceleration speeds and acceptance and cancellation rates. 
Riders may leave qualitative feedback or select feedback from a range of options (e.g., “Good 
conversationalist”). Drivers earn badges (visual icons of trophies or slogans) if they receive 
multiple items of positive feedback. Drivers can contact support via the app or through staffed 
“hub” centers, available in major cities, if they have any problems. While phone support became 
more readily available in mid-2018, most drivers report requesting support through the app. 
 Each company operates a different pay-for-performance system, however, drivers are 
generally paid a flat, pick-up fee for each ride along with a varying amount based on miles 
driven and time. Companies may also offer incentives such as hourly guarantees, increased fare 
during high-demand periods or bonuses for completing a certain number of rides in a short time 
period. Due to expenses and deprecation it is challenging to estimate drivers’ net pay. Estimates 





Given the emerging nature of on-demand work and my interest in theory development, I 
designed a multiple-sources qualitative study, spending three years in the field. I used five 
overlapping data sources, which I triangulated to bolster validity (Eisenhardt, 1989): participant 
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observation (160 hours as driver),10 conversational interviews (n = 112), semi-structured 
interviews in eleven North American cities (n = 107),11  focus groups with riders (n = 5), and 
social and print media (e.g., blogs, Reddit forums, magazines and newspapers articles). 
  
Participant Observation. To understand how algorithms were deployed and experienced, I 
participated in the ride-hailing industry as a driver and rider. From 2016 to 2019, I worked as a 
driver for several platforms in a major US city using both my personal car and rental car, the 
latter obtained through a platform-sponsored program. I varied my driving times and routes to 
widen my range of experiences. I drove the weekday morning commute, the evening bar shift, 
timed my airport runs with the international flight arrivals, visited higher and lower income 
neighborhoods, and worked major holidays, including two New Year’s Eves (the busiest day of 
the year). I also conducted mini-experiments on myself. Some days I would try to maximize my 
income by chasing surges and bonuses, while other times I purposefully ignored surges and did 
not check my earnings until the day’s end. Sometimes I manipulated the app to try and confine 
my trips to a certain area, while other times I let the app “drive” to see where I would end up. To 
gain perspective of drivers’ experience in a different area, I enlisted a research assistant to drive 
in another US city. Our ethnographic notes included reflections on: work performance, busyness, 
ratings, surge pricing and bonuses, pay, interactions with support, breakdowns, accidents, car 
care, and weather, traffic, and road conditions. I also attended several classes on defensive 
driving and my legal rights as a driver organized by a local activist group. As a rider, I kept notes 
                                                
10 [One hundred of driving hours were completed by the first author. As ride-hailing platforms restrict driving to the state where 
the car is registered, a research assistant completed the remaining hours in a different state. 
11 Geographic break-down of informant locations are as follows: 34% Ann Arbor or Detroit Michigan, 33% Washington, DC, 
33% other cities. Interviews were conducted in two phases. Sixty-one individuals were interviewed during the first phase of data 
collection, from January 2016 to November 2017. Approximately one year after the initial interview, all participants who had 
driven more than 10 hours/month over the past year (83% of all Phase 1 interviewees) were asked to complete a follow-up 
interview, of which 84% accepted. Some declined to participate because they were no longer driving, had moved, or were no 
longer interested in the study. When possible, I conducted a short exit interview. 
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of nearly all rides (n = 112) taken during the same time period. These rides were personal and 
specifically for the sake of this research as I would often spend afternoons taking rides around an 
area of town I have not visited before. Logs included information about how I hailed the ride, the 
car’s condition, app malfunctions, and overall impressions of the ride including my driver rating.  
 
Semi-Structured Interviews. I conducted two rounds of interviews with drivers, roughly a year 
apart. In my first round of data collection, I conducted 63 semi-structured interviews with drivers 
working in twenty-three North American cities and towns.12  The interview protocol began with 
grand-tour questions: “Tell me about driving?” “What’s a good day working?” “Describe a 
positive (negative) interaction you’ve had with a customer.” Roughly one year after the initial 
interview, I contacted all regular drivers13 for a follow-up of which 44 drivers (76%) were 
interviewed.14  Second-round interviews were more focused and followed up on themes that 
came up in the participant’s first interview. All interviews except one were conducted in English, 
and all interviews except two were professionally transcribed. In total, I conducted 107 
interviews with 63 drivers of which 19 (30%) were female. Fifty (70%) reported driving as their 
primary source of income and all except one reported driving to meet essential household 
expenses, such as utilities, health care, and child support. Twenty-four drivers (38%) were active 
on at least two apps, though not all participants lived in cities with multiple ride-hailing 
companies. Amount of time driving ranged from two weeks (10 rides) to seven years (18000 
                                                
12 I interviewed drivers in Ann Arbor (Michigan), Atlanta, Austin, Baltimore, Boston, Charlottesville (Virginia), Chicago, 
Denver, Detroit, Houston, Lewiston (Maine), Los Angeles, Missoula (Montana), Montreal (Quebec), New Haven (Connecticut), 
New York City, Palo Alto (California), Port Huron (Michigan), Philadelphia, Sacramento, San Francisco, Seattle, and 
Washington, DC. 
13 Using Katz and Krueger’s (2015) definition of regular driving as more than 10 hours per month, I did not contact four drivers 
for follow-up interviews. An additional participant was not contacted again as ride-hailing was now banned in their city. 
14 Of the 44 drivers who were interviewed again, four were no longer driving and so I conduced a short exit interview. The 
remaining drivers (14) declined a follow-on interview either because they were no longer driving (3) or not interested. 
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rides), with my sample averaging fourteen months driving and 1,800 trips completed with a 
4.87/5.0 rating. See Table 1 for a participant inventory. 
 
 I used several sampling approaches to ensure maximum variation and participant 
anonymity.15 I initially met roughly half my informants directly through hailing—either as part 
of my everyday life (e.g., traveling to the airport or in a different city for a conference) or 
through expeditions where I would visit an unfamiliar area of a new city and hail rides. Research 
assistants also travelled to cities to recruit potential informants. Further, to increase my 
participants’ anonymity, I would often hail rides from family and friends’ platform apps. The 
other half of my sample was recruited in-person at locations where drivers congregate (e.g., 
airport parking lots, vehicle inspection stations), online from advertisements in forums and 
discussion groups, convenience sampling (from friends and friends of friends), and snowball 
sampling. By far, snowball sampling was the least lucrative sampling technique because most 
drivers did not know other drivers.16 Whenever possible I tried to oversample on drivers who 
were female, white, or part-time to gain more minority perspectives. Though I recruited 
informants in-person, due to drivers’ variable schedules, I conducted the majority of interviews 
over the phone. Interviews ranged from 35 minutes to 2.5 hours with an average of 65 minutes. 
Lastly, I collected data across multiple cities because ride-hailing and new features (e.g., shared 
rides, deluxe rides) were introduced at varying times and places. For example, shared rides, a 
car-pooling type service that matches drivers with multiple riders traveling in the same direction, 
were first introduced in 2015 and are only available in larger cities. Interviews included cities 
                                                
15 News media have reported that riders and drivers have been blocked from the app due to taking grievances public (Issac, 2017, 
2019). 
16 Three drivers had multiple members of their household driving. I chose not to interview more than two people from the same 
household. 
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where the industry was well-established (e.g., San Francisco, Philadelphia), nascent (e.g., Ann 
Arbor, Missoula), banned (e.g., Austin, Montreal), and faced pressure from unions (e.g., New 
York City, Seattle). 
 
One important consideration is potential biases from my sampling technique. The 
majority of ride-hailing work is completed by a minority of workers. In other words, drivers who 
work the least are the majority of the population of drivers; however, the majority of rides are 
given by drivers who work the most hours. Further, unsatisfied workers are more likely to stop 
working before drivers who are satisfied. The majority on my sample was recruited while 
driving, hence my sample is skewed to drivers who driver longer hours and are more satisfied. I 
have described how my sampling affects my findings in the methods section in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
Focus Groups. To gain a deeper understanding of the riders’ experience, I conducted focus 
groups (n = 5) with heavy users (n = 27) who had regularly taken five or more rides per week 
over the past three months. Focus groups were recruited from a university subject pool and 
included students, staff, and community members. Conversations were recorded and a research 
assistant, who did not participate and sat in a side room, took notes while I led the group. 
Themes covered included trip experiences, how riders use the app, app malfunctions, and the 
rating system. 
 
Archival and Social Media. Archival materials served as useful support for triangulation (Shah & 
Corley, 2006) and included newspaper and magazine articles, social media posts, Youtube 
videos, how-to guides, blogs, forums, and company websites. Social media sources were chosen 
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by a popularity measure from Alexa, a web traffic analytics company. The most popular website, 
The RideShare Guy: Blog and Podcast For Rideshare Drivers, featured weekly posts by a 
rotating cast of drivers across North America. From these materials, I created several analytical 
aids, such as a timeline of the industry and a compilation of interviews with industry leaders. 
This was an unobtrusive form of data collection (Webb & Weick, 1979) that provided important 
information about the social, legal, and political challenges in the industry as well as additional 
perspectives on drivers’ experiences. 
 
Data Analysis 
I analyzed data using a grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2006; Locke, 2001; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990) with field observations, interviews, and forum postings as my primary data 
sources.  Chapter 5 and 6 each describe the specific analysis used for their respective findings. 
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Table 4.1: Participant Inventory 
*N Not known means either a) Driver did not know their number of rides and did not want to check their app in the interview or
b) Author forgot to ask.





















Sarah F Chicago Care Work  Y N/A Income, FT job reduced hours 12 500 - 800 N 
Jared M Seattle Service - Restaurant Y   Delivery 
 Income, multiple job holder; 
Social, drivers when bored 12 500 N 
Jamal M Ann Arbor, MI Service - Restaurant N N/A Income, fired 5 250 N 
Leo M Ann Arbor, MI 
Service -  Restaurant  
(manager/owner) N  N/A Income, in-between jobs 7 3000 Y 
Karen F Detroit 
Care Work; Social  
Security (disability) N N/A Income, pay for medications 15 1700 Y 
Jonathan M Washington, DC 
Manual Labor; Sales;  
Driver Y Taxi, Limo 
Income; Schedule Flexibility,  
illness 6 Not known Y 
Frank M Baltimore Taxi; Retail (manager) N Taxi Income, in-between jobs 18 5040 N 
Winnie F Washington, DC Security Guard Y N/A 
Income, pay for daughter's  
college 30 1500 Y 
Chapman 
M 
Detroit Manual Labor 
N N/A 
Income, laid off prior job 
18 5000 N 
Kentucky M Philadelphia Student N N/A 
Income, trying to start own  
business 1 350 N 
Polly F Philadelphia 
Retail; Care work  
(unpaid) N N/A 
Income; Schedule Flexibility 
for eldercare 12 4000 N 
Forest M Detroit 
Manual Labor; Social 
Security (disability) N Commercial 
Income, laid off, supplmenet  
social security; Boredom - get  





Income, laid off  
18 1500 Y 
Tabitha F Detroit Service - Restaurant N N/A 
Income, quit prior job because  
of boss 1 200 N 
Lillian F Baltimore 
Service - Restaurant;  
Care Work (unpaid) Y N/A 
Income, to meet unexpected  
expenses 6 
10 (not a 
typo) N 
Mary F Detroit Call Center; Retail Y N/A Income, laid off 14 1200 Y 
Ernest 
M 
Los Angeles Clerical/Office Work 
Y N/A 
Income, wanted extra money 
to spoil grandchildren  18 1000 N 
Myrtle F Boseman, MT 
Clerical/Office Work 
Y  N/A 
Income; Curiousity; Schedule  





VA Driver - Food Delivery N N/A 
Income, couldn’t find other 
job 36 N/A Y 
Joel M Detroit Sales Y Taxi  
Income, save money for  
retirement and help mom  11 5000 Y 
Jay M Washington, DC Sales N N/A Income, laid off prior work 60 4000 Y 
Chase  M Washington, DC 
Manufacturing  
(technican) Y N/A Income, no more overtime 1 25 N 
Aaron M Ann Arbor, MI Care Work; Student Y N/A 
Income, problems with prior  
boss; Schedule Flexibility with 
school  7 2000 N 
Catherin
e F Port Huron, MI Clerical/Office Work Y N/A 
Income for extra expenses;  
Boredom, likes being busy 4 300-350 N 
Seth M Washington, DC Clerical/Office Work Y N/A Income, Schedule Flexibility 24 5000 N 
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Participant Inventory 
 
*N Not known means either a) Driver did not know their number of rides and did not want to check their app in the interview or 
b) Author forgot to ask. 























Detroit Call Center; Retail - Food 
Services 
N N/A 
Income, for medication and 
'fun'; Social, meeting new 
people 18 500 Y 
Roger 
M 
Washington, DC Pilot (Contract) 
N Pilot 
Income not able to find 
enough pilot work; Schedule 
Flexibility with other work 6 1200 Y 
Sheldon 
M 
Ann Arbor, MI Driving Industry - 
Dispatcher Y Dispatcher 
Income, not enough overtime 
at other job 36 2250 Y 
Kristen F New Haven, CT 
Care Work;  Driver-Food 
Delivery N Delivery Income, lost job 9 580 Y 
Sean 
M 
San Francisco Civic 
Y N/A 
Income, extra money; 
Boredom, wanted to spend 
time productive 3 200 N 
Carlos M Baltimore 
Manufacturing  
(technican) Y N/A 
Income, no raise at curent job; 
Curiosity, new experience 4 
12 (not a 
typo) N 
Pound M Detroit Sales N N/A Income, in-between jobs 33 
18000 (not 




Service - Food Industry; 
 Student Y N/A 
Income, extra money for a  
student  0.5 
10 (not a 
typo) N 
Japan M Denver Call Center Y N/A Income, student loan/debt  14 657 Y 
Tyrone M 
Boseman, 
Montana Service - counseling Y N/A Income, multiple job holder  9 1500 Y 
Vox M 
Montreal, 
Quebec Manufacturing N N/A 
Income, couldn’t find other  
work 18 Not known 
Not an 
option 
Sebastien M Detroit Driver - Commercial  N N/A 
Income, student loan/debt  
payments 9 3000 Y 
Nancy GF San Francisco Research  Y N/A 
Income; Schedule Flexibility  




employed) Y N/A 
Income, to supplement side 
business 18 2000 Y 
Casside F Houston Clerical/Office Work Y N/A 
Income, lost job and supports  
adult daughter 60 800 N 
SueEllen 
F 
Denver  Interior Design; Care 
work (unpaid) N N/A 
Income, car payment; Social, 
meet people 6 536 N 
Charlotte F Ann Arbor, MI Care work; Student Y N/A 
Income; Schedule Flexibility,  
in school 2 70 N 
Lisa F Austin Call Center Y N/A 
Social, meet people and  get 
out of house 12 125 Y 
Maria F Boston 
Service - Retail; Service 
 - Food Industry N N/A Income, in-between jobs 24 500 Y 
Abraham M Washington, DC 
Real estate broker  
(self-employed) N N/A 
Income, not enough income  
from regular job 8 1000 N 
Zara 
F 
Washington, DC Service - trainer  (Self-
Employed) Y N/A 
Income, multiple job holder  
10 Not known N 
Jackson 
M 
Philadelphia Manual Labor 
N N/A 
Income, pays more than other 
work 20 4000 N 
Ralph M Detroit Service - Food Industry N N/A Income, in- between jobs 36 8000 Y 
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Participant Inventory 
 
*N Not known means either a) Driver did not know their number of rides and did not want to check their app in the interview or 
b) Author forgot to ask. 























Washington, DC Service - Food Industry 
N N/A 
Income; Schedule flexibility 
4 650 N 
Morris 
M 
Chicago Real estate broker (self-
employed) N N/A 
Income, left other job 
18 1700 N 
Calvin M Washington, DC 
Retail; Service -  
 trainer (self-employed) Y N/A Income, laid off 18 500 N 
Lincoln 
M 
Boston Driver - Food Delivery 
N Delivery 
Income, in-between jobs 
20 4000 N 
Albert M Boston 
Driver - Taxi;  
Manufacturing N Taxi  
Income, in-between jobs;  
Schedule Flexibility, sick child 3 2000 N 
Robert 
M 
Detroit Service - Food Industry 
N Delivery 
Income; Schedule flexibility, 
primary caretaker of children 
8 1500 N 
Kenny M Baltimore Manual Labor N Commercial Income, in-between jobs 12 Not known N 
Sam M Detroit 
Manufacturing   
(management) Y 
Works in auto 
plant 
Income, daughter's college 
fund; Social, meet people 14 1700 N 
Anton M Detroit Service - Food Industry N Delivery 
Income, could not find other  
work 18 2100 Y 
Chuck M Washington, DC Retail N Taxi  Income, in-between jobs 5 Not known Y 
Nixon M Washington, DC Sales; Service - trainer N N/A Income, laid off 10 Not known Y 
Slim M New York City Sales; Driver - Limo Y Limo  
Income; Schedule Flexibility,  
illness 30 6500 Y 
Chad M New York City Service - Food Industry N N/A Income 18 1500 Y 
Zack M New York City Sales N N/A 
Income; Schedule Flexibility, 
illness 30 4500 Y 
Laina GF 
Sacramento and 
San Francissco Office/Clerical N N/A Income, quit job 3 356 Y 
Marvin M 
San Francisco, 
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Allies or Adversaries?: 
Making Meaning of the “New” Gig Employment Relationship 
 
 
I have a double feeling about the company. It’s a great way to survive. When you 
don’t have another job, when you need to make ends meet, to put some bread on 
the table - it’s a great place to be. [Long pause.] On the other hand you make ends 
meet - not more. It will look like you earn a lot, but it’s only an impression. We 
are all miserable... we kill to pay for the car, to pay for gas, and put aside money 
for the next car because this car will be junk very soon. And hopefully there is 
some leftover money that can be used to buy bread. [Nervous laugh.] (Lincoln) 
  
 Caviar. Crowdflower. Catalant. The contemporary workplace is rapidly changing. Over 
the past decade the number of nonstandard workers has more than doubled with around 14% of 
the US workforce working as “free agents” moving between gigs. Much of this work is 
precarious with workers encountering temporary employment contracts, variable pay, and unsafe 
working environments (Kalleberg, 2009; Katz & Krueger, 2019). While emerging research has 
explored these structural changes (Curchod et al., 2019; Gray & Suri 2019; Lee et al. 2015; 
Shapiro, 2017), it has not yet explored how these changes are shaping workers’ experience and 
meaning-making, particularly in the rapidly growing on-demand economy, a labor market where 
work is always available and facilitated by digital platforms. Are workers grateful for the 
opportunity to work, or resentful at its conditions? How do these emotions affect the way they 
approach work and interact with clients, or their perspectives on the company? The “double 
feeling” that Lincoln describes highlights the complex and sometimes conflicting meanings 
workers give to the changing workplace. This paper goes beyond the dichotomy of “good job, 
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bad job” (Kalleberg, 2011) to explore how those in precarious, on-demand jobs experience and 
make meaning of their work. 
 
 Meaning making is a fundamental human endeavor (Baumeister, 1990; Brief & Nord, 
2000; Hall & Mirvis, 2004). Interpreting what work signifies and the role it plays in life has been 
encouraged by industry, business leaders, and in popular writing from the earliest days of 
capitalism to today (Hurst, 2017). Prior work has primarily considered meaning making in the 
aftermath of a trigger (Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005) or in the event of the 
work that has significance or meaningfulness (Dobrow, 2012; Bunderson & Thompson, 2009) or 
both (Maitlis, 2009; Schabram & Maitlis, 2017). Much less research examines the types of 
meaning constructed in the everyday. Several features of gig work complicate what we already 
know about meaning-making. Literature on the meaning of work has largely focused on how 
one’s values, beliefs, and attitudes can give individuals a sense of identity, purpose, and 
contribution through fostering a sense of authenticity, belonging, and self-efficacy. However, for 
many individuals, financial insecurity, often as a result of gig work, can make the economic 
value of work more manifest. Classic “strong” situations such as poverty or financial insecurity 
(Leana, Miettal & Stiehl, 2012) may crowd out the single sources of meaning typically identified 
in meaning-making studies. 
An emerging stream of research looks at the roles of others, such as managers 
and coworkers, in shaping meaning-meaning, arguing these individuals offer cues from which 
workers can then interpret (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001). Meaning 
can be constructed from managers normalizing stigmatized activities (Ashforth, Kreiner, Clark & 
Fugate, 2017), job titles (Grant, Berg & Cable 2014), professional development activities 
(Sonenshein, Dutton, Grant, Spreitzer & Sutcliffe, 2006), and connections to a broader purpose, 
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such as serving the sick (Dutton, Debebe & Wrzesniewski, 2016) or animal welfare (Schabram 
& Maitlis, 2017). Yet, a common feature of gig work is its decentralized and distributed nature—
workers are classified as independent contractors, with no long-lasting ties to the organization, 
work remotely, with little (if any) direct contact with organizational members, and are often 
assigned micro-tasks devoid of context—all of which limit the interpersonal and organizational 
cues available for meaning-making. In sum, the contemporary workplace puts into place a new 
set of previously unstudied features that may alter meaning-making processes.  
Lastly, on-demand work is a type of service work in which work is accomplished through 
interactions between workers, customers, and organizations. While the literature on the meaning 
of work has not specifically looked at this three-way dynamic, a central theme of labor process 
theory and service work literature is how workers make meaning of the service triangle. Framed 
as a dynamic contestation or struggle between workers, companies, and customers, a core 
question is whether workers experience their work as alienating or fulfilling—or, more 
accurately, to what extent workers are alienated from their work. In classic labor process theory, 
workers collude with co-workers to resist management’s exploitation by shirking, sabotaging, 
and boycotting (Roy, 1952; Burawoy, 1979; Montgomery, 1979). Customer service work entails 
that workers manage their emotional displays towards customers for the benefit of the 
organization, whether through smiling (Hochshild, 1983), being joyful (VanMaanen, 1989) or 
irritated (Sutton, 1991), which alienates them from their true emotions and ultimately their work. 
In addition, workers may be unfairly evaluated by customers (McCammon & Griffon, 2000; 
Fornell, Johnson, Anderson, Cha, & Bryant, 1996; Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry, 1988), 
which is exacerbated in online labor markets where customer ratings are the only form of 
evaluation (Curchod et al., 2019; Rosenblat & Stark 2016). Organizational routines offer some 
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protection against customers, providing workers guidelines for how to respond to inappropriate 
behavior so workers can maintain a sense of dignity and self-worth (Leidner, 1993; Sherman, 
2005; 2007). In sum, the service work literature suggests that gig work will be another work 
context that will exploit workers.  
The literature on the meaning of work and on service work leaves unanswered questions 
about meaning-construction and on-demand work. What cues are prominent in such a distributed 
work environment, and how do these cues shape workers’ attitudes, beliefs, and practices? To 
explore these questions I turn to the ride-hailing industry, the largest employer within the on-
demand economy. Ride-hailing involves three-way interactions between workers, customers, and 
the technology (app) that assigns, routes, and evaluates rides. My findings show that drivers 
make two overarching interpretations of the work—seeing it as either an alliance or as an 
adversarial relationship—based on cues from the customer and the technology. To frame my 
findings, I review literatures on the meaning of work and service work with a focus on how these 
theories may or may not apply to on-demand work. After describing my data collection and 
analysis, the findings section begins by explaining the shared beliefs and work biographies of 
drivers. I then delve into the experience of work itself, documenting three sets of practices and 
beliefs—in relation to customers, technology, and the company—that shape how drivers make 
meaning of their work. Together, the configuration of practices and beliefs converge into two 
constellations—alliance or adversarial—that describe two different modes or relationships to the 
work arrangements. Taken together, this study unpacks the workers’ experience of on-demand 
work, detailing how multiple sources of the work environment shape workers’ meaning-making 
construction. Theoretically this study makes several important contributions to the literatures on 






Making Meaning at Work 
How an individual makes meaning of work—interpreting what work signifies and the 
role it plays in their life—is a fundamental part of the human condition (Baumeister & Vohs, 
2002; Brief & Nord, 1990; Hall & Mirvis, 2004). According to Pratt and Ashforth (2003), 
meaning is the output of having made sense of something, or what it signifies; as in an individual 
interpreting what role her work plays in the context of her life. As opposed to sensemaking 
(Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014), which occurs 
only after an unexpected event or challenge, meaning-making is on-going and pervasive and, 
unlike meaningfulness (Dubrow, 2012; Bunderson & Thompson, 2013; Schabram & Maitliss, 
2018), may lack significance or importance.  
 Meaning can be constructed individually (from a person’s own values and perceptions), 
socially (from norms or shared perceptions), or both (Pratt & Ashforth, 2003). Psychologists 
have long considered the self as a primary agent or determinant of many kinds of behaviors, 
attitudes, and beliefs (Bandura, 1989; Brief & Nord, 1990; Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1961) that 
influence workers’ perceptions of the meaning of work. For example, the belief of how central 
work should be in one’s life is associated with one’s parents attitudes toward work (Dekas & 
Baker, 2014) and maps onto three ways individuals orient to work, as either a job, a career, or a 
calling (Wrzesniewski et al., 1997). Social information processing theory (Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1978) and its conceptual cousin, interpersonal sensemaking (Wrzesniewski, Dutton & Debebe, 
2003), suggest that individuals scan for, read, and interpret cues that directly and indirectly 
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inform how workers make meaning. Coworkers reinforce certain values and identities (Kahn, 
2007), such as being a caring and considerate team member (Wrzesniewski, Dutton & Debebe, 
2016), and provide opportunities for workers to express these identities. Managers guide 
organizational missions and goals in ways that influence workers’ perceptions of the meaning of 
their work (Podolny, Khurana, & Hill-Popper, 2005), even neutralizing the stigma of socially 
undesirable jobs (Ashforth, Kreiner, Clark & Fugate, 2017). Job crafting poses workers as active 
meaning creators in that they can alter the task and relational boundaries for their work 
(Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001; Tims, Bakker, Derks, 2012; 2013). Further, workers can change 
their own or others’ expectations of their behaviors (Berg, Dutton & Wrzesniewski, 2010) or 
pursue activities outside of their normal job duties (Berg, Grant & Johnson, 2010). Organizations 
also provide cultural raw materials or repertoires (Swidler, 1986) for individuals to draw upon, 
such as training opportunities that allow for the construction of self-narratives about growth 
(Sonenshein, Dutton, Grant, Spreitzer & Sutcliffe, 2006). Taken together, the meaning at work 
literature has evolved from looking at psychological to social mechanisms of meaning-making, 
such as interactions and cues with managers, co-workers, and the organization itself. 
Yet, the changing nature of work, as evidenced by an increase in remote/virtual work and 
precarious work conditions, may alter how workers construct meaning (Standing, 2011; Katz & 
Krueger, 2016, 2019). Being physically separated from managers and peers can foster extreme 
emotions (Petrigileri, Ashford & Wrzesniewski, 2018) and feelings of social isolation (Bartel, 
Wrzesniewski & Wiesenfeld, 2012), often leading many remote workers to turn to alternative 
work spaces such as coworking communities (Garrett, Spretizer & Bacervice, 2016). Other 
dimensions of the work context, such as individuals’ financial circumstances, shape how 
individuals determine the meaning of their work (DeVoe & Pfeffer, 2007; Pfeffer & DeVoe, 
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2009; Meuris & Leana, 2018). Research has shown that for those who are involuntarily 
unemployed or otherwise have inadequate incomes, the economic value of work becomes more 
salient (Brief et al., 1995; Brief & Nord, 1990; Jahoda, 1982; O’Brien, 1986) as opposed to the 
more latent value of work (e.g., self-fulfillment). In other words, workers with greater financial 
needs focus more on the economic value of work than its psychological significance. Existing 
research on meaning-making tends to identify a single source of meaning that may be crowded 
out in classic “strong” situations, such as poverty or financial insecurity (Leana, Miettal & Stiehl, 
2012). This literature suggests that elements of the changing work context, such as more remote 
work and precarious financial circumstances, may challenge meaning-making for workers. 
Looking across this literature identifies two unexplored questions. The more general 
question is, “How does meaning making occur in the everyday absence of triggers or work that is 
inherently significant?” Second, “How might theories of meaning-making be extended by 
exploring its construction in the ‘strong situation’ of a contemporary workplace with fewer social 
and organizational cues and more financial insecurity?”  To more deeply explore these questions, 
I turn to the customer service industry, the fastest-growing sector in the US and global economy, 
and its associated literature.  
 
Meaning Construction in Service Work 
 Job growth is concentrated in the fast-growing service sector, which, as of 1980, 
overtook manufacturing as the largest industry in the United States (Westcott and Bednarzik, 
1980) and is still the largest industry world-wide, constituting 80% of US GDP and 60% of the 
global GDP (World Bank, 2019). Service work is defined as value that is created collaboratively 
through the exchange of intangible resources and competencies by one party for the benefit of 
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another (Apte 2019; Vargo, Lusch, & Akaka, 2010). At the heart of service work is the triangle 
relationship between customers, workers, and organizations, dubbed the service triangle or the 
triangle of power. Two focuses of this literature are on the emotional labor of workers and the 
role of customers affecting the service triangle.  
Customers introduce a level of uncertainty into any economic exchange. Emotional 
labor—the process through which interactive service workers align their emotional displays with 
managerially imposed “organizational feeling rules”—is meant to reduce that uncertainty, in 
essence turning work into a commodified service exchange (Hochschild, 1983/2013). Flight 
attendants must “go out there and smile…. really lay it on” (Hochschild 1983: 4), Disney park 
employees are told to project an image of being “friendly, young, and educated” (Van Maneen & 
Kunda, 1989: 59), and insurance agents were dared to “develop a winning personality” (Liedner, 
1992: 104). Not forced to display only positive emotions, bill collectors are trained to convey a 
sense of urgency and irritation to debtors to induce prompt payments (Sutton, 1991) and doctors 
are taught to remain neutral even when delivering bad news to patients (Fineman, 1993). This 
acting—suppressing one’s true emotions and expressing the “appropriate” emotions toward 
customers to enhance the exchange—estranges workers from their true emotions ultimately 
alienating them from their labor (Hochschild, 1983).  
Relationships with customers can mitigate or amplify this estrangement. Customer 
relationships can be divided into two types: service and pseudo (Gutek, 1995; Bhappu & 
Schultze, 2006; Gutek & Welsh, 2000). Service relationships are characterized by the 
opportunity for repeated service exchanges between the same customer and worker with 
customers considering the worker in possessive terms such as “my doctor,” “my hairdresser,” or 
“my nanny.” Over time, these relationships become interdependent based on shared history, 
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trust, and repeated goodwill, leading to a greater sense of worker fulfillment (Gutek, 1995). In 
pseudo-relationships, customers have repeated service exchanges with a specific organization 
rather than the same provider, such as seeing doctors within an HMO or visiting a McDonald’s. 
This service design assumes that workers are functionally equivalent and interchangeable. 
Pseudo-relationships are challenging conditions for meaning-making, given that workers have 
weaker relationships with customers and the organization. Further, given that workers are seen as 
interchangeable from the organization’s viewpoint, it heightens feelings of estrangement. 
Another line of research examines power dynamics within the service triangle. Classical 
labor process theorists argue that organizations and customers always have control over workers 
leading to their estrangement from work (Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1979; Edwards, 1979). 
Taking a situationist perspective, Leidner (1994, 1996) challenges this concept arguing that 
customers can be antagonists or allies of workers and organizations based on a shifting three-way 
interest alliance. In some situations the routines of service workers or scripts serve to align the 
interests of workers and customers against the organization, making it possible for workers to 
feel better about work (Leidner, 1994). Other research suggests that organizations structure 
worker-customer relationships in a way that predisposes whether interactions with customers are 
experienced by workers as alienating or fulfilling. In organizations with a market orientation, as 
opposed to relational, workers are more likely to find the work alienating (Korczynski, 
2009). Race and class struggles are embedded within the job role, such that minority workers are 
given less visible jobs (Williams, 2006) or are subject to more extreme Taylorization (Sallaz, 








I analyzed data using a grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2006; Locke, 2001; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990) with field observations, interviews, and artifacts collected from drivers as my 
primary data sources. 
  
Stage 1: Focused Coding. Whether or not drivers enjoyed their work was evident from my first 
weeks in the field. While I tried to come into the field as a “tabula rasa” or blank slate given all 
the public media and around ride-hailing, I initially thought that most drivers did not like their 
work. Yet, in my first day of driving, I noted both positive and negative things about my day. 
Befuddled by the app, I missed my first ride, dropping my phone under the seat, but in the 
subsequent ride I received my largest tip ever ($20) and had an amazing conversation with a 
nurse who had a daughter at my alma mater. My first two interviews confirmed these different 
perspectives. Nixon complained at length about how customers disrespected him and about his 
physical pain from driving, noting several PTSD-like incidents. In contrast, Sam enthusiastically 
shared about the friendships he developed with customers—indeed he became an informant and 
he gave me several rides off the app. Three subsequent interviews with drivers offered similar 
positive feedback about the work. Thus, I followed my data, probing on the aspects of the work 
drivers did and did not enjoy, making sure to ask every participant questions such as, “Tell me 
about a positive (negative) experience with a rider?” or “What has been your best (worst) day 
working?” 
 Based on my field work, I split the interviews into two categories according to how 
drivers evaluated their work (positive/negative), but it quickly became apparent that these 
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categories were too coarse, as even people who were satisfied with the work had complaints and 
vice versa. I then tried two different coding schemes, first adding two different valence 
categories (neutral and both highly negative/highly positive) and then trying to recategorize the 
interviews on a continuum from highly negative to highly positive. Neither proved fruitful, as I 
still did not have enough theoretical leverage, being unable to find mechanisms to explain the 
difference or extrapolate and answer the question, “What is this a case of?” Thus, I stopped 
analyzing my data at the individual level and started searching for a new unit of analysis. Though 
drivers did not work in a traditional work setting, there were specific things they continually 
interacted with or frequently thought about in the course of their work activities. Thus, I decided 
to re-center my analysis around these touchpoints or salient features of the environment that were 
central to completing the work. In re-reading my fieldnotes and transcripts focusing on what 
features of the work environment were most salient, I came up with the following list: customers, 
car, app, algorithm, phone, pay, company (overall), the business model, the physical body, and 
the traffic. 
  
Stage 1: Axial Coding. In the next stage of analysis, I began axial coding and iterating between 
the data and existing theory to begin building “a dense texture of relationships” around concepts 
(Charmaz, 2006: 60). I created a spreadsheet with all touchpoints and participant comments on 
each. I removed traffic because of insufficient data, as there were fewer than two-dozen pieces of 
data as compared to hundreds for the customer touchpoint. Drawing on Straus and Corbin’s 
(2007) suggestions for early-stage coding schemas, I then coded whether each mention of a 
touchpoint was a thought, feeling, or action. By far data about the customers were richest, as they 
contained thoughts, feeling, and actions, so I began more detailed analysis comparing when 
 
 74 
references to customers also mentioned other touchpoints. From this I was able to further refine 
my analysis. Cars, for example, could be mentioned in two different ways: In the context of 
customers mentioning the car, comments were specifically about the driver’s own car or the 
objects within; however, in the context of the business model, comments were more about their 
car as a depreciating asset. Similarly, body pain was mentioned only in the context of the 
business model and the business model was only mentioned in the context of thoughts about the 
company. This analysis allowed me to condense my touchpoints to customers, technology, and 
the company. 
  
Stage 2: Theoretical Coding. In the final round of analysis, theoretical coding, I developed 
relationships between categories elicited in earlier stages in order to “weave the fractured story 
back together” (Charmaz, 2006: 63). At this point I had all of my data neatly laid out in front of 
me in a mass of index cards—the touchpoint, data for each touchpoint, and whether it was 
thoughts feeling or action. I then asked myself two questions “What is the fundamental 
assumption driving the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors relating to this touchpoint?” and “What 
is the larger story about the touchpoints?” I went back to a quote from Lincoln (which opens this 
paper) that had particularly haunted me as it highlighted the tension I was seeing in the data. “I 
have a double feeling about the company. It’s a great way to survive.… We are all miserable. We 
kill to pay for the car, to pay for gas.” After reading the quote several times, things began to 
click. This “double feeling” was why my first attempt of coding only on positive and negative 
perspectives about the work lacked analytical leverage, as workers were often feeling, thinking, 
and enacting both. And their interactions with the touchpoints showed the meaning-making 
process as workers knitted together a view of the work that was both engaging and estranging. I 
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had experienced this tension firsthand—my glee in setting my own hours and delight in engaging 
conversations with customers, and my frustration every time the app matched me with a long-
distance pick-up or annoyance every time a chatty passenger sat in the front seat uninvited. I 
went back to my data around touchpoints and coded again around positive and negative valence. 
Moving between analyzing data, drawing models, and writing memos, I further refined 
categories to better understand the mechanisms that participants credited as responsible for 
creating meaning. I mapped these mechanisms for each touchpoint and then abstracted these 
ideas to devise a theory that explains how workers construct meaning within a web of 
touchpoints in an organizationally sterile environment.  
 
Findings 
I present the empirical findings in three sections to address how workers construct 
meaning of gig work. First, I describe common experiences and beliefs among drivers. I then 
focus on the distinguishing practices and beliefs between drivers, particularly their interactions 
and interpretations of customers, technology, and the company itself. After presenting these 
findings, I present a nomological model showing how workers’ practices, beliefs, and emotions 
mutually reinforce two predominant orientations towards the work: alliance or adversarial.  
 
Shared Experiences and Beliefs 
Drivers’ shared prior job experiences and attitudes toward work. Most had prior experience in 
either production or customer service work. Drivers’ most immediate past jobs included food 
services/retail, call center work, delivery driving, and sales, and nearly one-fifth had previously 
worked in the transportation industry. Drivers described their attitude to work in general as a 
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means to an end in which they “do to get paid” (Joel) and  “don’t like doing, but it puts food on 
the table” (Sheldon)—with “the only part that I like about working are the paychecks” (Aaron).  
Drivers expressed similar experiences that brought them into ride-hailing, describing 
various push and pull factors. Shocks, such as an illness or layoff, often pushed workers into the 
industry as they needed to find alternative work quickly. “I was working with Zipcar and the 
position I had got terminated. I wanted a car and thought Uber was the perfect way to pay for 
your own car. I could work whenever I needed to while looking” (Nixon). In contrast, pull 
factors were based on lifestyle and pay preferences. Describing his calculations between his 
regular work and ride-hailing, Kenny said, “I've been really contemplating on doing it full time 
because just doing the numbers, I know I can make at least what I'm making during my eight 
hour shift.” All drivers except for one depended on driving income to pay portions of the 
household expenses. (See Table 4-1 for participant inventory of prior work held and expressed 
motivation for driving.) 
Once in the ride-hailing industry, drivers encountered similar work environments across 
companies. Driving is distributed work in that workers are physically independent from the 
company, with little, if any, direct contact with managers, co-workers, or other organizational 
members. During my three years of driving, I did not meet a single member of either company I 
drove for. Instead, information and behavioral cues were transmitted through the app via 
algorithmic nudges and notifications. In such an organizationally sterile environment, drivers 
rely on customers, their only source of direct human interaction, and their own practices to make 





 In the next section of the findings, I describe how workers behave with their main source 
of human interactions, customers, through two sets of work practices: relational and 
transactional. In relational practices, drivers define their work as customer-service oriented, 
focusing work activities and deriving meaning through developing positive rapport with 
customers. In contrast, for transaction practices, workers define their work as getting a customer 
safely to their destination focusing their efforts and deriving meaning through making each ride 
as efficient as possible. In each of these practices drivers create more or less social distance with 
customers, setting looser or tighter emotional, mental, and physical boundaries.  
  
Relational Practices 
Going Above and Beyond the Call of Duty: Building Rapport and Caring for Customers. 
Relational practices are routine rider-focused work activities that are meant to facilitate the 
customer service experience such as by providing care, building rapport, and developing positive 
relationships with customers. Before a ride begins drivers attune for cues, watching customers as 
they are walking to the car, observing for possible conversation starters, such as a Redskins 
baseball cap or Macy’s shopping bags. Sam keeps three phone chargers, water, an umbrella, two 
blankets, and gum among other snacks in his car “just in case.” (See Image 1.) 
 
I was working football last Saturday and two guys got in the car late and we were 
sitting in a traffic jam and the guy was like, “I’m dying, my God, I'm so thirsty.” I 
was like, “There's water in the back. Go grab one,” and you would have thought 
they won a pot of gold. They each had a water in their hand. And they're like, 
“God, I'm starving,” and I'm like, “Hey, here’s some summer sausage, you guys 
should eat it,” and they're like, “Oh my gosh, you're the best driver ever!” 
(Laughs.) You never know. It’s a dollar water and a dollar sausage and it made 
their day...They’re going to go back and remember me and talk about me for the 




Signaling that they genuinely care about customers’ well-being, and customers return 
affirmation that they are valued, are indicators to drivers they are doing their job well. Offering 
emotional support is another relational practice. As popularized on the HBO show, Taxicab 
Confessions, the close quarters and limited relationship length can entice riders to share intimate 
life details, with drivers stepping into the role of counselor and confidant. “You know how Dr. 
Phil does 5-minute cures. I call mine 7-minute interventions. I let people vent. Your boyfriend 
broke up with you? I tell you to find another one! I make ‘em laugh” (Karen).  In extreme 
situations, drivers may even stop working to console riders. 
A young lady in the back, she started crying. I pulled over and got out the 
flashlight. She was crying because she was a lesbian and never told anyone. Her 
sorority, sister, family, friends would kick her out—and she came out to me. I 
had no experience. I just said “There. There. It’ll be okay.” So we sat there on 
Hill (St), until she calmed down. (Aaron ) 
 
These forms of emotional relational practice are labor intensive in that drivers must 
attune to a rider’s emotions and search for the appropriate responses, which can lead to emotion, 
mental, and physical fatigue. Yet their offering of emotional support in response to a stranger’s 
distress signals drivers’ care and concern for customers.   
 Building friendship is another relational practice. Beliefs about customers—that they 
were “professional” (Kenny) and “high class people” (Jonathan)—facilitated drivers being 
friendly and open which led to cultivating relationships. Describing his overall attitude towards 
customers, Japan said, “Getting in a Lyft or Uber should always feel like you’re getting a ride by 
your cousin’s friend to the airport. Why would you try to do anything other than to make them 
feel like they’re your buddy?” In the car’s close quarters, drivers and customers swap stories and 
discover shared interests, with several drivers reporting later hanging out with customers at bars, 
casinos, and sporting events.  
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I met this girl who was also in a band and she invited me to come to one of her 
shows. I did and their band is totally kick ass. I’ve gone to five of their shows 
now, I see her at other shows and stuff. I feel like I made a buddy—I see her at 
shows all the time and we always catch up. (Jared) 
  
Discovering mutual interests and learning from one another strengthens rapport between 
drivers and customers, making work more pleasurable and meaningful. In addition to 
friendships, several drivers reported finding professional contacts (e.g., a termite inspector, a 
babysitter, a job lead) from riders and one driver even helped a customer find a summer 
internship. In sum, in relational practices, drivers cultivated rapport with customers through 
offering care, emotional support, and friendship.  
 
Crafting a Shared Experience: Using the Car to Vibe with Customers. Using the car or props 
within the car to create a shared experience is another way drivers build rapport and signal care 
to riders. The car, especially the American car, is an extension of the self and a means of 
expressing personal and/or group identity (Berger, 2001). Popular media outlets such as MTV’s 
Pimp My Ride, Lowrider Magazine, and Instagram feeds dedicated to “VanLife,” showcase 
customized cars symbolizing one’s self-expression and individualism. Within their car, drivers 
often create their own physical and social space, complete with tchotchkies and snacks for the 
customers. Music can also be a medium to create connections. I describe my interaction with a 
party car on a Friday night ride: 
 
The car was popping! Fairy lights on the floor. Tinsel garlands on the backseat. A 
globe and glow sticks on the dashboard. Top 40 music. I’d never seen anything 
like it. “It’s a party car. I do it on Friday and Saturday - it’s a hit on South campus 
[fraternity row].” Seems the car has quite a reputation. On the drive he told me 
several stories about how excited students were when they got inside and realize 




Not only are the artifacts potential conversation sparks, they are tangible signs that the driver has 
spent time, money, and effort to enhance the customer’s experience. The car becomes a talking 
point for drivers and customers to talk about their social life, music, and weekend plans.  
Music is a powerful tool for transcendence, making it possible for individuals to 
communicate across gender, race, class, national, and even language boundaries (Juslin & 
Sloboda, 2011). After noticing Jamal’s rather eclectic choice of politically conscious hip-hop 
music—including Tupcac’s “Brenda’s Having a Baby,” a song about a young girl’s rape, 
followed by her pregnancy, homelessness, and attempts at selling drugs and her body before her 
murder—I started a conversation about Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow. At the end of 
the ride, Jamal thanked me, noting his frustration at not being able to have more real 
conversation, and his appreciation for our talk, calling it “refreshing.” In a follow-on interview, I 
asked more about his music choice. 
Driving started getting easy after I figured out what music people liked to listen 
to, so we could all vibe together. Honestly, I didn’t know what white people liked 
listening to (laughs). I figured black people love Drake, so white people might 
like Drake, so I played Drake’s Views album. A lot of the black community is 
starting to wake up [become socially aware], so I’m going to play an artist that’s a 
little woke. So I play Chance the Rapper and a lot of people started vibing and 
that’s when I really started getting more comfortable.... [My favorite thing about 
this job is] teaching people about black people. A lot of white people need to 
learn, teaching—you can’t do that at the [traditional] workplace because people 
get uncomfortable. (Jamal) 
  
Music allows drivers to bypass the mundane and engage in deeper, more meaningful 
conversations. Other driver artifacts that sparked conversations included pamphlets, unprompted 
scripts, and products. Similar to Jamal’s social awareness campaign, other drivers shared 
memorial cards of black victims of police shootings. (See Image 4.) During my time in the field, 
I met a gubernatorial candidate who handed and read me a copy of his stump speech, an author 
who tried to sell me a copy of his latest book on public speaking, a fundraiser who solicited 
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donations for his after-school tutoring program, and an energy healer who explained to me the 
various crystals and Tarot cards that decorated their car. (See Image 3.) Music, print materials, 
and other artifacts were thus sparks for conversations that turned the car from being the driver’s 
personal space that the customer was just passing through to a space where more meaningful 
conversations and deeper social interactions could take place.  
 
Summary of Relational Practices: In relational practices, providing good customer service is a 
key component to how drivers define their work, thus expressing care toward and building 
rapport with customers. Attuning for customer cues, offering emotional support, cultivating 
friendships, and using audio, visual, and physical materials to spark conversation, drivers engage 
in these relational behaviors on their own accord unprompted by the organization. These 
practices suggest that drivers see customers as a positive and integral part of the work which, in 





Customers as Fares. Transactional practices are routine money-focused work activities that are 
meant to facilitate drivers optimizing their earnings by minimizing interactions with customers 
and enforcing boundaries around additional, uncompensated rider requests. In transactional 
practices, workers define doing a good job as getting their customers safely to their destination 
and earning money. Describing her relationship with customers, Casside said “All I know is that 
I need to get you to your destination ‘cause that’s my mindset, get you to your destination in a 
fast, safe way so I can get my money and you can get out of my car.” At best customers are 
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faceless fares that need to be transported, or at worse self-centered monsters that drivers must 
continually defend against.  
Twenty to thirty percent of people are nice, but I’m not trying to establish a 
personal relationship. This is a taxi. I get you where you need to go and go about 
my business. I’ll talk, but I’m not trying to get to know you. I don’t do much if 
I’m not getting paid for it. Not going out of my way to help you. People will take 
advantage of you. It’s the ones who do three-minute rides and try to take two or 
three treats. It’s one treat or get the hell out of here! People get crazy, greedy, take 
more than they should. You’re dealing with random people you don’t even know 
and you’re sharing your space with them (laughs)... after a while mentally you 
black it out. I’m not trying to develop a full-blown relationship, hang out with 
them on the weekend, pow wow, and all that stuff. It’s just a ride and that’s it. 
(Laughs.) Get the fuck out. (Ernest) 
Given the belief that the majority of customers are unpleasant and try to take advantage 
of drivers’ generosity, drivers merely tolerate customers. By avoiding emotional engagement 
through eye contact, eschewing conversation, and not offering help, drivers create psychological 
boundaries to protect themselves. Indeed, offering emotional support is seen as potentially 
dangerous, “I just be taking them where they want to go. I had about five or six ladies in my car 
crying. You think you’re helping somebody and then you get an email from Uber saying you 
hurt them or you harassed them” (Jackson). Drivers describe compartmentalizing their behavior, 
“keeping it business, professional” (Kenny). Another way that drivers avoid emotional 
engagement with customers is by pretending they do not understand them when there are 
problems. 
If I see you’re about to say that you are not happy, I pretend that I don’t 
understand. I just try to change the subject or talk about something else or I’ll 
pretend I didn’t hear what you said or that I just don’t understand. And once I 
pretend I don’t understand, everything is okay. And when they get out, they’re 
like “Okay, bye, have a nice day.” (Porris)  
By giving the illusion of not understanding customers and avoiding emotional labor, drivers are 
again demonstrating that providing superior customer service is not an integral way they define 
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their work. Instead, all of their actions are directed towards minimizing interactions with 
customers so they can complete their rides as quickly and efficiently as possible.  
Enforcing Boundaries. Along with cognitive and emotional boundaries, drivers enforce physical 
boundaries to protect their belongings and themselves. Placing a bag on the front seat to stop 
chatty passengers from sitting there was a commonly mentioned physical boundary. Driving is 
mentally and physically taxing, as one must stay alert to changing road conditions, and this is a 
strategy I used frequently as a driver to avoid emotionally draining small talk. (See Image 5.) 
More generally, drivers felt customers disrespected their vehicle, “People forget it’s my vehicle. 
They put feet on seats, fart in car, do all this weird stuff. They mess up your door handles. You 
know they’ve got food on their hands. These people don’t care!” (Ernest). Towels on the 
backseat, floor covers, and signs requesting customers to wipe their feet and refrain from eating 
and drinking or slamming serve as reminders for riders to behave. 
“What’s that?” I asked pointing to a dry erase board in the back pocket. Kandace 
quickly went into a long rant, her voice getting louder and angrier. “I had to make 
it cause people were misbehaving. They trifling. This one woman spilled coffee 
all over my backseat – and didn’t even say sorry!” [Swings arms open.] “So I 
made the sign. But then people started touching the sign. And messing it up. No 
[voice gets even louder]. You don’t need to touch the sign to read it, so I had to 
make a new sign.” [The first line on sign is “Don’t touch the sign.”] “Is it okay if I 
touch the sign?” I asked. “Yeah, but don’t mess it up.” (Fieldnotes - Sept 2019. 
See Image 6.) 
 
Objects serve as material deterrents against inconsiderate customers by helping enforce 
physical boundaries of what is and is not acceptable in their cars. Drivers also protect their time 
and themselves from potential legal liabilities by not doing extra, unpaid work, such as carrying 
bags, or waiting for customers while they are running errands. Two drivers below describe the 
boundaries they enforce: 
I try not to overstep any boundaries. These people are strangers. If it wasn’t for 
the app, your problem wouldn’t be mine. I have people coming up to the car and 
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they got real luggage and I say, “I’m sorry, I’d really like to help you but I can’t 
touch your luggage. You want my help now, but the moment one of those straps 
breaks, you’re gonna be writing a complaint and I’m gonna be responsible.” So I 
got to respect myself. I gotta respect my boundaries. (Jackson) 
 
They want to go to McDonald’s and get something to eat. If somebody gets in 
the car and says, “Hey, do you mind going through McDonald’s?” I say, 
“Absolutely not. Why would I go through McDonald’s?” And they say, “Well, I 
have other drivers that do it for me.” I say, “Well, if other drivers like to wait 15, 
20 minutes sitting in a drive-thru, that’s on them.” I don't want to make 17 cents 
a minute and drive you a mile down the road and have my car smell like 
McDonald’s and have you sitting back, eating fries, making my car smell like 
fries. (Roger) 
 
In refusing to take on any duties beyond driving to a destination, drivers reaffirm that that 
their primary purpose in working is to transport passengers. By reinforcing their boundaries 
about what behavior is and is not permissible for the customers, drivers define what type of work 
they are doing and emphasize what parts of the work are meaningful for them.  
 
Technology Practices and Beliefs 
In the next section, I describe the relationship between relational and transactional work practices 
that are associated with thoughts and feelings about the technology. Specifically, I show how 
relational practices are associated with seeing the technology as helpful and supporting drivers’ 
interests, while transactional practices are associated with seeing the technology as adversarial 
and subverting drivers’ interests. 
 
Technology as a Friend: Divine Intervention and Relational Reminders 
 Algorithms as God. Algorithms are the scaffolding of the ride-hailing system in that they assign, 
structure, and evaluate work. Drivers acknowledged that algorithms underpinned their work, 
although they were unclear exactly how. Discussing the opacity of the ratings algorithm, Kenny 
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said, “They say I made the top ten percent, but it doesn’t tell you in what. Maybe it’s the amount 
of hours you’re on the road. Maybe it’s the number of five star comments you get. I don’t know. 
I honest to God don’t know.” Another driver invokes God in describing the algorithm’s actions: 
I really believe it’s God and the algorithm. I don’t know how it works, not like 
that. There’s a lot of passengers that’ll say, “I wish there was a way I could pick 
you specifically as a driver.” I don't know. But at the end of the day, it just works 
out. It’s really weird, really weird. (Sebastian) 
 
Though many drivers believe the algorithm is unknowable, there is a general belief that 
algorithms are benevolent in that they make sure drivers are treated fairly, receive accurate 
ratings, and are assigned profitable rides. Even when falling behind in their earnings, drivers 
believe the algorithm is assisting them. 
I don't know, I call it lucky or blessed, but it seems when I start late I’ll just get 
trips that are worth more money. I can’t say that I can aim for that, but it just 
seems to be I get lucky all the time. I catch a surge, a big surge halfway across 
town, and then I catch another surge back across town, and then I’ll be right back 
to the money where I would have been working that whole morning. I say it’s a 
groove because I keep getting that same luck. (Laughs.) I know what it takes to 
get my 200 bucks a day. (Chapman) 
 
Although describing himself as knowing what it takes to earn $200 a day, Chapman is really 
attributing his ability to meet his income goals to the algorithm which he doesn’t fully 
understand, calling himself lucky and blessed. These positive believes contribute to the idea that 
they drivers will generally earn enough to meet their needs.  
 
App as Relational Reminder. For those engaged in relational practices, the app became a physical 
memento of past positive conversations with customers. Workers describe touching the app 
while working and at home to revisit their compliments (qualitative comments from riders), 




I have all of the reviews to prove [I am a good driver]. I can go on there and 
[see], “I just loved the conversation. Thank you for the ride. You put me in a 
good mood.” “Your car is so clean. Your car smells good, you’re a sweet 
person.” All of this stuff, it’s wonderful. It makes you feel good and want to do 
better. I always look at everything because I play with my app a lot. I'll go in it 
and look at different things or look at my ratings, see if it’s still a 4.86. I just go 
in the app and touch all over it. It gives you that motivation to continue. 
(Casside) 
 
It makes me really happy—no, really! When I read them I’m like, oh, great, this 
guy loved me. So those are awesome. I normally have great people. So yeah, we 
rate each other very well. I’ve had very good ratings on most. I check it all the 
time—I check it more than I drive. (Kristin) 
 
Serving as a physical artifact of the work, the app for some drivers is a tangible reminder 
that they performed their jobs well by providing good customer service. It can be checked 
repeatedly, in or out of working hours, serving as an always-ready reminder of the positive 
human aspects of work. 
 
Summary of Technology as Friend. In this perspective, drivers perceive aspects of the 
technology, namely the algorithms and the app, as helpful in making sure they earn enough 
money. Even though drivers don’t actually understand what the algorithm is doing, there is a 
general sense that the algorithm is working in their favor by assigning the most lucrative rides 
and rating them well. Additionally, for those engaging in relational practices, the app reminds 
drivers of one of the most enjoyable aspects of their work, i.e., customers. Overall, a positive 
interpretation of the technology contributes to workers developing positive beliefs about their 
work. 
 
Technology as Foe: Conspiracies and Misleading Information 
The Algorithm is Out to Get Me. In transactional practices, drivers focused on efficiency, aiming 
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to complete each ride transaction quickly with as little emotional and physical labor as possible. 
Evaluating the technology similarly, drivers assessed if the algorithm was matching them to the 
most optimal (lucrative) rides, with the algorithm consistently falling short. Indeed, drivers often 
interpreted the algorithm as “out to get them” by not assigning better rides.  
I swear there was a conspiracy because in the afternoons—I logged in every 
single day at 4:00—I would get a long ride that would take me out of the city in 
the opposite direction towards the airport. And then right after I get out of the 
city, the city would light up like a Christmas tree [on the heat map display]! I 
swore it was a conspiracy against me because I did very little, if any, prime-time 
rides. Because I’m always sent in the opposite direction. (Slim) 
 
Are algorithms conspiring against drivers? The opaqueness and inscrutability of the 
algorithm makes it impossible to objectively know, yet subjectively Slim interprets the algorithm 
as conspiring based on the pattern of logging in and being assigned lower-earning rides. These 
Drivers feel sure about who is making the algorithm work and it’s not God: “The machine and 
the software are set up by people, by humans. God?? No! Just humans made it” (Chad). Drivers 
report the algorithm manipulating wait times, making them wait longer and longer to drive down 
their hourly wage after a high-paying ride, or only matching rides right as they are signing off.17 
Here the algorithm is perceived as forcing drivers to stay on the road longer when nearing a 
bonus target:  
I’ve had that weird thing happen outside a building and didn’t get rides. I know 
what they’re doing. It’s not rocket science. If a driver gets to 67 rides, and 
they’ve got three to go [to reach a incentive], why would you want them to get in 
the queue quicker than everyone else? So, if I need three more rides, it’s 4:00 in 
the morning, I’ll get a ride in Bethesda, which is 50 minutes [long], and then I’ll 
get a ride that’s another hour. Well, all that time, I’m looking at the clock going I 
almost don’t want to take this ride because I need to get quick [short] trips, so I 
can just get the bonus. When you’re two rides away from the bonus, you don’t 
care about [the fare]. You just want to get the ride, so you can get that extra 
                                                
17 There may be an objective reason supporting drivers’ interpretations, as some hailing companies have publicly claimed to keep 
driver hourly wages between $12 - $19 (Hall & Krueger, 2016; Mishel, 2018), although this does not seem to be common 
knowledge among drivers. Furthermore, for some companies in some cities (e.g., Uber in New York City), there is a guaranteed 
minimum hourly wage, which may affect how algorithms assign work. 
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hundred bucks, or 80 bucks, whatever it is. But, I think Uber, they know what 
they’re doing. I think they have it programmed to make it as hard as possible 
when a driver is pushing the edge of the envelope to [get the incentive]. (Roger) 
 
In contrast to the unknowability of the algorithm, as evidenced by the belief of drivers 
engaging in more relational practices, these drivers are clear on what the algorithm is doing—
making work less efficient by keeping them on the road for longer hours at lower rates of pay. 
Drivers’ inability to access technical support cements for drivers that they are at the whim of an 
algorithm. Irritated after receiving only one ride an hour for the past week, Chad called support. 
“Oh, your rating is down. I’m sorry, we can’t do anything. Thank you very much.” If 
there’s a judgment, if there’s a consideration, if there is something, you would say, “Oh, 
I'm working really with a human.” I’m not working with a human, I’m working with a 
machine. 
 
Overall the algorithm was perceived as not being aligned with drivers’ interests, instead 
thwarting them from earning the most money in the shortest period of time.  
 
Misleading Information. Some drivers believed the app transmitted false messages about 
changing work conditions and pay. They complained that information about surges was 
misleading, as the surge frequently disappeared when the driver arrived in the area, leading to the 
popular catchphrases: “Don’t chase the surge” (Sarah) and “I’m too smart to chase surges” 
(Sheldon). Drivers felt frustrated and sometimes bombarded by surge alerts, receiving up to three 
notifications per day. “Why is Uber sending me alerts for surge pricing? I never walked out of 
the house or jumped out of the bed because of the surge” (Zara). Ringing sounds when a ride was 
assigned, pop-ups, and priming cues, such as the word “money” in the color green, urged drivers 
to pay attention to information delivered through the app. 
I mean it’s all so simple; humans are just animals at the end of the day. If you 
give the cat a shiny toy it will play with it for hours; with humans it’s a little 
more nuanced, but at the end of the day it’s the same. When you get a ride 
 
 89 
request, it’s like Pavlov’s dogs. The thing rings a bell—“Oh, new customer.” 
And then you go to press the button to pick them up. If you have audio plugged 
in, it used to count down to make it more intense. That shit was insulting when I 
think about it. (Jared) 
The frequency of the messaging and not so subtle priming cues coupled with the 
challenges of earning a buck led some drivers to question the veracity of the information and, at 
times, the entire business model. The work “is not as easy as they advertise” (Ernest) and the 
companies “do a lot of false advertising” (Leo) about pay. In reference to an in-app message 
about changing fares, one driver reported: 
Uber still lies to people. What’s the latest one they did? They told people, when 
you get in a car, they charge you [a pick-up fee]—$2 and some change. 
Basically what they did is they raised it 30 cents. They told the customer is that 
it’s for the drivers—well they don’t give anything to the drivers. But yet they 
send us something that’s actually still on my phone that states that the [pick-up] 
fee for a passenger went up, but nothing will change on your fare. So basically 
they’re saying the fee is for administration. And they’ve done it twice in a year. 
Uber did over a billion rides last year. They gave themselves a $30 million raise 
twice. (Leo) 
Seeing the disconnect between the fare information presented to customers and drivers, 
drivers interpreted that the app was providing misleading information, which then made them 
question the overall business model. In sum, many drivers believe the company had conflicting 
interests and its actions were not always aligned with their self-interests, and thus drivers needed 
to carefully evaluate any pricing information.  
Summary of Technology as Foe. In this perspective, drivers perceive the algorithm and app as 
antagonistic in meeting their goals of being effective drivers. Drivers describe the algorithm as 
actively conspiring against them by not giving them the most lucrative rides, and purposefully 
giving them misleading information that then shapes their thoughts about the business model. 
Taken together, these perspectives may make drivers more critical towards their work. 
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Feelings and Beliefs about the Company 
In the following section, I describe how workers think and feel about their work arrangements 
and the company as a whole. Drivers with more relational practices and positive beliefs about the 
technology tend to see the company and the work itself in a more positive light; they believe that 
the company was helping them earn more and have enjoyable experiences, as well as enabling 
them to serve society at-large. In contrast, those with more transactional perspectives and 
negative beliefs about the company tended to be more pessimistic about the work, finding it hard 
to earn enough money and describing the company as a bottom-feeder. 
 
Company as Supporter, Helper, Community Builder  
Cultivating rapport with customers and having positive perspectives about technology were 
associated with drivers having a more positive view of the company, as they experienced the 
different components of the work as complementary. Drivers often described the work as 
pleasurable, enjoying the act of driving and the companionship from customers. “I kind of like 
driving. This gets me out to see beautiful views of the city, to hear cool things and cool stories, 
and meet people from all around the world. This job is so much freedom.” This sense of freedom 
was due, in part, to the fact that drivers felt like the system was enabling them to meet new 
people, own their schedule, and earn money—in short, the system was working for them and 
adding value. Suffering from multiple chronic illnesses, Karen had not worked a steady job in 
more than fifteen years before driving; she reported that working helped her “build myself back 
up to a person within a year,” exclaiming, “if this car thing goes well I could actually be 
independent.” Similarly, Chapman felt empowered by driving, realizing he no longer had to 
work in a “Matrix type of situation.” Describing his relationship to ride-hailing, he said, “I think 
of what a great idea, what a great company. It’s a pleasure to work with them. To work with 
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them, because we’re partners, so I don't say work for them. It’s a great partnership.”  
More generally, workers recognize the impact of ride-hailing on the larger community. 
After complaints about the city’s expensive and ineffective taxi service, an elected official I 
interviewed championed and then drove for a ride-hailing company, reporting, “I had watched 
the fight to bring [company] to [my state] when it went through the legislature. I have 
experienced the very tough taxi market as it relates to the customer experience in [city].” Drivers 
were proud that their work provided transportation to those that most needed access.   
It’s such a help to the person that’s getting a ride, to the person that’s giving the 
ride, and the community as a whole if the person is drunk. Or helping mothers 
get to work without having to call people to ask them to come take her to work. 
You got students that can be independent. Wives that can be independent of their 
husbands without the car. The family with one car now, with a budget, can 
become two cars with Uber’s help. When I really realized the impact that Uber 
had in everybody’s lives, especially when I drive the drunks, being that my son 
got killed by a drunk driver, I always tell them I appreciate that they’re actually 
doing Uber and saving somebody’s life. (Chapman) 
 
There is an overarching sense that ride hailing is working well—not only for the drivers 
themselves, but in terms for the community at-large. 
  
Company as Adversary and Community Destroyer 
Focusing on efficiency, by minimizing interactions with the customers and viewing technology 
as misleading and a hindrance to said efficiency, was associated with drivers having an 
antagonistic view of ride-hailing. Drivers described their relationship with the company as 
adversarial, blaming it for damaging their bodies and cars. Two drivers describe their aches and 
pains: 
It wasn’t what I thought. You really have to grind for the money and then when 
you think about the gas that you’re spending, you ain’t really making that much 
money. I heard people say, “Oh, I make $1,500 a week or $1,200 a week or 
whatever.” I guess they might be working 14 hours … it messes up my body to 
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sit in the car for so long. I had a friend who was making real good money on 
Uber—like $1000 week—and man he did not look too good. Like not healthy. 
(Nixon) 
[I: And when I say the word Lyft, what comes up?] Well, the first thing, back 
pain. (Laughs. Pause.) Maybe like tiredness. I don’t know why I’m going this 
route, but I am. Gas. Money. And bottom feeder. It’s mainly my side gig now, 
but when I was doing it as my only source of income it was keeping me busy, but 
I found that I didn’t have the stamina to do it as much as I wanted to. I had these 
grandiose plans of driving 10 to 12 hours a day six days a week and it just 
doesn’t work like that. Your body can’t do that. I don’t know how truckers do it. 
I really don’t.  (Jared) 
Unable to afford a larger car to accommodate his 6’2” frame, Jared eventually stopped 
driving due to back pain. Similarly, Nixon left ride-hailing for the more regular hours and less 
physically-taxing work of a medic. The continuing physical pain of driving affects drivers’ 
enjoyment of the work, highlighting the physical and financial costs of the work. 
Even savvy drivers, who analyze traffic patterns to find the most efficient times and 
places to work, are uneasy about the business model.  
It’s not necessarily something I like to talk about a lot. It’s complicated, because 
… honestly being an Uber/Lyft driver is far more complicated than being a taxi 
driver. In terms of what I do for preparation, what I do to analyze areas that are 
busy, the hours that I schedule it around. It’s not something I’m proud of either. 
A huge, huge part of the gig economy is they take advantage of people who don't 
know any better. A lot of people that drive aren’t that smart at all and I don’t 
want to be grouped in with the people that don’t understand the difference. 
(Ralph) 
 
Being taken advantage was a common refrain. Commenting on their increasing body pain 
and falling wages, drivers feel stuck in “a money game, making money for them. I’m just a cog 
in a money making machine...  a cog in a non-profitable company” (Japan), and find themselves 
in an unsavory relationship where “Uber is the pimp, the riders are the johns and we just open 






Process of Meaning-Making in New Gig Work 
 
Drivers come into ride-hailing with similar work histories, general attitudes about work 
and motivation, and encounter identical, organizationally sterile, work environments, yet their 
differing practices and beliefs radically shape the meaning they construct. In two different sets of 
practices, relational and transactional, drivers either cultivate connections or enforce boundaries 
with their customers, viewing them as a joy or a nuisance to be managed. Similarly, drivers 
develop contrasting views about technology, perceiving it as either supportive in meeting their 
income goals or actively working against them. From these contrasting practices and 
perspectives, drivers develop two different relationships towards their work arrangement, 
viewing it as either a complementary system, in that the work serves them and the community, or 
an exploitative system, in that the work destroys their body, property, and spirit. I call these 
relationships “modes” as they represent a preferred or prevalent orientation, but, at the same 
time, indicate that the orientation is not a permanent state. This process is outlined in Figure 6.1. 
  
Alliance Mode. Drivers’ work practices, beliefs, and associated feelings are mutually reinforcing, 
creating two modes: alliance and adversarial. When viewing themselves as in an alliance with 
their work, drivers see customers and technology as aligned with their interests. The belief that 
delivering good customer service is an integral part of their work and that customers are 
professional, high class people makes it natural for workers to extend care, offer emotional 
support, and build positive relationships. Technology serves as a repository of past customer 
interactions, storing compliments, badges, tips, and customer ratings that reinforce drivers as 
good at customer service. In other words, technology reminds drivers that they are good at their 
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job, leading to a positive interpretation of the technology. Though the algorithm is inscrutable, 
drivers believe that the algorithm ensures things work out, in that they earn enough money to 
meet their goals. This belief, along with the thought that the company is serving society at-large 
by taking drunk drivers off the road and providing transportation for at-need populations, 
reinforces workers’ beliefs that they are in an alliance. These practices, beliefs, and feelings are 
mutually reinforcing, leading workers to perceive that they are in a benevolent work system. 
 
Adversarial Mode. When viewing themselves in opposition with their work arrangement, drivers 
view customers and technology as misaligned with their interests. The belief that getting 
customers safely and efficiently to their destination is their primary job and that customers are 
inconsiderate leads drivers to enact mental and physical boundaries, 
 limiting their engagement with customers. Technology reinforces negative beliefs about 
customers, as it is seen as the object that brings customers’ problems to drivers. As drivers must 
rely on the algorithm to assign and price rides, they are unable to tell if they are working as 
efficiently as possible. This lack of information is associated with mistrust in the algorithm and 
the perception that the app is providing misleading information. Though the algorithm is 
inscrutable, drivers believe that the algorithm has only the company’s interests in mind and is 
actively conspiring against them by making it harder to meet their income goals. Bodily aches 
and pains remind drivers of the physical toil of the work for not enough pay. This belief that they 
are being harmed by the company along with the belief that the industry’s reputation taints them 
reinforces workers’ beliefs they are in an adversarial relationship with their work. Taken 
together, these practices, beliefs, and feelings are mutually reinforcing, leading workers to 




Discussion and Contributions 
 
Implications for Literature on Meaning-Making 
The literature on meaning-making has generally constrained itself to looking at single, 
largely intrapsychic antecedents of meaning in each study, such as values (Baumeister & Vohs, 
2002), beliefs (Wrzesniewski et al, 1997) or familial attitudes (Brief & Nord, 1990) that are 
largely intrapsychic, which limit our understanding of the many sources from which workers 
draw meaning. In this study, I propose a more integrated model of meaning-making composed of 
a complex interplay of social and material interactions. Specifically, this research explores 
meaning construction around two previously unexplored parts of the work context: customers 
and smartphone technology. The meaning of work literature has just begun to look at the role of 
social interactions in the workplace in shaping meaning and, to date, has largely focused on other 
organizational members who are physically present such as managers (Pododny, Khurana, & 
Hill-Popper, 2005) and co-workers (Salancik & Pfeffer,1978; Dutton, Debebe, Wrzesniewski 
,2016). Though interactions with customers lack the duration and depth of exchanges with 
managers and co-workers, I find they are a crucial component of the meaning-making process. 
Indeed, these encounters with customers are powerful enough to shape and reinforce technology 
practices and beliefs in so far that technology is neither inherently perceived with malice or 
goodwill, but instead shaped by these encounters. Technology can remind workers of positive 
prior interactions or lead to the belief that they are being taken advantage of economically. These 
findings align with other scholars’ assertions that meaning at work—and life—requires 
contributions from multiple sources (Baumeister, 1991; Chalofsky, 2003).  
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This study explores the process of meaning construction in lower-skilled service workers 
who are nearly all economically dependent on their work. Almost universally the meaning of 
work literature is framed around highly skilled workers (Dobrow, 2013; Petrilgeri, Ashforth & 
Wrzesniewski, 2018) or meaningful types of work (Bunderson & Thomspson, 2009; Schabram 
& Maitlis, 2017), which raises the question of whether workers for whom economic motives are 
more salient engage in similar meaning-making processes. While thoughts about whether or not 
the business model is economically sustainable for workers is part of the meaning-making 
process, other features of the work environment are also salient. Indeed, the strong economic 
situation may actually account for why workers express conflicting thoughts on the work 
arrangements, both appreciating the flexibility and being exploited by the business model. By 
seriously considering the meaning-making processes of this population, this paper addresses 
concerns that the meaning of work literature over-emphasizes positive motives for work, 
neglecting workers who must work to meet financial needs (Brief & Nord, 1990; Rosso, Dekas, 
& Wrzesniewski, 2010). 
The ultimate meaning individuals made of their work arrangements is that they were 
either engaging or estranging. This bifurcated state has been seen in other literatures such as the 
promotion/prevention approach to goal-setting (Higgins, 1998; 2005), appetitive/aversive 
approaches toward interpersonal relationships (Gable, 2006; Gable & Gosnell, 2011), and labor’s 
feeling of alienation/fulfillment toward management (Marx, 1847; Burawoy, 1976). This study 
explores some of the practices, beliefs, and emotions that underlie these end states of 





Implications for Literature on Service Work 
Prior literature on the service triangle has primarily used a lens of power, conflict, and 
struggle (e.g., Leidner, 1993; Williams, 2006; Sallaz, 2009; Korczynski, 2009; Reich & 
Bearman, 2018); in contrast, this study focuses on how the elements of the triangle mutually 
reinforce one another to shape worker experiences and beliefs. By taking this alternative 
perspective, the present study makes at least three unique contributions to the literature in service 
work. First, it describes games on the service floor, both with customers and with technology. 
Second, it suggests that different customer-engagement strategies can exist within the same 
organization, and that they lead to two different subjective experiences of the work. More 
generally, this study adds to the literature on how materiality, namely technology, influences 
relationships within the service triangle. 
The concept of shop-floor games assumed a central role in the analysis of conflict and 
consent studies of manufacturing work, but has been neglected in the study of service work 
(Lopez, 2010; see Williams (2006) and Sallaz (2009) for exceptions). This study shows how the 
customer takes the place of the manager as the “thing to be managed” and the algorithm takes the 
place of machines as the source of unpredictability in shop floor games. For those deploying 
relational practices, in addition to striving for material wins like tips, successful social interaction 
with the customer can itself be a kind of “win”—that is, a desired outcome that can constitute the 
object of the games. And these wins are multiplicative in that these successful interactions are 
forever shrined within the app’s technology, as badges and compliments, or when drivers thank 
passengers for using a ride when drunk. Thus, an alliance mode is achieved. In contrast, those 
deploying transaction practices have much less clearly defined wins. The goal is in trying to 
complete a ride as quickly as possible, and thus this practice is based on minimizing losses as 
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opposed to maximizing gains. Algorithms and customers are sources of unpredictability that 
must be actively managed or, in the case of algorithms, cannot be managed, and these losses are 
multiplicative. Thus, an adversarial relationship.  
Another line of work argues that service work changes the nature of the organization to a 
“customer-orientated bureaucracy” (Korczynski; 2002; Filby, 1992; Ungerson, 1999). This line 
of research argues that the organizing practices of the firm—market or relational—shape whether 
workers experience customer interactions as more or less alienating. In contrast, this study shows 
that alienation and fulfillment can exist within the same organization. At its core, the platforms 
rely on markets, aiming to efficiently match drivers with riders as quickly as possible for the 
lowest cost. Yet, with drivers’ performance evaluation being tied to the customer rating, the 
firm’s organizing practice appears to be more relational. Drivers who are efficiency-focused 
“lose” in that they tend to be more alienated from the work while those with a more relational 
mindset tend to feel less alienated. This finding is surprising since one would expect the first 
group—whose actions are most aligned with the organization’s—to express more satisfaction 
and harmony with their working environment, yet it is the inverse.  
More generally, this study offers insight into the role of materiality in service work, 
something that has been understudied. Most research focuses on service workers who create 
products as desirable objects for consumption, such as retail displays (Pettinger, 2004; 2006; 
Warhurst et al., 2009), or workers themselves who are the product of consumption, such as 
“pretty girls” at nightclubs (Mears, 2011; 2015). In contrast, this study looks at the material 
object as being a key component of the service triangle—indeed, one may think of this context as 
like the traditional service triangle, with technology taking the place of the organization as its 
mouthpiece. Although the algorithm’s code is inscrutable, drivers always ascribe intent, viewing 
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the algorithm as either helping or harming them. However, the technology is not always 
evaluated with suspicion (Marx, 1847; Brown & Korczynski, 2010) or as an autonomy enabler 
(Mazmanian, Orlikowski & Yates, 2013; Shevchuk, Strebkov, & Davis, 2018), but instead is 
always evaluated in light of its surrounding context, an evaluation that reinforced workers’ 
assessment of the work arrangement.   
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
Several of this study’s limitations provide opportunities for future research. First, the 
sample was chosen to answer the research question and, though it was diverse in age, prior work 
experience, and length of time driving, participants were predominantly men and were all living 
in North America. Also, for the most part, these drivers had decided to continue driving for some 
time—i.e., now workers who had driven for only two days and then quit. Although the model 
may help explain the meaning-making experience of those in a variety of male-dominated 
occupations (such as construction, manufacturing, or banking), future research could explore the 
transferability of the model to contexts with different gender and or cultural compositions. 
This study looks at one variation of service work and future research could test and 
expand on these findings in other service configurations. Other intermediaries that are part of the 
digital service system include mystery shoppers, payment systems, data services, etc. Hospitality, 
education, and health systems are other examples of service systems that could be examined. For 
example, hospital social workers may act as buffers for the organization, treating the patients as 
“humans” and thus permitting physicians and other health care workers to concentrate on the 
technical parts of health care (Heimer & Stevens, 1997). Additional research is needed to 
understand how these findings may apply in other service systems. 
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One limitation of this paper is that it cannot answer why workers undertake a specific 
work practice. A reasonable assumption would be that workers who were ‘forced” or pushed into 
driving by a shock event, for example, may be more likely to enact transactional practices while 
those who were more “attracted” or pulled into driving may be more likely to enact relational 
practices. However, my analysis of comparing push versus pull factors showed no differences 
between groups. Similarly, I found no relationship between work history or amount of economic 
dependency and either kind of work practice. A larger, more diverse sample size and other 
research methods, such as longitudinal surveys, may provide additional insights. The process 
portrayed in the paper shows engagement and estrangement as “end states,” but, in fact, these 
two states are fluctuating and can change over time or even exist simultaneously, such as in the 
case of Lincoln’s “double feeling.” However, there could be times in a driver’s work life where 
one mode is more salient than the other or, alternatively, certain events may trigger a driver to 
switch to another mode (e.g., a driver switching from alliance to adversarial mode after an unfair 
termination). Following workers over several years would provide greater insight to these 
questions.  
Similarly, one criticism of this paper is that workers who enact relational practices did 
not encounter disrespectful customers, and those in transactional practices did not encounter 
friendly, open customers. Given my broad sampling and how customers were assigned to riders 
(by the algorithms), this is likely not the case; it is more likely that workers interpreted their 
customers differently. Labeling theory argues that deviance is not a quality in behavior itself, but 
in the interaction between the person who commits an act and those who respond to it (Becker, 
1991). As previously described, differences in beliefs about elements of the work (“the work is 
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about providing good service and customers are friendly” vs “the work is about being efficient 
and most customers are greedy”) predisposed drivers to have varying beliefs about customers. 
Another lens to examine in these worker-customer interactions is through boundary work 
(Lamont, 2009) or normalizing the interactions across class differences. In relational practices, 
no boundary work is needed—drivers see themselves as wanting to provide a positive customer 
experience and see customers as good people. Conversely, in transactional practices, much 
boundary work is needed—drivers see customers as having lower morals and being less 
professional. However, in contrast to prior research (Lamont, 2009; Sherman, 2005, 2007), the 
boundary work associated with transactional practices did not neutralize, but instead 
exacerbated, the differences between the two groups—as drivers remained aloof and hostile 
towards customers. This is due, in part, to other elements of the service triangle (technology, 





I began this research project with a simple question about how meaning is constructed in 
the contemporary workplace, the gig economy. Though drivers share common experiences and 
beliefs about work, I find workers developing two opposing relationships to their work 
arrangements. Specifically, I document a set of mutually reinforcing practices, beliefs, and 
emotions, in relation to the customers, technology, and the company itself, that shape workers’ 
relationship to their work arrangement. These two modes—alliance or adversary—indicate 
whether workers believe the work system is working for or against them. This paper contributes 
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Choice without Freedom: Autonomy and Control in the Algorithmic Workplace 
 
The unknown future rolls toward us. I face it, for the first time, with a sense of hope.  
Because if a machine, a Terminator, can learn the value of human life, maybe we can too. 
- Sarah O’Conner 
 
Algorithms—computer-programmed procedures for transforming input data into a 
desired output (Gillespie, 2014: 167)—are transforming how work is controlled and coordinated 
by allocating, optimizing, and evaluating the work tasks of millions of employees, from Starbuck 
baristas to Wal-Mart clerks to Uber drivers. By 2020 more than 70% of jobs and 90% of service 
work will require interaction with digital technology (Muro et al., 2017). Yet, work that is 
controlled and coordinated by algorithms, in which algorithms substitute for human managers, 
presents fundamentally different challenges for organizations and workers that have not yet been 
explored. In this article, I consider the behaviors of workers employed in an algorithmic 
workplace in order to examine how they navigate the tension between algorithmic control and 
the individual need for autonomy. Given the rapidly evolving contemporary workplace, 
understanding the experience and implications of algorithmic work is crucial to developing 
updated theories of organizational control and worker autonomy. 
 Organizations control and coordinate what workers do. Ever since firm owner-operators 
lost the ability to oversee workers directly (Edwards, 1979), organizations have strived to regain 
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control through controlling pacing (Taylor, 1911, 1949), formalizing policies and procedures 
(Weber, 1947; Gouldner, 1954), and enforcing social pressure through co-workers (Barker, 
1993; Mazmanian, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2013) and customers (Liedner, 1996; Lopez, 2010). 
Algorithms—a new mechanism of control and coordination—promise to tighten control, further 
reducing inefficiencies by transferring managerial oversight to software code. Algorithms allow 
work to be dynamically assigned, sliced, monitored, priced, and evaluated. In some 
contemporary work settings, such as the on-demand economy, algorithms are embedded 
throughout the entire human resource cycle, selecting applicants, creating schedules, and 
evaluating performance. When matching workers with firms needing a particular expertise, for 
example, algorithms have augmented or replaced referral-based hiring practices in companies as 
diverse as Amazon, LinkedIn, and Nippon Airlines. Deliveroo, a food delivery service, eschews 
human managers by having algorithms compare workers’ delivery times to create performance 
ranks. The increasing reliance on algorithms and the effect of algorithms on work coordination 
raise significant questions about how organizations will maintain control and, correspondingly, 
how workers will respond. 
 Autonomy—the ability to exercise a degree of control over the content, timing, location, 
and performance of work activities—is a core human need (Maslow, 1968; Ryan & Deci, 2003; 
Wageman, 1995) and a defining feature of jobs (Hackman & Oldman, 1976). Indeed, autonomy 
is associated with higher levels of job satisfaction, motivation, and job performance (Oldman & 
Hackman, 2010; Langfred & Moye, 2004; Langfred & Rockmann, 2016). However, from the 
standpoint of organizations and their agents (managers, owners, and principals), the temptation 
has long been to squelch autonomy and exert total control over workers—with the goal of 
maximizing efficiency and optimizing output. Compared to higher-skilled work, lower-skilled 
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work is especially vulnerable to autonomy restrictions as tasks are more discrete and less 
complex (Burawoy, 1976, Edwards, 1980). Algorithms further threaten lower-skilled workers’ 
autonomy as they lessen the need for managers—who can offer autonomy by granting leniency 
(Anteby, 2008) and brokering idiosyncratic deals (Rousseau, 1995)—and can reduce the scope of 
work activities by formalizing tasks and procedures. On the online labor market MTurk, for 
example, larger work assignments are sliced into micro-tasks: for a translation job, workers 
might be asked to translate a single sentence as opposed to an entire document, and are then 
evaluated and paid by the sentence. Autonomy is such a defining feature of work that Kalleberg 
(2009, 2011) describes it as the distinguishing characteristic between higher-skilled “good jobs” 
and lower-skilled “bad jobs.”  
Overall, emerging research argues that algorithms will tighten the “iron cage,” squelching 
workers’ autonomy for the sake of algorithmic efficiency (Faraj, Pachidi & Sayegh, 2018; 
Kellogg, Valentine & Christin, 2019; Rahman, 2019). Yet, from my extensive qualitative field 
study of the ride-hailing industry—the largest employer in the on-demand economy—I found 
that ride-hailing drivers express a sense of autonomy in response to algorithmic controls. Here, I 
define and explore the concept of algorithmic work—work that is constituted, to some extent, by 
an algorithm or a set of instructions programmed by a computer—and consider how long-
standing theories on organizational control and worker autonomy need to be reconceptualized in 
this new context of the algorithmic workplace. I found that drivers choose between three 
tactics—compliance, engagement, and deviance—in response to the algorithm’s demands, each 
tactic reinforcing their sense of autonomy as they strive to maximize income. This study puts 
algorithmic work on the map by identifying its structural elements and analyzing how workers 
actively navigate the algorithmic workplace. Challenging the emerging assumption that 
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algorithms cripple worker autonomy, I conclude with the idea of a “good bad” job, arguing that 
autonomy is not solely a function of job design and that a sense of autonomy may actually be 
enabled by algorithmic controls. 
 
Control and Autonomy in the Algorithmic Workplace 
By their very nature, organizations are intended to provide some level of control and 
coordination. Indeed, if an activity had no need for centralized control and coordination, there 
would be no need for an organization (Blau & Scott, 1962; Gouldner, 1954; Thompson, 1967). 
According to March and Simon (1958), one of the defining characteristics of an organization is a 
central coordinative system that links work activities to a shared goal. Much of the research on 
organizational control builds on labor process theory (Braverman, 1974; Buroway, 1979; 
Edwards, 1979; Thompson & Vincent, 2010), which describes how managers, driven by 
capitalism and a desire to maximize profits, continually deploy new technologies and control 
mechanisms to extract more value from workers. In Adam Smith’s hypothetical pin factory, 
foremen coordinated specialized roles (metal cutter, pin drawer, roller, finisher, etc.) to increase 
productivity under the foreman’s watchful eyes (Smith, 1827). As firms grew in size, control 
structures evolved to compensate for the lack of direct control or observation and monitor more 
complex production processes. With the development of technical control, organizational 
technologies became a substitute for direct supervision—assembly lines at a machine-like pace 
to make it harder for workers to loaf, for example, or cash registers to monitor transactions and 
make it more difficult for workers to steal. Developing his theory of scientific management, 
Frederick Taylor set out to control workers’ behaviors by directly linking wages to effort and 
specifying the exact physical movements needed to perform a task most efficiently (Taylor, 
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1911, 1947). Following the Second World War, organizations continued to become more 
complex, giving way to new models of control, such as bureaucratic controls that relied on 
formal and informal rules and procedures to guide workers’ behaviors. The organizational 
structure of the firm establishes company policies as the basis for how to accomplish tasks, set 
wage tables, and guide advancements (Selznick, 1943; Blau, 1955). Job descriptions (Weber, 
1947; Gouldner, 1954), checklists (Pronovost & Wohr, 2010), advancement guidelines 
(Gouldner, 1954), and scripts (Moreo, 1980) direct workers’ behaviors, which are then evaluated 
by supervisors (Vancil, 1982) and metrics (Govindarajan, 1988). In practice, direct, technical, 
and bureaucratic control are multi-layered in that they frequently combine and overlap creating 
reinforcing levels of controls (e.g., Barley & Kunda, 1992; Cardinal, Kreutzer & Miller, 2017; 
Sitkin, Cardinal & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2010). Together, these control mechanisms can make 
workers feel like they are in an iron cage—a technologically structured, rigid, and dehumanized 
workplace (Barker, 1993; Weber, 1968). 
 As we enter the twenty-first century, technology is again reshaping work—this time 
through algorithms—prompting another evolution of control models. More and more 
organizations are deploying algorithms—computer-programmed procedures for transforming 
input data into a desired output (Gillespie, 2014: 167)—as a central coordination system for 
assigning, pricing, monitoring, and evaluating work. Algorithms were first widely introduced in 
workplaces in the 1980s, with the development of micro-computers and information technology 
that allowed work to be infomated and automated (Zuboff, 1988). Over time, they became 
associated with data-mining and machine-learning, as algorithms came to discern patterns from 
large amounts of heterogeneous “big” data (Danaher, 2016; Kitchin, 2017). More recent 
research, oddly enough in fields outside of management, documents the birth of algorithmic 
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management or the practice where software algorithms and the surrounding devices that support 
them assume managerial functions. Accounts describe algorithms selecting work (O’Neil, 2017), 
scheduling shifts (Hodson, 2014; Kantor 2014), assigning tasks (Lee et al., 2015; Rosenblat, 
2018), prioritizing tasks (Gupta, 2018), setting wages (Borgs, Candogan, Chayes, Lobel, 
Nazerzadeh, 2014; Chen et al., 2016, 2017), nudging behaviors (Burbano, 2016), surveilling 
activities (Viscelli, 2016; Levy & Barocas, 2018), and evaluating performance (Edelman, Luca, 
& Svirsky, 2017; Kirilenko et al., 2017). These reports of today’s information and 
communication technologies (ICT) suggest a resurgence of Tayloresque control practices, with 
workers being subjected to high levels of monitoring, detailed measurement of work 
productivity, and statistical analyses of performance (Taylor & Bain, 2005; Kristiansen et al., 
2018). Such accounts equate the work environment to an “assembly line in the head” (Bain & 
Taylor, 2000) or an “electronic sweatshop” (Fernie & Metcalf, 1998).   
Algorithms differ from prior control models in that they are more comprehensive and 
opaque. Algorithms enhance already in-place monitoring technologies, such as cameras, sensors, 
and biometrics trackers, by comparing inputs to expected outputs such as physical features 
(O’Neill, 2017; Wang & Kosinski, 2018), speech patterns (Leonardi & Contractor, 2018; Lix, 
Goldberg, Srivastava & Valentine, 2019), production speed (Landay, 2019; Xu, He & Li, 2014), 
and movement patterns (Clemes, O’Connell & Edwardson, 2014; Thorp et al., 2012; Levy, 
2014). Truck drivers receive admonishments from their driving app if they deviate from 
prescribed routes or speed limits (Levy, 2015); a machine-learning tool notifies managers when 
their employees’ projects appear to be moving too slowly (Schweyer, 2018). Algorithms provide 
instantaneous feedback that can be immediately entered into the production process, 
continuously updating control mechanisms (Crowston & Bolici, 2019). Upwork, for example, 
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sends algorithmically-powered chatbot warnings that remind workers of their agreement to not 
work outside of the platform when they include personal information such as phone or email 
addresses in their communications with clients (Jarrahi, Sutherland, Nelson & Sawyer, 2019). 
Algorithms can further control work activities through task formalization, prescribing how, 
when, and by whom a task is performed (Hall, 1977; Adler & Borys, 1996). Through 
formalization, a large task—say, building a massive open online course (MOOC)—can be 
broken into smaller chunks: building a webpage, designing quizzes, and creating a syllabus. Each 
task is then distributed among workers and independently monitored and evaluated by algorithms 
(Valentine et al., 2017). The inner workings of such algorithms are opaque, due to intentional 
secrecy, required technical literacy, and machine-learning opacity (Burrell, 2016). The codes that 
produce algorithms are often propriety and, even if disclosed, are usually not interpretable to the 
average user (Boling, Anderson & Schwarz, 2015). The expansion of algorithms into work has 
largely eroded people’s capacity and psychological motivation to take meaningful action against 
them; workers rationalize their potential harm believing that privacy loss is inevitable (Fast & 
Jago, 2019). Lastly, machine learning is unintelligible to humans as algorithms make forecasts 
and predictions based solely on learned patterns and inferences in short periods of time (Borch, 
2017; Dietvorst, Simmons & Massey, 2015; Karppi & Crawford, 2016; Weld & Bansal, 
2018). Taken together, this research suggests that the rise of algorithms as a coordinating 
mechanism within organizations will further tighten the iron cage by restricting worker 
autonomy and furthering alienation and estrangement from work. Yet, at the same time, we 
know the need for autonomy and self-determination is innate (Orpen, 1985; Wageman, 1995; 
Ryan & Deci, 2000; Manslow, 1968) and that workers often defend their autonomy in the face of 
tighter organizational control.  
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Scholars have generally understood autonomy in the workplace as the ability to exercise 
a degree of control over the content, timing, location, and performance of work activities. 
Autonomy is considered crucial to work, as it is positively linked to well-being, engagement, 
motivation, job satisfaction, and retention (Annink & den Dulk, 2012; Vera, Martínez, Lorente, 
& Chambel, 2016; Wu, Griffin, & Parker, 2015), and it is seen as the defining feature between 
“good” and “bad” work (Kalleberg, 2009, 2011). Autonomy can be operationalized structurally 
and psychologically. Structurally, in the employment relationship, workers may have choice in 
when, where, how, and what work to complete (Cappelli & Keller, 2013), for example the ability 
to set their own schedules and set their wages. It can also be prioritized as a function of 
organizational and job design. For example, a traveling salesman or R&D scientist may have 
more discretion in their daily work arrangements and tasks than a call center worker or lab 
technician. Managers may also create idiosyncratic arrangements with individual workers, or i-
deals that allow for increased flexibility (Rousseau, 1995), for example, or grant leniency in the 
face of questionable behavior (Anteby, 2008). Co-workers can grant one another autonomy 
through encouraging loafing, machine sabotage, or unprofessional behavior, or by prioritizing 
one task over another. Often seen as in direct conflict with the management’s interest, these 
behaviors have been labeled as resistance by practitioners and scholars alike (Vallas, 2016). 
Psychologically, autonomy can be experienced when workers believe they have control over 
their work activities—I refer to this as having a sense of autonomy. Workers may passively 
internalize organizational norms and rules such that they believe they are making their own 
choices (Van Maneen, 1979; Kunda, 1992) or, more actively, craft meaningfulness and purpose 
(Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001) through changing their perspectives and behaviors (Bakker, 
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Tims & Derkas, 2012; Berg, Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2010) and interpreting cues from their 
environment (Dutton, Debebe & Wrzesniewski, 2016; Sonenshein, et al; 2013). 
Lower-skilled workers are generally assumed—by virtue of their lack of occupational 
status, undifferentiated skills, repetitive work tasks, and lower social position—to require more 
control. Subsequently, work is designed to eliminate autonomy through deskilling (Burawoy, 
1976), fixed scheduling (Reich & Bearman, 2018), fixed piece-rate pay systems and wage 
schedules (Gouldner, 1954; Shaw, 2014), scripts for routine customer interactions (Liedner 1996, 
1999), and continual pressure exercised through organizational norms (Barker, 1993; 
Mazmanian, Orlikowski & Yates, 2013; Michel, 2011; Van Maneen, 1979; Kunda, 1992). In 
spite of these constraints, workers regularly undertake acts of autonomy (e.g., Anteby, 2008; 
Haraszti, 1978; Juravich, 1985; Ramsay 1966; Bensman & Gerver, 1963; Pollert, 1981; 
Hodgson, 2004; Gouldner, 1954) and management responds with attempts to squelch them 
(Edwards, 1979; Ezzamel & Willmott, 1998; Gouldner, 1954; McLoughlin, Badham & Palmer, 
2005; Reich & Bearman, 2018; Vallas, 2016). Organizations view these acts of autonomy, at 
best, as attempts to undermine productivity and, at worse, as threats to extinguish the 
organization. Algorithms provide a new, powerful tool to further redesign jobs and limit 
autonomy. 
In contrast, lower-skilled workers who have a psychological sense of autonomy over their 
work activities often appear less threatening to organizations and management. A sense of 
autonomy is positively associated with job satisfaction, motivation, and performance (Bunderson 
& Thompson, 2009; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005; Rosso, Dekas, & 
Wrzesniewski, 2010; Tims, Derks, & Bakker, 2016). Being able to craft one’s jobs and design 
meaningful work (Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001) is especially important for lower-skilled 
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workers who often find themselves in physically demanding and stigmatizing work (Leana, 
Miettal & Stiehl, 2012). Meaningfulness is often constructed through interpersonal sensemaking 
and interpreting the cues workers receive from their supervisors and co-workers (Wrzesniewski, 
Dutton & Debebe, 2003). Those in lower-skilled work, for example, may experience 
meaningfulness from managers normalizing stigmatized activities (Ashforth, Kreiner, Clark & 
Fugate, 2017), job titles (Grant, Berg & Cable 2014), reminders from peers about their values 
(Dutton, Debebe & Wrzesniewski, 2016), or connections to a broader purpose such as animal 
welfare (Schabram & Maitlis, 2017). Compared to those in higher-skilled positions, lower-
skilled workers often find it harder to craft a sense of autonomy in their work activities as they 
must change the expectations of others as opposed to only altering their own thoughts and 
behaviors (Berg, Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2010). Further, features of the algorithmic work 
environment may limit the ways lower-skilled workers seek and experience autonomy. Often 
physically isolated, these workers have limited exposure to interpersonal cues from managers or 
co-workers that could enforce their sense of autonomy. The isolation also makes it harder for 
workers to engage in conversation with one another, discuss concerns, and coordinate collective 
action in response to shared grievances. 
The literature on control and autonomy in the workplace thus offers conflicting 
assessments on how control and autonomy might be experienced by workers in an algorithmic 
workplace. On the one hand, algorithms can be seen as constraining autonomy by monitoring, 
structuring, and formalizing work activities with more comprehensive and invasive methods than 
prior control models. Algorithms can lead to more distributed and remote work with workers no 
longer co-located with supervisors whom they can coax and cajole to change rules or with co-
workers with whom they can organize and conspire. This then further tightens the amount of 
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unchecked control that organizations can exert. On the other hand, algorithms also create a space 
where workers can have greater control over their work activities. As work is spliced into 
smaller, independent segments, it can be distributed among independent contractors. In this 
employment arrangement, workers choose whether, when, and where to complete each task and 
often operate away from the prying eyes of managers and co-workers. As the mechanisms of 
socialization are faint, workers may be less likely to internalize organizational culture and rules, 
hence increasing their autonomy.  
The tensions between control and autonomy raise critical questions on whether bedrock 
theories of organizational control from decades of research are still relevant for the 
contemporary, algorithmic workplace. If not, what are new mechanisms of organizational control 
and their relationship to worker autonomy? Focusing on workers’ experience working and 
interacting with algorithms, this research aims to explore how workers navigate the tension 
between algorithmic control and their needs for individual autonomy. I found that many drivers 
working for the ride-hailing industry experienced a sense of autonomy even at times when the 
algorithm was most constraining, because they interpreted their responses to the algorithms as 
helping them meet their goals of earning money. Unpacking the dynamics of these workers’ 
experiences allowed me to make sense of these contradictions and to develop an understanding 
of the relationship between work, control, autonomy, and algorithms.  
 
Research Setting and Data Analysis 
 
The Ride-hailing Industry 
First launched in 2011, ride-hailing services such as Uber, Lyft, Evercar, and Juno have 
disrupted the taxicab industry. Algorithms, which serve to coordinate the work, are the core 
 
123 
innovations that enable these services: Algorithms match independent, distributed drivers 
(working from their own cars) with customers within seconds, giving block-by-block directions. 
Fares dynamically adjust based on consumer demand, and driver performance is evaluated by 
customer ratings and driver acceptance and cancellation rates. Drivers have little direct contact 
with company representatives; even hiring and firing, euphemistically called activation or 
deactivation, is conducted online. Work requirements may vary, with most companies requiring 
clean driving records, no moving violations in the previous three years, state vehicle inspections 
and, increasingly, despite industry protests in some cities, criminal background checks. Once 
hired, which can take from three days to three weeks, workers can go “online” and begin driving. 
 
A Typical Ride: The Work Task 
Completing rides, or a work cycle, is based on a coordinated three-way interaction between the 
driver, the rider, and the app. Drivers begin a shift by choosing a location to open their app, then 
they swipe right to go “on-line,” signaling to the platform that they are ready. A complete ride 
consists of 1) the app matching the driver and rider; 2) the driver getting to the rider’s location 
and waiting for rider to enter vehicle; 4) the driver swiping “start ride” on the app; 5) the driver 
and rider interacting; 6) the driver dropping the rider off at their destination; 7) the driver 
swiping “end ride” and rating the rider. (See Figure 1.) Work cycles may end prematurely, such 
as when a rider fails to show up or the app malfunctions. After the end of a work cycle, 
employees may stay “on-line” and wait to be matched again or go “off-line” and stop working 
altogether. In smaller cities, where trips tend to be shorter, drivers can complete as many as six 
or seven rides in an hour while, in larger markets, a driver may only complete two or three. Rates 
for each ride are determined locally and based on a pick-up fee, distance, time, and surge (if 
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any). Drivers may also be offered bonuses for completing a certain number of rides within a 
designated time period, but this is not required and is not offered in all markets. Gross reports of 
earnings range from $12 to $30 per hour.18  (See Chapter 4 for a more complete description of 
the ride-hailing industry.) 
 
Data Analysis 
I analyzed data using a grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2006; Locke, 2001; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1997) with field observations, interviews, and forum postings as my primary data 
sources. Please see chapter 4 for more details about my setting and data sources. 
 
Stage 0: Iterative Collection and Analysis. Data was collected in four two-month waves, with 
each collective wave followed by two months of preliminary analysis and reflection. For 
example, after my first round of data collection (roughly 10 hours of driving and 20 interviews), 
I refined my research questions, interview schedule, and the structure of my field notes. I noticed 
that drivers often discussed pricing incentives (surges and bonuses for completing a certain 
number of rides) and setting daily/weekly earning goals.19 This issue and similar themes 
appeared often in my field notes, and thus in subsequent interviews, I probed to understand if and 
how drivers’ activities were shaped by incentives (e.g., ignoring bonuses that were too 
challenging to achieve, choosing to drive around projected surge times). I also paid attention to 
this in my own behavior as a driver. I continued to identify new themes as my research 
progressed, thus coming to ask about pricing incentives and how changes in policies (e.g., Uber’s 
                                                
18 Calculating drivers’ true net pay is difficult as earnings vary based on mileage rates (which vary by city), incentives offered 
(which vary by person as determined by the app), hours worked, the cost of operating the car (gas, insurance, depreciation, 
maintenance), and tax rates. Further, some cities, such as New York City, have implemented hourly minimum wages. 
19 Similar to cab drivers, ride-hailing drivers set daily or weekly earning goals; however, unlike taxi drivers (Camerer, Babcock, 
Loewenstein & Thaler, 1997), drivers will stay out longer during periods of high demand, such as in inclement weather, earning 
above their initial goals (Cramer & Krueger, 2016). 
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addition of tipping in 2017) influenced work activities as well as drivers’ concerns about the 
ratings evaluation system.  
 
Stage 1: Open and Focused Coding. Towards the end of my field work, I began focused data 
analysis. While my preliminary analysis informed my way of thinking, I put these early 
observations aside in order to see my data with fresh eyes as I began coding, or as Charmaz 
(1996:45) calls it, “generating the bones of analysis.” First, I read over my field notes to 
familiarize myself with their content and then turned to the interviews for more in-depth coding. 
Interviews and field notes were coded over five rounds. I began by open coding one-fifth of my 
transcripts selected on maximum variation of the following: gender, number of hours worked, 
length of time driving, and geographic location. From the initial codes three major themes 
emerged: narratives about the work experience (emphasis on general (dis)like of the work itself 
and the app), income (emphasis on maximizing income), and ratings (emphasis on grievances 
about the ratings system). In the next two coding rounds, I started to focus on identified themes 
while also continuing open coding, through which two additional themes emerged: interactions 
with the app (i.e., accepting a ride request) and strategies to create a good work day. No new 
themes emerged in the last two rounds of coding. Throughout the process, I wrote memos, 
discussed ideas with colleagues, and presented early findings at workshops. 
 
Stage 2: Axial Coding. In the next stage of analysis, I began axial coding and iterating between 
the data and existing theory to build “a dense texture of relationships” around concepts 
(Charmaz, 2006: 60). Based on my lived experience, I knew there was a rhythm to driving so I 
began by constructing a model of a routine day and a routine ride. I quickly noticed work 
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repetitions depending on the time I worked, driving the same streets (e.g., North Capitol Street 
on weekday mornings, Wisconsin Avenue on weekend evenings), with similar people (e.g., 
professionals in the morning, partiers on weekend evenings), having identical conversations (i.e., 
silence in the morning, drunken conversations on Saturday night). Work tasks were also 
repetitive in that each ride required the same interactions with the app (e.g., accepting a ride, 
rating the rider). Informants across cities used near-identical language to describe their days and 
rides, which confirmed my hunch. Using stacks of index cards, I laid out the five thematic codes 
on top of the routine day and routine ride models and, as I had more data for typical rides than 
typical days, I focused my analysis on the former. As rides were coordinated through the app, I 
turned to the literature on mobile devices, platform work, and algorithms. One thing that puzzled 
me in the literature was that algorithms were often described as a discrete unit (e.g., Orlikowski 
and Scott, 2013; Seavers, 2017; Curchod et al., 2019) as opposed to a system of distinct yet 
interlocking controls, as both I and my informants had experienced. Declining a ride, for 
example, affects ratings and ratings can affect the following week’s bonus offering. Building on 
this insight, I re-coded my data around each mention of an algorithm-like function.20 I identified 
five types of algorithms: work matching, work instructions, surge pricing, bonus pricing, and 
ratings. Further coding clarified the following for each algorithm: its purpose, how it 
communicated to drivers, how it was linked to other algorithms, and whether it influenced 
drivers through rewards or sanctions. With the temporal work cycle and function of each of the 
five types of algorithms, clear coding for the second half of my findings was relatively 
straightforward. I identified and coded human-algorithm interactions, paying close attention to 
the conditions surrounding each interaction, as well as consequences and drivers’ responses. 
                                                
20	As my informants rarely used the word algorithm, instead choosing to obscure the algorithms’ functions, I relied on my own 
experiences to determine whether an informant’s responses referenced an algorithm.	
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Originally, I had only two tactics (compliance and deviance) that were associated with two 
algorithmic controls (rewards and sanctions). Conversations with colleagues pushed me to 
consider cases where the drivers were making choices that the algorithm didn’t reward or punish, 
eventually leading to the labeling of engagement tactics. 
 
Stage 2: Theoretical Coding. In the final round of analysis, theoretical coding, I developed 
relationships between categories elicited in earlier stages in order to “weave the fractured story 
back together” (Charmaz, 2006: 63). At this point I had all of my data neatly laid out in front of 
me in a mass of index cards—the tactics linked to each algorithm and each algorithm linked to a 
different stage in the temporal work cycle. I repeatedly asked myself, “What is the company 
trying to do?” and “What are the workers trying to do?” In re-reading transcripts, I found that 
one of my informants had already answered these questions: “The company is trying to make 
drivers take as many rides as possible. The driver is trying to make as much money as possible.” 
Suddenly everything clicked. The company was trying to structure work in such a way that 
drivers would find it easy—even compelling—to give as many rides as possible. Tasks were 
simple and discrete, so they could be monitored and doled out by an algorithm, yet they were 
also designed to be motivating, hence the pricing incentives. Advertisements emphasized the 
personal freedom of driving one’s own car, and workers were drawn to the idea of being free to 
work and earn whenever and whatever they wanted. From my first day in the field, I saw drivers, 
including myself, taking advantage of the flexibility in the schedule while trying to maximize 
earnings. I went back to my data and re-coded around themes of choice, discretion, and freedom. 
Identifying autonomy as a key theme in how workers viewed the work overall and in each 
algorithmic encounter gave me more confidence in autonomy as a key finding. Moving between 
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analyzing data, drawing models, and writing memos, I further refined categories to better 
understand the mechanisms that participants credited as responsible for shaping their autonomy. 
I mapped these mechanisms for each tactic and then abstracted these ideas to devise a theory that 
explains how workers construct a sense of autonomy in light of algorithmic constraints.  
 
Coordination and Autonomy in the Algorithmic Work Environment 
I present the empirical findings in three sections to address how workers navigate the inherent 
conflict between algorithmic control and individual needs for autonomy. In the first two sections, 
I describe how this tension is present in the work arrangement. First, I describe how algorithms 
scaffold and coordinate work, through rewards, sanctions, and pacing, which, in turn, create the 
algorithmic work environment. I then discuss how two features of the work arrangement—
schedule flexibility and the compensation structure—create a set of expectations in which drivers 
perceive ride-hailing as enabling freedom, especially as compared to standard work. In the final 
section and heart of the paper, I explore the lived tensions between algorithmic control and 
autonomy. I investigate how drivers navigate their day-to-day work environment using three sets 
of tactics: compliance, engagement, and deviance. I then explain how these tactics and the 
inferences that undergird them reinforce workers’ perceptions of autonomy even though the 
work is tightly coordinated by algorithms. After presenting these findings, I conclude that while 
this type of work promises freedom in terms of flexibility, it actually only provides choices; yet, 
these choices are sufficient enough to foster a sense of autonomy. Thus, the term “good bad 
job”—good in that this work offers a sense of autonomy, which is often lacking in lower-skilled 




Structural Context for Work Coordination in the Ride-hailing Industry  
Algorithms Scaffold Work Coordination. Algorithms scaffold the ride-hailing system by 
coordinating the work cycle and controlling behaviors through rewarding, penalizing, and timing 
drivers. Five algorithms coordinate the work cycle by: 1) matching drivers and riders, or 
assigning work; 2) instructing drivers on how to do the work (e.g., giving directions, setting 
timers, suggesting acceleration speeds); 3) adjusting ride prices dynamically during busy times 
(surge pricing); 4) offering bonuses (“Do 50 rides in the next 5 days for an extra $50.”); and 5) 
evaluating performance through customer service metrics. (See Table 1 for descriptions of all 
five algorithms.) [Insert Table 1 about here.] Together these control and coordination 
mechanisms create a workplace where the algorithms are the focal feature—for example, in a 
four-hour shift a driver may only complete a dozen rides but will have more than a hundred 
unique interactions with the algorithm.  
 
Rewards. Algorithms coordinate work through rewarding, sanctioning, and pacing drivers’ 
behavior to guide workers to behave as desired. The pricing algorithms—surges and bonuses—
reward drivers if they coordinate their schedules in response to demand. Surges can be 
predictable, such as commuting hours, or sporadic based on local events, traffic patterns, and 
weather. Texts or in-app notes alert drivers that: “Demand is higher than usual in Center City. 
Take advantage of higher than normal fares!”, “1.2 - 1.8x boost - 4.30PM-7PM in downtown 
DC!” and “Adele is playing at the Convention Center tonight! The streets will be full of 
people!!” (See Image 5-1.) Heat maps pop-up when drivers first sign on and after every ride, 
displaying real-time demand, with darker colors indicating higher surge areas. (See Image 2.) 
Checking and following heat maps become a routine part of the workday, so that one “turn[s] on 
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[the] app and then you see that very orange, bright color” (Sarah, Chicago) and rush to “try to go 
where the heat maps are surging” (Nancy, San Francisco) for the rewards of higher pay. “I got 
three pool rides in a row—sweet!” (Field notes, February 2017).  
Weekly bonuses offer extra pay for completing a ride quota that is algorithmically 
determined. How bonuses are set are proprietary and at times seem arbitrary; for example, a 
driver who meets the quota one week may receive an easier or harder quota the following. 
Bonuses and quotas are clearly and continuously communicated to drivers though texts and in-
app alerts—indeed, while taking a three-month hiatus I still received biweekly texts. (See Image 
3.) Bonuses also induce commitment by offering larger rewards for staying on the app for longer 
periods. After driving with a competitor, a Boston driver, Porris, received a bonus offer from his 
prior company: “They will pay me up to $500 on top of the money that I make for [regular 
rides]. And if I stay without logging out for one hour they will pay me $40. (Laughs) That’s how 
they just got me back easily.” In sum, pricing algorithms reward drivers, and these payments 
influence commitment to a particular company. 
 
Sanctions. The matching and evaluation algorithms sanction workers who do not comply with 
company policies. When the algorithm matches a driver to a rider, the driver’s phone buzzes, 
presenting approximate distance to pick-up locations, details about the rider (rating), and surge 
amount (if any); drivers have fifteen-seconds to accept. If drivers do not accept and complete a 
certain percentage of rides, they are sanctioned. “We use acceptance rates to determine driver 
eligibility for certain incentives and help keep rider wait times short,” one policy notes. 
Escalating repercussions for declining rides include warnings, temporary blocks, and permanent 
deactivation; consequently, most drivers reported accepting all requests. (See Image 4.) When 
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asked if she declines any rides, Jay, in D.C., replied, “Not really, because like I mentioned, I’m 
out here to work.” Laughing, she added, “You can decline—how are you going to decline?” and 
reported that she had accepted every ride request in the past year. 
 Riders’ ratings serve as a proxy for managers’ performance evaluations, as high ratings 
(>4.6) are required to continue driving. In short, riders can fire drivers. While instances of 
deactivation due to ratings are low, with leaked internal reports suggesting only 2-3% drivers are 
at risk (Cook, 2015), the threat of low ratings looms large. Drivers hang signs over backseats 
reminding riders that anything less than five stars is harmful. (See Images 5, 6, and 7.) At the end 
of one ride, a driver cheerily said to me, “You’ve been a five-star customer! I hope you rate me 
the same!!” while making sure I was watching him rate me. Drivers with high ratings receive 
compliments, badges, and congratulatory notes from headquarters. (See Images 8 and 9.) In the 
case of a ratings drop, some drivers receive warnings, with information about how to improve 
customer service or an order to attend a class, while others are deactivated with no means of 
recourse. (See Images 10 and 11.) In cities with only one ride-hailing company, deactivation is 
the equivalent of an industry shut-out.21  
  
Timing. Lastly, the work instruction algorithm coordinates work through navigation and timing. 
After a driver accepts a ride, these algorithms provide directions, create queues, and set timers. 
Instructional material describes the process as follows: “After you accept a request, tap 
‘Navigate.’ The app automatically opens your selected navigation app to guide you to the rider. 
The rider will see your car icon approaching on their app and your ETA. When you’re getting 
close, we’ll send them a text message.” (See Image 12.) Once the driver arrives, a countdown 
                                                
21 While drivers also rate riders, these ratings do not have the same consequences. If a driver rates a three or below, they are not 




timer appears dictating how long drivers must wait (sixty seconds to ten minutes based on ride 
type) before marking the rider as a no-show and being matched with the next. In shared rides 
work instructions are critical as multiple individuals with different destinations share the same 
vehicle and drivers depend on the navigation systems to indicate the route. Instructions urge 
drivers to “Always follow the app’s instructions. The route is built on efficiency, so the order of 
who is picked up and dropped off first varies from ride to ride.” (See Image 13.) In another 
example of timing, in high-traffic areas such as airports and sporting events, drivers are assigned 
to virtual queues. 
Nudges or algorithmically-informed suggestions influence work coordination by 
suggesting behaviors. Texts—such as, “You haven’t driven in three days. Go out there and make 
some money!” or “Summer weekends are busy! Head to your promo hub [in app] for weekend 
incentives and surge pricing”—encourage drivers to sign on. Other notifications push longer 
hours, such as pop-ups that appear only when logging off: “You’ve only driven 11 hours today!” 
or “Only $18 to go until you meet yesterday’s pay-out.” (See Image 14.) Drivers must click 
“OK” to acknowledge the message before they can log off. Telemetrics monitor speed, 
acceleration, and deceleration, offering encouragements such as: “Good job keeping your 
breaking smooth!” (See Image 15.) In sum, through rewarding, sanctioning, timing work 
activities, and nudging behaviors, the algorithms create the structural environment or algorithmic 
workplace within which drivers navigate.  
 
Drivers’ Image of Work 
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The Air of Freedom. Two features of the work arrangements—schedule flexibility and the 
compensation system—create a psychological lens through which drivers view the work as 
enabling freedom.  
 
Schedule Flexibility: Freedom from the tyranny of the 9-5 workplace is the most-touted promise 
of ride-hailing. “I’m my own boss” is a common refrain drivers use to describe their work, 
largely based on the ability to set their own work schedule in their own car, without managerial 
interference. Advertisements urge potential drivers to “Drive into the Future and Ditch the 9-5.” 
(See Image 8.) Viewing traditional 9-5 workers “as almost being in a Matrix type of situation, 
stuck to their jobs, stuck to their time and all that,” Chapman, in D.C., credits driving with 
opening his eyes so he doesn’t “see work as something that you got to go fill out an application 
and be somebody’s employee.” Comparing ride-hailing to his prior union job, Jackson, in 
Philadelphia, said, “I don’t have to do eight hours. On my [prior] job, you show up for four hours 
and then you want to leave for two, that’s not an option. Uber, I can do it for four hours. Stop for 
three hours, then start for four hours. I control the shift. I don’t have a boss.” Drivers scheduled 
work around professional and personal obligations. Seth, a D.C. driver, said the flexibility made 
him a more available parent: “I'm a man with kids and I didn’t want to miss my kids’ school 
appointments. I'll be able to be home with them and I don't have to call no bosses and lie and 
give an excuse that I'm sick.” Schedule flexibility also allows drivers to take extended breaks. 
Sheldon, in Ann Arbor, takes four to five months off every year to run another business. It took 
more than two months to schedule a follow-up call with Nathan, in Charlottesville, as he often 
traveled. “Nobody told me that you can go or you can’t. I turn off my application, I go home [to 
Pakistan]. I come back and I start again. At other companies, you have to give notice months 
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[before] and sometimes it is impossible. If you find [another] job for a month or two, you get 
your job, and come back. Nobody asks you why you are not here.” Schedule flexibility allowed 
workers to juggle multiple priorities and obligations without having to interact with a manager, 
supporting their belief that employment in the ride-hailing industry enables freedom.  
Drivers report that being able to work unencumbered by management and co-workers 
was another perk that enhanced flexibility. Tabitha, in Detroit, wanted to continue driving as she 
did not “want to have another bad boss and be miserable.” Describing his prior job at a nursing 
home, Aaron, in D.C., said, “The working environment stressed me out a lot and my coworkers. 
[And I just had to do something.] I interviewed a few drivers and they tell me they like the 
flexibility. So Uber is the right choice, it was a smooth transition.” Driving in personal cars 
allowed drivers flexibility in designing their work environment with bobbleheads, floor lights, 
signs, play lists, and snacks. Some drivers guide conversation to topics of interest such as social 
justice. This flexibility can make driving work feel freeing, especially compared to traditional 
work.   
Uber doesn’t feel like real work to me. The time goes fast. Today I been [driving] since 6 
AM. It’s 9:41 in the morning now. I’m at Starbucks getting my coffee. I ordered a mocha 
with whip cream earlier. I listen to my own music. I control where I’m going. It doesn’t 
feel like work. Not asking someone else for permission—now that separates it from 
work. I don’t have to stay a certain time. (Jackson, Philadelphia) 
 
In sum, the flexibility the work arrangement provides, through scheduling and being away from 




Unlimited Earning Potential: The compensation system also contributed to drivers’ sense of 
freedom; given the scheduling flexibility, drivers could literally work non-stop.22 Drivers 
reported they could “basically write their own check” (Polly, Philadelphia) and “there’s a lot of 
money to be made” (Jamal, Detroit) if you “put in the time” (Tabitha, Detroit) by “getting up 
early, being out there [and] not going in for stupid reasons” (Kristen, New Haven). Chapman, a 
former union worker reflected the sentiments of most participants: 
If I need $1,000 in one week, I can get it. If I need $2,000 in one week, I can get it. At a 
job I couldn’t do that without tons of overtime and approvals and whatnot. I can do that 
with Uber, I can make as much money as I can possibly, basically just put[ting] myself to 
[it], I can make it. It’s very refreshing. 
 
Expected and unexpected bills kept drivers on the road. Winnie, in D.C., reported driving on her 
day off to pay for the water bill her daughter ran up when home for the holidays. One winter 
week I noticed I was taking longer and longer breaks, once taking a three-hour break to feed 
ducks at a park. The next day, looking at an upcoming bill, I decided to make a change:   
Well, it’s before 7 a.m. and I’m on the road. That’s much earlier than any time this week. 
I’m a bit nervous because it’s my first big [long] day and I don’t think there’s any way I 
can cover the rental [car] cost unless I get the promotion [incentive]. Here I go—I gotta 
get out there and get my paper!! Ain’t nobody going to pay me unless it’s me. (Field 
notes, February 2017) 
 
Through self-talk I propelled myself into action, reminding myself I was responsible for my 
earnings. Like many drivers, Kentucky in Philadelphia set earning goals to ensure he makes what 
he wants: “Usually I like to make $150 or more. That’s a nice number to get. If I’m getting a lot 
of short rides the whole night, I’ll settle for 120 or 30 and then I’ll go home—nothing less.” 
Overall, schedule flexibility was valued by drivers as it allowed them to dictate both their 
working hours and money earned.  
 
                                                
22 The majority of interviews were conducted before ride-hailing companies started capping how many consecutive hours drivers 
could work. Starting in mid-2018, drivers were forced to take a 6-hour break after 12 hours on the road. The few drivers who 
complained about the cap have circumvented it by splitting their shift or working on more than one app. 
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Worker Experiences in Response to Coordination by Algorithms 
The control and coordination of work by algorithms and workers’ needs of autonomy create a 
continual tension that are played out at the site of each human-algorithm encounter. In the 
following section, I describe the lived experience of this tension by exploring the practices 
individuals use to navigate their algorithmic work environment and the consequences of those 
practices. Ultimately, I find that the responses to each tactic (compliance, engagement, deviance) 
reinforce drivers’ sense of autonomy in spite of the constraints imposed by the algorithms.  
  
 
Compliance Tactics: Algorithms as Rules. 
Driving is often routine. How often do we check the side mirror before signaling and changing 
lanes? Or stop upon hearing the sirens of an ambulance? These small, routine actions are part of 
the rules of the road and, similarly, drivers follow rules when encountering algorithms. 
Following the algorithms’ rules such as accepting rides or heeding routing directions are built 
into the work system—if drivers fail to comply, they are not able to work and thus are not able to 
earn money. Other times, following the algorithms’ nudges (such as driving to an area indicated 
as surging by a text message) is financially rewarded. Jay, in D.C., described the work 
environment as a system of rules meant to be followed: 
The system is: [you] do the work or you don’t. There’s no in-between. You got to be out 
here. If you are out here during the surge hours in the morning then you’re going to be 
ahead of the game within those two hours, you can make $50 to $60—as the day goes on 
you make $200. If you work during the surge in the afternoon that adds up. So that’s the 
only thing you can really do. You can’t go around the system. The system is foolproof. 
You can’t cheat it [laughs]. There’s no way. Yeah. No. The app determines the distance 
and determines how long you’re in the car and how much you’re going to get paid—so 




In order to meet their income goals, following the algorithms’ rules becomes standard behavior. 
When asked, “How do you use the app?” or “Do you have any special techniques you use 
driving?” the most common responses were: “Like you’re supposed to,” and “No.” Drivers know 
to accept most trips because if they decline, that means no work, and they ultimately want to 
work.  
 
Hard Compliance: Hitting Incentives. In hard compliance, drivers are rewarded by following the 
algorithm’s nudges. Common nudges are text notifications of hourly wage guarantees, surge 
pricing, and bonuses for completing a certain number of rides. Choosing to stay on the road to 
meet a bonus is a way for drivers to express autonomy. Polly, in Philadelphia, said, “I try to be in 
the areas where the incentives are. That’s more money for me.” Flexing her schedule around the 
bonuses, Tabitha, in Detroit, said, “You know what you need up front in the beginning of the 
week. It’s a 20 percent bonus and that’s basically what I’m trying to hit. If I hit this, then I’m 
good, I’ll go home [laughs].” Chapman, a Detroit driver, said, 
It’s an opt-in thing they make you do—so by opting in that’s my way of saying, “I’m 
taking the perks and I’m working the system.” Last week I made 35 extra dollars off 
some perks and I did it by doing what I’m supposed to do. That’s all I continue to do. In 
any job do what you’re supposed to and everything else will work itself out. It’s just 
staying on the road, cause you gotta do the hours to make it work out. You can’t cheat, 
you know what I mean? 
 
Opting in, or following the algorithm, is seen as the only way to increase earnings; thus, drivers 
stay on the road to meet their goals of maximizing income. Nervous laughter and references to 
the futility of cheating suggest drivers believe they have less control than the algorithms. Even 
though it is clear who is creating the rules (the algorithms) and who is following them (the 
drivers), drivers are still able to exercise some discretion by choosing to drive long enough to 
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meet the ride quotas. By keeping themselves moving, drivers feel they are accomplishing their 
work and exerting their best effort to meet their goals.  
  
Soft Compliance: Giving Riders Five Stars. In soft compliance there are no rewards or 
punishments associated with following the algorithm’s rules, although drivers are aware of its 
preferences. Drivers are encouraged, for example, to rate riders five stars. After completing a 
ride, drivers are directed to a screen that is prefilled with a five-star rating and it is easiest just to 
accept that rating. Jackson, in Philadelphia, said, “I give everybody five stars. It’s just not that 
deep, mentally, to me to be giving somebody three stars instead of five. As long as you stay back 
there, don’t mess up my car, and don’t bother me, you’re five stars.” Likewise, Casside, in 
Houston, said, 
I don’t have a problem with the rating system because everybody that I bring, I give five 
stars. You could’ve been ugly. You could’ve been mean. You could’ve been everything. 
I’m gonna still give you five stars because of the fact that—guess what?—you paid me. I 
brought you to your destination and you paid me. I don’t have no shade about why you 
mad today. I didn’t do it. All I know is that I need to get you to your destination in a fast, 
safe way so I can get my money and you can get out of my car. Gotta keep it moving. 
 
By choosing to accept a pre-filled five-star rating regardless of riders’ behavior, drivers are 
saving themselves the time and mental effort of evaluating every ride. By extension, drivers 
report not considering riders’ ratings when deciding whether or not to accept rides. Joel, in 
Detroit, never declines rides based on ratings, explaining: “I want to work. I’m not here to see 
what you’re rated.” Drivers follow the rating-system suggestions in part because they can get 
back to their primary task, making money, as soon as possible—simply put, it is easier to give 




Compliance Tactics Summary: Autonomy as Mobility. In compliance tactics, drivers interpret the 
algorithm as a set of rules, and believe they need to follow the rules in order to reach their 
earning potential. Instead of drawing on schedule flexibility as a source of autonomy, these 
drivers associate physical mobility with autonomy. They view being on the road and earning 
rewards from the algorithm as the only path to success: “You gotta be out there” (Jay). “It’s just 
staying on the road, cause you gotta do the hours” (Chapman). “Keep it moving” (Casside). 
“Keep on moving and pick up the next one” (Roger). “If your car is not moving you cannot earn 
money. That’s what the driving job is all about” (Jonathan, D.C.). Overall, this tactic suggests 
that though some drivers see themselves as working for the algorithm, being able to physically 
navigate their environment in a way that is rewarded by the algorithm gives them an overall 
sense of autonomy. 
 
Engagement Tactics: Algorithms as Tools 
Driving often requires strategizing. On a road trip, for instance, a driver might use a navigation 
system, cruise control, and a toll pass to reach the destination faster. Similarly, drivers engage 
with algorithms to navigate their environment and earn money more efficiently. Using the 
algorithm to make strategic decisions is neither rewarded nor penalized. 
 
Chasing, Ignoring, and Avoiding Surges. Taking into account surge pricing is the most common 
way drivers report engaging with algorithms. Ernest, in Los Angeles, described the importance 
of surges: 
[They] play a critical role in whether or not you’re going to go out, because you’re 
dealing with economics—one thing about [driving] is you don’t want to waste your time 
or your gas. I use it to my advantage. They give you the information via the satellite and 
when it comes into your app, you want to be in those areas. [The company] pays flat rates 




Surges can often make the difference between breaking even and making a profit, especially as 
base-mileage pay declined over the years. To chase a surge, drivers check heat maps, text 
messages, or in-app notifications before driving to in-demand areas. Porris, in Boston, uses the 
heat map to determine the most profitable areas. “I’m just waiting for the surge price to go up. 
When the surge price is starting to go up, that’s when I put the system on. I know where to be, 
when, what time—every single day.” Forum posts offer complex suggestions to monitor surge 
pricing through time-lapse screenshots or using “one phone to drive for Uber or Lyft, and the 
other phone to zoom out to your entire market to watch the surge areas.”  
Not all drivers chase surges. SueEllen, in Denver, ignores them. “I don't pay much 
attention to the surge. I start up where I start off and just go wherever I get my ping. Driving 
towards the surge, it’s just not worth it. It’s just too much thinking.” Due to their real-time 
nature, surges change frequently. Drivers often mistrust surges because they disappear quickly or 
attract too many drivers. Jared, in Seattle, said,   
[The surge] is a little annoying because it’s often times misleading or by the time you get 
there it’s gone. They’ll send out a text message that says, “Adele is playing tonight, the 
streets will be filled with people.” But I’m still going to be taking one person at a time. 
There’s going to be a lot of traffic and I’m going to be driving one person. They just 
exaggerate—maybe that’s a better word—you’ll make crazy cash this weekend. It’s 
almost like they’re insulting your intelligence [laughs]. 
 
Tempering expectations and carefully choosing routes are important strategies, as following the 
surge does not necessarily lead to more money. Others go a step further, examining the heat map 
and then going in the opposite direction. Seth, in D.C., said,   
I don’t hang around where the surge is because there are a lot of cars around. You go a 
little farther to get more passengers than to go where the surge is and get less passengers. 
For example, get one passenger in 30 minutes and make $20, but go outside the surge and 




By monitoring surge notifications and making estimates to determine if a ride is worth their time, 
drivers exercise autonomy. Irrespective of their actions—Porris, for example, only turns on his 
app when there is a surge while Seth drives in the opposite direction—each driver is monitoring 
the app, filtering information, and responding in a way they believe maximizes pay. 
 
Screening Rides. Another engagement tactic is when drivers screen for rides after being paired 
by the matching algorithm. Forum posts urge drivers to “Screen your rides and only take the 
ones that make sense for you. Learn to say no to long rides during rush hour. It will absolutely 
enhance your driving experience and add several thousand dollars per year in your pocket.” 
Drivers filter rides by distance, ratings, and surge, often declining rides that are more than ten 
minutes away or that will pull them from preferred areas. Ralph, in Detroit, said, 
I screen out riders by their name, rating, and location. These people are more problematic 
than average. I won’t even pick up because it’s not worth it. They just harass me. I’m 
traveling from 10-15 minutes away to take them to a liquor store and wait for them with 
their kids. 
 
Before each pick-up, a driver does a mental calculation using the output of the matching 
algorithm as input to calculate potential income versus time spent. Rejecting more distant 
pickups allows drivers to be available for shorter, more profitable rides. By screening, drivers are 
able to strategically use the algorithm’s information in a way that supports their own interest to 
earn money.  
The “Get Rides to Destination” feature allows drivers to request the matching algorithm 
to pair them with rides in a chosen direction (limited to two per day). Nancy, a San Francisco 
driver, uses it to pick up riders while commuting to her primary job. Forum drivers report putting 
in distant destinations, states away, to get longer rides. Like many drivers I entered my home 
address towards the end of a shift to get another fare before stopping for the day.  
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I needed to be home by 3:15, so I put on the “Get Rides to a Destination” feature. Ping 
…  [shared ride], too much hassle, plus it’s an 8-minute drive away. Decline! Ping. 
Another [shared ride]… Decline! Can these people not give me a good ride? [Shared] 
rides take too long and there’s no way I’ll get home in time. Another decline and I’ll be 
blocked [30 seconds] from the app. Whatever. Ping. Oh good, it’s a [private] ride. 
Accept! I drop the lady off only a few blocks away from my house and I’m home at 3:08! 
(Field notes, July 2018) 
 
This example illustrates the multiple ways drivers can engage with the algorithm while staying 
within the boundaries. Even after requesting rides in a certain direction, I exercise another level 
of choice by calculating which rides are more likely to get me home in time and am indifferent to 
the penalties for rejecting multiple rides.  
 
Selective Work Entry and Exit. Another engagement tactic is to strategically log in and out of the 
app to earn more. Many drivers prefer starting work in busier areas, even if it means commuting 
thirty to ninety minutes. Chase, in D.C., said, “I try to stay away from the inner cities, because 
it’s a lot more traffic, so I normally cut it on when I’m on the Beltway [or] when I get almost to 
the airport.” Kentucky drives forty-five minutes from the suburbs to downtown Philadelphia. 
Usually what I do is I get to the Manayunk-Roxborough exit. Two miles before I get to 
the exit I turn it on to try and get the algorithm working because the algorithm factors in 
how much time you’ve been waiting to receive a ride. The longer I’m online, the more 
chance I have to get a ping and go pick somebody up. The first couple days I did that I 
got a ping right as I got off the exit. That’s where I start and then I keep going on from 
there. 
 
In the hopes of influencing the matching algorithm, Kentucky turns on the app before he arrives 
at where he actually wants to start working. In a similar tactic, called going fishing on some 
forums, drivers scope out other drivers on the passenger app and either position their car between 
or far away from other cars to optimize chances of being paired with a ride. 
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 Lastly, workers may turn off the app in one area before turning it back on in another more 
lucrative area. In college towns most rides are short and thoughts differ on whether or not these 
are profitable. Two drivers describe their opposing beliefs.  
I told my buddy this. Sometimes you just got to turn on the app and go wherever the 
riders take you. If you go to Ypsilanti, just leave it on. If the Ypsilanti person takes you to 
Detroit, leave it on. If the Detroit person takes you to Royal Oak, leave it on. Do that 
once and see where you go and how much you make, because you’ll see that it doesn’t 
pay to do that. They’ll see that staying in Ann Arbor is the best thing you can do as 
opposed to going outside. At the end of the day you look and see how much money you 
made, and you realize that, hey, I didn’t make a lot of money at all. (Sheldon, Ann Arbor) 
 
I get out of Ann Arbor as fast as I can. They charge about 20 cents more a mile, which is 
good. They charge more of a base rate, which is good. But your rides are much shorter. 
So if you’re going two miles in Ann Arbor, it could take you 10 to 12 minutes to get 
there. You can’t make any money. Between the hills and people walking, you can’t get 
anywhere fast. I’d rather take someone 20 miles on a highway, because I can get there in 
20 minutes and make some money, than take someone three miles around Ann Arbor 
making an extra 20 cents a mile. (Leo, Detroit) 
 
Although drivers differ in their opinions about what types of rides are more profitable, their 
responses are the same—engaging with the app to stay in their preferred areas. Blind compliance 
will not result in more money; only strategic interaction does. Switching the app on and off gives 
drivers a sense of autonomy in that they are able to circumvent the matching algorithm and stay 
in preferred areas. 
 
Engagement Tactics Summary: Autonomy as Strategizing. In engagement tactics, drivers 
interpret the algorithm as a tool using its output to inform their decisions. These tactics reinforce 
drivers’ sense of autonomy in that they enable drivers to strategically navigate their work 
environment in order to meet their earnings potential. Each encounter with the algorithm presents 
drivers with another opportunity to exercise their discretion, such as analyzing a heat map before 
deciding whether or not to drive towards a surge area. Additionally, the tactic of choosing when 
to begin and end work further reinforces a sense of autonomy as it is linked to schedule 
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flexibility. Unlike compliance and deviance tactics, drivers are not rewarded or sanctioned 
because they are interacting with the algorithm as intended or in a way that is not explicitly 
against company policy. In other words, while drivers’ responses to the algorithm may not be 
what the algorithm is suggesting (i.e., drivers ignoring surge nudges), all their responses are 
within the boundaries of the company’s rules and regulations.23 Drivers thus see themselves as 
working in conjunction with the algorithm. In sum, strategizing reinforces drivers’ sense of 
autonomy as it enables them to align their responses to the algorithm with their interests of 
meeting their earnings goals. 
 
Deviance Tactics: Algorithms as Clay 
Drivers skirt the rules. Late to work, a driver may roll through a stop sign or dart into the HOV 
lane and, while these maneuvers can shorten trips, they are ticketable offenses if caught. 
Similarly, drivers manipulate the algorithms to earn more, which can result in punishments if 
detected by the work system. 
 
Pre-Selecting Riders. One of the most prevalent deviance tactics is when drivers attempt to 
circumvent the blind matching algorithm by trying to have the algorithm match them with 
someone already in their car. When I first began data collection, drivers in several cities 
recounted this tactic and my field notes describe such an incident in D.C. in which I was the 
rider: 
[She] seemed unphased as we navigated bumper-to-bumper rush hour traffic, but I was 
nauseated and frustrated with all the out-of-the way stops and complained after we 
dropped off the Georgetown frat boys.“Wanna switch to a private ride?” she asked. 
“Sure, as long as it doesn’t hurt you.” “Naw, it’s cool.” She ended my ride and then went 
                                                
23 While drivers using the passenger app is not the intended function of the app, this tactic is well-advertised on ridehailing web 
communities and has not been blocked by the company, though it would technically be possible to do so. 
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off-line. As soon as she went back on-line, she told me to request a new ride and—ta-
da!—we were matched. As we continued to Ballston, she confessed she didn’t like shared 
rides as she’ll drive for half an hour and realize she's only made $5. (Field notes. August 
2016) 
 
Though against the rule, switching to a private ride was in the driver’s interest as it paid more 
and pleased the rider (me). In late 2015, when ride-hailing first launched in my city, I became 
friendly with a driver who soon became my designated airport driver. I would text him my travel 
plans and once in his car I would request a ride and we would be matched immediately. As a 
rider, I appreciated the convenience of having a ride at a specific time and my driver appreciated 
a guaranteed large fare. By late 2016/early 2017, it took multiple attempts to be matched even 
though we were in the same car, and I often resorted to paying in cash. By mid 2017, I was back 
to using the app in its intended fashion for airport rides; around the same time across the country, 
drivers reported similar events. In late 2017, Pound, in Detroit, describes: 
[A friend asked] “I’ve got to go to the airport at 4:30 p.m. on Friday, can you take me?” 
Sure. It used to be that you would get in the car and they’d request a ride and 
automatically goes to you. It’s changed dramatically. It takes maybe three or four times 
that [the rider] has to request a ride, cancel it, request a ride, cancel it, request a ride, 
cancel it. It gets to me. 
 
Though the code underlying the algorithm is proprietary, it is clear to drivers that the matching 
algorithm has changed in that proximity is no longer the most heavily weighted variable. If 
drivers continue trying to bypass the matching algorithm by rejecting multiple rides, they can be 
charged a penalty or temporarily blocked. These penalties make it less attractive to preselect 
riders, thus further constraining workers’ behavior.  
 
Blanket Ride Rejection. Blanket rejection of specific rides is another deviance tactic. Shared 
rides, where the algorithm coordinates multiple riders who are traveling in the same direction, 
were introduced in late 2015. For the company, shared rides reduce road congestion (allowing 
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drivers on the road to travel more quickly) and offer rides at a lower cost point, which may 
potentially bring in new customers. When the D.C. metro system was undergoing major repairs, 
ride-hailing companies launched massive advertising campaigns and I paid less for shared rides 
than a metro ticket. Most drivers, however, dislike shared rides due to the low fares, circuitous 
routes, and querulous riders confused by the service and frustrated by longer travel times. Two 
drivers shared similar sentiments about shared rides. 
I never did like [shared rides] cause it’s too damn cheap—it’s almost cheaper than a 
metro bus ($1.90). If you reject, it makes your rating go down and then they’ll try to 
block you! I rejected a few until I got a notification, “Hey, we notice that you haven't 
been accepting your [shared rides].” Basically you gonna have to start accepting them or 
you gonna get blocked out of the system. (Winnie, D.C.) 
 
In the beginning they used to say [shared rides] were optional, but after a month they said 
it was mandatory and were sending messages saying they were going to cut me off the 
app if I kept [rejecting shared rides]. I wrote two messages saying all the reasons I don’t 
like doing it. If I force straight decline the ride the app turns off, but I can take a break 
and turn it back on. I really don’t like having five people in the car.  (Jackson, 
Philadelphia) 
 
Though drivers attempt to deviate by rejecting shared rides, their attempts are countered. The 
warnings were severe enough for Winnie to change her behavior, however Jackson continued to 
reject and be blocked. Serial offenders report harsher penalties such as being blocked for longer 
periods or deactivation. In late 2017, new incentives linked bonuses to ride quotas making shared 
rides more attractive. Two drivers described the changing sentiments. 
It was a good day yesterday—had a few [shared rides] so it was nice. [Shared rides are] 
good, especially if you want to get incentives for that promotion. It’s easier and faster to 
get. (Sean, San Francisco) 
 
I love incentives—it helps when I’m trying to get multiple rides. If I’m trying to get 60 
rides and I get a [shared ride], it takes 40 minutes, but I get three rides. It’s a great deal 





With this new incentive, a deviance tactic—blanket ride rejection—is transformed into a 
compliance tactic—bonus opt-in. In doing so, expressing autonomy through deviant behavior is 
curtailed and, instead, drivers are encouraged to express autonomy in a way that is both lucrative 
and aligned with company policies.  
 
Inflating Surges. In the next two deviance tactics, drivers are not penalized, as their deviance is 
not (yet) detected by the work system. Drawing on supply and demand theory, drivers try to 
inflate surge pricing by driving to areas that are about to surge, log off, and then monitor the ride 
app for prices to rise before logging back on. Describing a $180 fare to the airport, more than 
four times the regular fare, Ralph, in Detroit, said, 
What does [the company] want me to do? They want me to take as many rides as 
possible. What do I want to do? I want to make as much money as possible. They punish 
me for it; however I profit more than I hurt. [Describes declining several rides waiting for 
a surge increase.] They were trying to get me to work for a cheaper rate and I didn’t want 
that, but if I [don’t accept] three rides, I get punished and can’t log in for half an hour. I 
figured out ways around it. I just request myself. [Laughs] I use a separate e-mail for my 
passenger and my driver account and I’ll go back online. There is a bit of an opportunity 
cost, but it’s better than being locked out for 30 minutes. 
 
By circumventing the algorithm’s countermeasure (blocking), drivers exercise choice and 
manipulate the algorithm to get the ride at the rate they want. As described earlier in this section, 
trying to be matched with a preselected rider has costs both in terms of time and money, yet 
Ralph is so determined he is willing to pay to earn a higher fare. This escalating cycle of “driver 
deviance-system countermeasure-driver work around-driver deviance” ultimately reinforces a 
sense of autonomy in that the algorithm is eventually “beaten” and a higher fare obtained.   
 
Protecting Ratings. Drivers can be deactivated or deemed not eligible for incentives if their 
rating falls below a threshold. Fearing a poor rating, drivers act preemptively by cancelling 
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potentially negatively-rated rides. Porris, in Boston, said, “If I make a mistake I cancel the trip 
and give it to you for free, doesn’t matter where you are going. [That way] people don’t really 
have the chance to give me any bad rating.” Likewise Roger, in D.C., described:  
I’m 4.90 and before I was a 4.93. I had just turned 4.93 and I picked up a woman and her 
kid. The app took me to the back of where she lived and she was in the front and it was 
really cold. She was holding the kid in her hands, she called me, she was all pissed off at 
me. I said, ma’am, I'm just going where the app sent me. She ran in the back, got in the 
car, destroyed me on the ratings, and I went from a 4.93 to a 4.90 just like that. And if 
you lose points it’s real hard to get them back, so what I’ve learned is that if you want to 
make sure that the person can’t rate you, close out the ride right before you let them off. 
The ride will cancel—it will still pay you up until that point, but it’s impossible for them 
to rate you. I tell them straight up too. I tell them so that they understand, I’m canceling 
you because I don’t want you to rate me. 
 
Prematurely cancelling a ride allows drivers to shape the working environment before the rider 
and rating system can. In Roger’s situation, three interdependent factors beyond his control—a 
malfunctioning work-instruction algorithm, the rider’s sour reaction, and the rider’s negative 
rating—affected his rating. Similar to Ralph, Roger exercised choice and canceled the ride early, 
shortchanging himself in order to protect his ratings.24 Drivers also manipulate other ratings 
systems, such as accepting rides they have no intention of completing in the hopes that the rider 
will cancel and their acceptance rate will remain high.  
 
Deviance Tactics Summary: Autonomy as Manipulating. In deviance tactics, drivers interpret the 
algorithm as malleable clay that they can manipulate in order to increase their earnings. These 
tactics reinforce drivers’ sense of autonomy in that they enable drivers to select the rides they 
most want even when that means going against company policies. Each encounter with the 
algorithm presents an opportunity to manipulate it, such as turning off the app to reduce supply 
                                                
24 While it is statistically impossible for one ride out of the 5,000 that Roger has completed to affect his overall score so 
significantly, drivers report that a single negative rating can have a disproportionate effect on ratings. Further, company websites 
state that ratings are not always calculated by a straight average of the last 500 rides, but give no further information on how 
averages are calculated. 
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and inflate surges. This autonomy comes at a price in that even when these tactics are not 
detected, drivers sometimes sacrifice earnings to manipulate the system. Yet, the very possibility 
of manipulation reinforces drivers’ sense of autonomy as it enables drivers to counter the 
algorithm repeatedly. Taken together, this suggests that drivers see themselves as working 
against the algorithm in that they have greater power over it.  
 
Inferences and Responses to Algorithms that Reinforce a Sense of Autonomy 
Attempting to succeed in a working environment with opaque rules and scripted work activities, 
drivers engaged with the algorithm in ways that supported their aspirations to earn money and 
reinforced their sense of autonomy. Industry standards and norms—such as advertising rhetoric, 
the contracting employment relationship, and the absence of human managers—supported 
drivers’ sense of autonomy by enabling drivers to feel in control of their work activities around 
scheduling and earnings. In contrast, the most prominent feature of the industry, algorithms, 
served as a structural constraint controlling and coordinating work activities through assigning 
rides, dictating wait times, and dynamically setting and adjusting fares. However, somewhat 
paradoxically, drivers interpreted their interactions with the algorithms as reinforcing their sense 
of autonomy. In response to each encounter with an algorithm, drivers deployed a tactic, either 
complying, engaging, or deviating with the algorithm, based on their thoughts about what the 
algorithm was doing, how much autonomy the algorithm was allowing, and their own interests.  
Ultimately, each tactic reinforced drivers’ sense of autonomy in that they were indeed their own 
boss. This process is outlined in Figure 1. 
Although algorithms are a structural feature of the work environment, drivers interpret 
them and interact with them in ways that reinforce their sense of autonomy. Upon encountering 
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an algorithm, drivers make a mental calculation based on their goals, the current working 
conditions, and prior experiences with the algorithm before deciding how to respond in a way 
that will align with their interests. As the inner workings of the algorithms are inherently 
obscure, drivers have to fill in the gaps or make inferences about how the algorithm coordinated 
the work so far and how it would continue to do so. Interpretations of the algorithm fell into 
three broad categories (rule, tool, clay), which allowed a certain amount of autonomy and were 
associated with a corresponding tactic that, in turn, helped drivers maximize their income goals.  
Every interaction with an algorithm or an associated nudge (e.g., heat map, ride 
assignment) set off a chain of interpretations and behaviors that ultimately reinforced drivers’ 
beliefs that they could maximize their earnings. If drivers complied with the algorithm, they were 
inferring the algorithm was rigid, like a rule, so they needed to follow or work for the algorithm 
to meet their goals. Compliance was observed and often rewarded by the company, such as extra 
pay for hitting a ride quota, and the extra pay could help drivers feel autonomous in that they had 
done something (following the rules) to help meet their financial goals. Another type of 
compliance, accepting rides, kept the drivers on the road, enabling them to be matched with more 
rides and thus to meet their income goals. In sum, for compliance tactics, accepting the 
algorithm’s nudges is the most apt way for drivers to meet their financial goals, thus the 
algorithms are seen positively and aligned with drivers’ interests.   
If drivers engaged with the algorithm, they were inferring the algorithm was providing 
information, like a tool, and thus they needed to work with the algorithm to meet their goals. For 
example, a driver could selectively decide when to start and could suspend driving in order to 
remain in more lucrative areas. In this way, drivers strategize and exercise choices about what to 
do. These actions are within the standard practices of work so drivers are neither rewarded nor 
 
151 
punished by the company (as long as the behavior is not excessive). In sum, for engagement 
tactics, each algorithm’s nudge provides information that must be evaluated for drivers to meet 
their financial goals, thus the algorithms are seen as neutral, because, depending on the situation, 
the algorithm can be in (mis)alignment with the drivers’ interest.  
Lastly, if drivers deviated from the algorithm, they inferred the algorithm was malleable, 
like clay, and they needed to work against the algorithm to get what they wanted. Drivers, for 
example, might turn off the app in an area they thought would be busy in order to increase surge 
pricing. When these actions are detected by the system, drivers can either be directly sanctioned 
or collectively curtailed by being “programmed away” by the company, keeping drivers from 
doing this action in the future. In sum, for deviance tactics, algorithmic nudges are, at best, to be 
negotiated and, more often, actively countered in order for drivers to meet their earnings goals, 
and therefore the algorithms are seen negatively and at odds with drivers’ interest. 
Tactics enforce drivers’ sense of autonomy in two different ways. For each tactic, drivers 
responded to algorithms in ways that support their interests, such as maximizing earnings or 
getting home at a certain time. Meeting their goals gives drivers a sense of autonomy in that they 
are making choices that directly affect what they deeply care about. Even in the cases where two 
drivers engaged in completely opposite behaviors to maximize income, such as one staying in a 
certain area while another avoided it altogether, each driver believed they were taking the 
optimal course of action. That drivers make these decisions independently, without the input of 
managers and co-workers, heightens a sense of autonomy. 
Second, each tactic is associated with a micro-expression of autonomy that highlights a 
specific element of control a driver had over their work activities. In compliance tactics, drivers 
keep their car moving and are quickly matched with rides, thus earning more. When deploying 
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deviance tactics, drivers are sanctioned (if caught) with lower ratings and lock-outs and, in 
return, report deploying counter-measures against the algorithm. This cycle of deviating from the 
algorithm, being countered, and then deviating again can give drivers a sense of autonomy as 
they are negotiating with the algorithm to meet their goals. When deploying engagement tactics, 
drivers are neither rewarded nor punished but instead strategize about how to make the best use 
of the information provided to maximize their earnings. By using information from the algorithm 
to make decisions, drivers exhibit a sense of autonomy over their work activities, while still 
operating within the boundaries of the algorithm to meet their goals.  
Strikingly, the algorithm, a feature of the work environment that constrains behavior, is 
interpreted by drivers as enabling autonomy. In part this is due to drivers having a broad 
conceptualization of autonomy and being unaware of how the algorithm actually makes 
decisions. This gap creates a space where drivers are able to interpret the algorithm and their 
responses to it in a way that supports their interests and ideas about autonomy. No matter if a 
driver deems the algorithm as constructive, obstructive, or neutral with respect to their goals, 
they can always interpret their responses to the algorithms as supporting their interests. Shaped 
by the industry’s narrative of freedom and their own experience of schedule flexibility, drivers 
frame all of their responses to the algorithm as indicators of autonomy. Drivers have dozens of 
interactions with the algorithm, and each interaction reinforces a sense of autonomy. In a single 
ride a driver, for example, could use the passenger app to locate the most lucrative area to wait 
for a ride (engagement tactic), then accept the first ride request (compliance tactic) and cancel 
the ride early so the passenger cannot rate the ride (deviance tactic). In sum, although drivers 
make different inferences about the algorithms, all the inferences and the corresponding tactics 






Venturing into the “contested terrain” (Kellogg, Valentine & Christin, 2019) of algorithms, 
control, and autonomy, this study offers insights into the nascent field of algorithmic control and 
how workers navigate within these systems, thus answering calls to develop grounded models 
that reflect the changing realities of work (Barley, Bechky, & Milliken, 2017). Specifically, I 
shed light on how workers navigate the tensions between algorithmic controls and workers’ 
needs for autonomy, ultimately explaining how these workers are able to maintain a sense of 
autonomy within a constrained environment. The identification and articulation of this 
phenomenon offers a number of insights to the literature of autonomy and algorithms in the 
workplace. 
 
Implications for Algorithmic Control  
 Existing research argues that algorithmic control facilitates a new form of rational control 
that is more invasive than technical and bureaucratic control because it is more comprehensive, 
instantaneous, and opaque (Aneesh, 2009; Couchon et al., 2019; Faraj, Pachidi & Sayegh, 2018; 
Kellogg, Valentine & Christin, 2019; Rahman, 2019). Yet, in spite of its constraining nature, I 
find several distinct features of algorithmic control systems that facilitate autonomy. Algorithms 
allow for work to be distributed across individuals so that the organization’s goals are 
accomplished by each worker’s independent effort. This pooled interdependence allows workers 
to have a greater sense of control, mastery, and autonomy over their work activities (Thompson, 
1967), which counteracts the alienation and estrangement that commonly arise in lower-skilled 
work (Vallas, 2016). In addition, the macro-employment conditions of schedule flexibility and 
less structured relationships with management and customers can “enchant” workers (Endrissat, 
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Islam & Noppeney, 2015), despite the harsh material realities of long hours, precarious work 
status, low pay, and dangerous work conditions. The remoteness and physical isolation that is 
often found in conjunction with algorithmic work can also heighten a sense of autonomy. In the 
absence of organizational and managerial cues to guide workers’ interpretations (Jackson & 
Dutton, 1988; Sonenshein, et al., 2013), workers may have attributed their responses to the 
algorithms as self-directed. Further, the large information asymmetry between what the 
algorithm and the worker know may allow workers more cognitive space from which to draw 
their own conclusions which, in the absence of conflicting information, will support their already 
held beliefs that they are making their own choices (Festinger, 1954).   
 These insights about how autonomy is produced provide greater understanding about 
how algorithmic control models incentivize workers beyond the carrot and stick employed by 
other rational control systems (Adler & Borys, 1996; Blau, 1955; Edwards, 1979; Gouldner, 
1954; Zuboff, 1988). I find that this system “manufactures consent” (Burawoy, 1979; Roy, 1952) 
by giving workers the choice to opt-in at every phase during the work cycle. Workers thus have 
more buy-in into the entire process, which is critical in a context where they can stop anytime. 
Similar to escalating commitment (Staw, 1976; 1981), repetitive requests and subsequent buy-ins 
engender commitment to the system while preserving a sense of autonomy. Within a six-hour 
driving shift, an individual may give consent hundreds of time with each act of consent further 
cementing psychological commitment. These micro-consent choices both reinforce a 
psychological sense of autonomy and autonomous behaviors in that workers are able to respond 
and interact with the algorithm by physically moving and strategizing and manipulating the 
algorithm. Though these actions of autonomy are embedded within a larger work system, drivers 
can enter and exit the system at will. Thus, in contrast to recent research on the “algorithmic 
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cage” (Rahman, 2019; Faraj, Pachidi & Sayegh, 2019; Kellogg, Valentine, & Christin, 2019), I 
find that workers have real autonomy in algorithmic work.  
 
Implications for Workers’ Autonomy 
Classic research on autonomy suggests autonomy is a stable, embedded feature of designing jobs 
and group structures (Hackman, 1976; Hackman & Oldman, 1976; Langfred, 2000; Wageman, 
1995). These formulations assume that employee’s aspirations for choice, dignity, and 
expression compete with the organization’s implicit need for control and hence must be carefully 
doled out so that any workers’ autonomy is in alignment with organizational goals (Blau, 1955; 
Osterman, 1999). Indeed, this quest for autonomy is so salient it is considered the defining 
feature between “good jobs” and “bad jobs” (Kalleberg, 2009). Management and team structures 
also enable autonomy. Managers grant autonomy through leniencies (Anteby, 2008) and 
idiosyncratic arrangements (Rousseau, 1995), while collusion among co-workers influence 
workers to take unscheduled breaks (Roy, 1952) or shortcuts (Bernstein, 2012). In line with this 
research, algorithms are theorized to further circumscribe work autonomy, designing jobs that 
are even more structured and more isolating. Yet, surprisingly, I found workers have a strong 
sense of autonomy.  
 These findings problematize general assumptions that autonomy is a stable job 
characteristic embedded only in “good jobs” and reinforced by interactions with managers and 
peers. No one would describe a ride-hailing job as “good,” as it is inherently precarious with 
long hours, little pay, and no possibility of career advancement. Yet, these workers experience 
autonomy while engaging in work. In a recent review considering the future of job design, the 
founders of job design theory noted that they had “under-recognized the importance for work 
redesign in the broader context … [of] the organization’s formal properties” such as “technology 
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and control systems” (Oldham & Hackman, 2010: 472). These findings counter the assumption 
that only “good jobs” are characterized by high autonomy. Indeed, one of the fruits of the on-
demand economy is the birth of the “good bad job.” 
Similar to Blauner’s (1964) expansion of Marx’s (1840) theory of alienation, this 
research broadens Hackman and Oldman’s (1976) conceptualization of autonomy by explicating 
the linkage between work conditions, structures, and autonomy. This research details how 
different types of autonomy (mobility, strategizing, manipulating) interacted with one another in 
a short period of time to reinforce a sense of autonomy. In a single ride a driver could use the 
passenger app to position between other cars (autonomy as strategizing), reject all the shared 
rides (autonomy as manipulating) before accepting a private ride, and quickly rate the rider to get 
back on the road quickly (autonomy as mobility). Each of these tactics was interpreted as 
supporting drivers in meeting their ultimate goal of earning income, and together they mutually 
reinforced workers’ sense of autonomy.   
While the autonomy this work offers is not the promised freedom touted by the industry, 
it is also not an act of self-duplicity. Games on the shop floor are real choices, however narrowly 
conceived (Burawoy, 1976), and, in the same vein, tactics in response to algorithmic control are 
voluntary though circumscribed. These choices allow workers real discretion in accomplishing 
their work tasks. Nor, however, is the autonomy an act of defiance (Roy, 1952; Montgomery, 
1979) or an attempt to find meaningfulness out of a “bad” job (Bunderson & Thompson, 2009; 
Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001); instead, it is the simple yet not insignificant act of trying to earn 
a living. Unlike other organizational ethnographies of lower-skilled work, this research seriously 
considers workers’ accounts of autonomy, not discounting workers as victims of false 
consciousness (Marx, 1840) who are unwittingly reproducing systems of self-oppression 
 
157 
(Burawoy, 1976; Barker, 1993; Mazmanian, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2013). The heroes of those 
accounts are the workers who do not allow the “time study man” to observe them (Montgomery, 
1979: 115), refuse to smile (Hoschilds, 1983), and do the “seatbelt squeeze” on unruly 
Disneyland riders (Van Maanen, 1991). My findings suggest an alternative, unsung hero: those 
who go to work each day to earn a living, enabling their own sense of autonomy in spite of 
organizational and algorithmic constraints.  
  
Limitations and Future Research 
My findings can foster naturalistic generalization, as parallels may be drawn between the 
description of a case and one’s own experience in similar contexts (Stake, 1995). The ride-
hailing case highlights workers’ experiences in contexts in which the entire human resource 
cycle is managed by algorithms and subject to monitoring, evaluation, and control. As algorithms 
are becoming more integrated in the workplace, influencing hiring, evaluation, and compensation 
practices, more and more workers are being subjected to management by algorithms. What was 
previously under the discretion of a manager is now measured, quantified, categorized, and 
monitored under an algorithm’s control and oversight. Surprisingly, I find that algorithms give 
rise to more opportunities for worker autonomy in that workers have another structure they can 
interpret, strategize about, and deviate from. In sum, individual discretion is not simply 
“programmed away,” although this is an intention of algorithmic management and does not 
lessen the inherent control algorithms impose on the work itself. 
This study is a first response to calls for research on how algorithms are being embedded 
into occupations (Kellogg, Valentine & Christin, 2019). My finding of a “good bad” job—in that 
work can be experienced as positive while structurally precarious—suggests that algorithmic 
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work is not as alienating as previously forecasted. An Amazon warehouse worker may have 
some autonomy, in terms of physical movement, but less opportunity for strategizing or 
manipulating due to electronic tracking; a worker engaged in the “ghost work” (Gray & Suri, 
2019) of algorithmic curation may have even less. In contrast, on-demand work for TaskRabbit 
and Upwork might be better “good bad” jobs, as workers have more possible ways to interact 
with the algorithm, clients, and platform. In pursuing the study of algorithmic work, researchers 
must be careful not to typecast the integration of algorithms as always estranging workers. 
These findings can be also analytically generalized by moving beyond the empirical 
phenomenon to consider the conceptual implications of the case study (Stake, 1995). With the 
rise of online platforms, gig work has achieved the status of a household name, with more than 
90% percent of Americans aware of the service, if not consumers or workers themselves. Recent 
discussions of contemporary life suggest that the experiences of these workers are consistent 
with broader shifts in the move toward post-traditional society (Gray & Suri, 2019; Standing, 
2013; Vallas, 2016). Discontent at the rise of neo-liberalism and “surveillance capitalism” 
(Zuboff, 2019) fuels inquiries on finding meaning, value, and fulfillment at work. Industry and 
popular media discourses construe gig employment as emancipatory where freedom and self-
fulfillment can be won.25 Further, firms are encouraging workers to develop their personal brand 
(Vallas & Christin, 2018) and take ownership of their careers and skill development (Hall, 
1996), leading to a “radical responsibilization” of the workforce (Fleming, 2017). These factors 
                                                
25 This is a dangerous assumption. Hatton (2011) described that from its inception, the temp industry has contributed to the 
degradation of work—from the “Kelly Girls” exploiting 1950s gender stereotypes to justify low wages, minimal benefits, and 
chronic insecurity, to the 2000s “permatemps” who painted workers as financial liabilities. Further, both Hacker (2006) and 
Fleming (2017) argue that the radical responsibilization is linked to growing economic insecurity and worrying levels of personal 





help illuminate why the ride-hailing industry’s claims of freedom are so popular and why 
workers are apt to interpret their interactions with the algorithm as reinforcing their autonomy.  
Further, this case provides an empirical example of how control systems are layered over 
one another, or are a pampliset. Algorithmic control relies on traditional methods of technical 
and bureaucratic control (i.e., determining the rule and pacing the speed of work), but also 
introduces new methods, such as adjusting wages in real-time and using algorithmically-
determined ratings. A unique feature of algorithmic control models is that mechanisms of control 
can be interdependent—the output of one type of control may be the input of another type of 
control. In ride-hailing, for instance, drivers’ algorithmic ratings influence what rides they are 
matched with; meeting a prior week’s bonus quotas affect what quotas you are offered the 
following week. Additionally, this case provides insight on how algorithmic control models can 
be adopted across multiple industries. In ride-hailing work, human-algorithmic interactions are 
part of an “algorithmic labor triangle” (Cameron, 2019), a three-way interaction between 
workers, management, and customers, in that customer evaluations affect how the algorithm 
assigns tasks to the worker, and the worker’s task-acceptance rate affects evaluations. Each 
member of the triangle both controls and is controlled by different members in the labor process. 
Thus, algorithmic control can be seen less as a path-dependent model and more as an interweave 
of different types of control exercised by varying actors. Future work should continue to explore 
how this overlapping affects the ways in which control is actually implemented, especially with 
respect to managers and customers. 
While this is an extensive study of the ride-hailing industry, it is limited to workers 
within one industry, and the sampling strategy did not allow me to identify clear variations 
across participants in terms of dimensions such as industry, gender, race/ethnicity, immigration 
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status, tenure, hours worked per week, prior and/or co-current employment, or location. I also 
selected drivers who chose to continue to drive (the median time driving was a little over a year), 
as opposed to those who quit after a few weeks. Based on my sampling technique (I recruited 
most participants after meeting them in-person as a rider), these workers drove more often and 
were not representative of the overall population of ride-hailing drivers, many who drove 
less than 10 hours a week (Katz & Krueger, 2016).26 This was a conservative sample as one 
would expect that the longer a driver worked, the less likely they would be to have a sense of 
autonomy, since the business model presents challenges to schedule flexibility (wages are 
synched to morning and evening high-demand periods, such that those who want to earn the 
most must work consistent time blocks). Over the course of my study, the continual downwards 
pressure on wages forced many drivers across the country to work even longer hours for the 
same or less pay. Furthermore, I studied drivers in the ride-hailing industry from 2016 to 2019 
and algorithmic technologies have continued to evolve. These factors necessarily qualify my 
insights. However, as algorithms are becoming more and more embedded into work across a 
range of skill levels, these results offer important insights into the implications of autonomy 
within algorithmic workplaces. Future research should continue to examine whether and how 
individual experiences and algorithmic controls articulated here apply in the case of different 
types of work. Second, as this research focused on the employment relationship, drivers, and 
their experiences of the work, future research in algorithmic work should continue to explore its 
implications for customers, managers, and teams.  
 
 
                                                
26 Similarly, Gray & Suri (2019) and others convincingly argue that the majority (80%) of the work on digital platforms is done 





I began this research project with a simple question about how work is navigated in an 
algorithmic work environment. My research describes a two-part framework where algorithms 
structure the work process through the use of rewards, sanctions, and timing. Drivers, in turn, 
make inferences about the algorithm and then respond with a set of tactics—compliance, 
engagement, or deviance—that give them a sense of autonomy within the constraints of their 
work environment. Taken together, this paper contributes to the understanding of autonomy in 
the algorithmic workplace. More importantly, this study gives hope—hope that the rise of 
algorithms being embedded into contemporary work will not condemn lower-skilled workers to 
an ever-tightening iron cage. 
 





































Table 6-1: Algorithmic Tactics 
 
Tactics Sub-Tactics    Data 
Compliance Hard Last weekend it was 50 rides and you get $150 bonus. If you give 75 rides you get a 
$250 bonus. If you give 90 rides you get a $350 bonus. I was trying to work 
towards the 90 rides, but on Saturday it didn’t work out because I got longer rides. I 
didn’t get as many rides. I only got 21 rides. The first day I got 30. I was on track, 
but the second day screwed me. Then I got 80. This past weekend that just 
occurred, it was 60 rides for $175 bonus. 90 rides for $300 bonus and 105 rides for 
$375 bonus. That’s [105] way too many rides. You could probably do it if you’re 
out 13, 14 hours. [laughs] That’s crazy. That’s a lot of rides. First day [I was out] 
eight or eight and a half [hours]. The second day was five and a half. Then 
yesterday was 10 and a half. So, I was out probably combined in driver mode, 24 
hours this weekend… With commuting, that was 30 hours total. (Kentucky, 
Philadelphia) 
Compliance Soft Basically everyone gets a five unless they do something to annoy you, and then 
they get a four, and four out of five stars is supposed to be really good, but it’s 
not…. if you get anything less than a five, it’s kind of a problem. A three or less is, 
you’ll never be paired with that person again. The scale of what the stars mean has 
really shifted and are really weighted on one end. So I give pretty much everyone a 
five—I’ve never had to give anyone less than a five. They actually started auto-
filling it now, so when you complete a ride, it just pops up five stars and you just hit 
go, hit complete, so it just assumes you’re going to give them five stars. (Charlotte, 
Ann Arbor) 
Engagement Catching  
Surges 
Go to the big events at the height of a surge (i.e. when the event ended). What I 
found was that I lost a lot of time looking for riders, and then I would have to 
cancel. By that time, the surge was over and now I just lost time and money at this 
big event. A better strategy is to go a little before the event is over and after the big 
crowd is gone. It is easier to move in and out of the area and you can get multiple 
rides as opposed to one big ride. (RideHailng Blogger) 
Engagement Avoiding 
Surges 
Lyft only displays Prime Time levels in two colors: pink and magenta. To 
complicate that, the amount of Prime Time on a given pink or dark pink tile varies. 
This means you don’t even really know what these stupid pink squares mean! They 
are unpredictable. I have received 0% Prime Time after getting a request in a 
magenta square many times. I have also received 100% Prime Time when there 
were no pink Prime Time Squares on Lyft’s heat map. It just appeared out of 
nowhere. I often feel like Prime Time is determined by a Random Number 
Generator (Harry, ride-hailing blogger) 
Engagement Avoiding 
Surges 
You turn on your app and then you see that very orange, bright color around 
downtown area… you rush to that area, when you’re five minutes [from] the area, 
the color just disappears or it becomes very light instead of that deep red or deep 
orange color that you saw at first, so that’s the thing I don’t understand. So I tried it. 
I did it a few times. I went to the spot and the color changed, so now I don't trust 




I only accept rides five minutes [away] and below. I’m not going to accept anything 
out of five minutes—especially if it’s not a surge, okay? …Often times they’re 15 
minute rides, 14 minute rides [away]…And I'm not going to do it, because often 
times it’s going to cost me more time and gas to get there for a three minute ride for 
the rider. That is totally not worth it to me. So going back to… how I utilize my 
app, you took a question directly from the methodology that I use in order to make 




If you live a long way from the concert venue, put on a destination filter with the 
concert venue as the target and sit and wait for your long run to the concert. Given 
that concerts are in the evening, when there is a whole lot of other traffic, it won’t 
be as reliable as the airport runs on Monday morning. But it’s a good way to try to 
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get a really long run right out of the gate. Destination filters are also a great way to 
do “opportunity driving.” Going somewhere more than 10 miles away? Leave early 
and put on a destination filter for where you’re going. Maybe you’ll make a few 





As a passenger, you can see all the cars around. That’s also another good indicator 
when you’re working too. If it’s a ton of Ubers around, don’t even bother. Don’t go 






You open the passenger app and it will show you the eight closest drivers and then 
you just go where they’re not. You could count all the other drivers on any given 
moment. It would be the 200 block of Ryman, but there were too many cars—it was 
too stressful…it wasn’t always a sure thing. So I would go four blocks away where 





I had a woman who wanted me to take her home. Her friend canceled it, and she 
wanted me to take her home, so I said just make the request. No matter how many 
times she requested me, she never got me. It was always another driver. I canceled 
on two people while she was in the car and she had to cancel on three drivers before 
I just said you got to get out, it’s not working for some reason. So it wasn’t 
necessarily who was closer. You’ve got to realize [the company] is doing 
something, and whatever they’re doing is not necessarily whoever is closer, because 
if she’s sitting in the car with me, how are all these other drivers that are two blocks 
away getting the request? (Roger, Washington, DC) 
Deviance Blanket Ride 
Rejection 
 
Well, actually I never did like [shared ride service] ‘cause it, it’s too damn cheap. 
Really. I mean it’s almost cheaper than a metro bus. If you reject, it makes your 
rating go down and then they’ll try to block you out the system! One time I rejected 
a few until I got a notification that basically, “Hey, we notice that you haven’t been 
accepting your [shared rides].”  So basically you gonna have to start accepting them 




There was a bigger concert and I kept denying rides, waiting for the higher surge 
charge because I knew there was going to be one. And they blocked me for like a 
minute or two, which I was fine with because that’s what I wanted to do. [Laughs.] 
I didn’t know if I was going to be able to turn back on, which I was irritated about, 




So now it was Sunday night and I had completed my required trips but was just 
short of the required acceptance rate. I didn’t want to continue giving rides because 
it was late, requests were slow to come in and I really wanted to get home and 
sleep. But I also didn’t want to miss out on the $80 that I was so close to earning. 
So I figured out a way to get the $80 WITHOUT giving any additional rides. I 
decided that I’d remain online and accept the next request I received. A few 
minutes later a request came in and I tapped the screen to accept it. But instead of 
completing the ride, I cancelled it. Wait, what?? Yep, because I had accepted the 
request, my acceptance rate now jumped above the 80% threshold and unlocked the 
$80 bonus for me. BOOM! And because I then cancelled the trip, my completion 
rating dropped, but not enough to disqualify me from the bonus. I got my bonus and 





























“First day. I’m sitting on a shady 
street two blocks from my house, 
nervously checking my phone every 
twenty seconds so I don’t miss a 
ping. My phone… suddenly starts 
buzzing. Yay – a ride! I see a 
flashing circle with a timer, counting 
down. My hands are sweaty, the 
phone is vibrating, and while trying 
to swipe I drop the phone under the 
passenger seat. Darn! After a few 
seconds the phone goes quiet. I’ve 
lost my first ride.” 







such as how 


















Always follow the app’s instructions. 
Keep a close eye on your app for 
shared rides. The route is built on 
efficiency, so the order of who is 
picked up and dropped off first 
varies from ride to ride.” 























“Demand is higher than usual in 
Center City. Take advantage of 
higher than normal fares!”  
~ Text message, from Web forums 
“You turn on your app, and then you 
see that very orange, bright color 
around downtown area, that means 
there is a surge there. There is a high 
demand…so you rush into that area.” 






















“For the weekend of 15 March 2018, 
my incentive was, ‘an extra $90 for 
completing 24 trips.’” 
 

















appears at the 




“If you’re ever paired with 
somebody who is a bad rider, if you 
give them a 1, 2, or 3, you’re not 
matched with them anymore. If 
somebody is a bad passenger, I give 
them a one star and I don't have to 
worry about ever seeing them again. 
Ratings are good for drivers and the 
passengers. ~ Joel, Detroit 
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Figure 6-2: Inferences and Responses to Algorithms  




























Figure 6.2: Inferences and Responses to Algorithms that Reinforce Autonomy 
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Table 6-3: Summary of Algorithmic Work Tactics 
 
 Compliance Tactics Engagement Tactics Deviance Tactics 
Algorithms are to be 
 
Followed Used Manipulated 
Metaphor for Algorithm 
 
Rule Tool Clary 
Drivers Get the Most 
Profitable Rides By 
 




How Work System 
Responds to Workers 
 
Rewards Does nothing to driver, 
punishes if excessive 
Sanctions if caught 
Drivers Feel Autonomous 
Because 
 
They are moving and 
earning money 














Image 6-3: Text Notification of Bonus Offers 
 
Image 6-4: Deactivation Notice (Accessed via Link in 








Image 6-5: Sign on Driver’s Backseat Encouraging 
Riders to Rate Five Stars 
 
 
Image 6-6: Sign on Driver’s Backseat Encouraging  
Drivers to Rate 
 
 
Image 6-7: Signs Available for Purchase on Website 





Image 6-8: Notification from Ride-hailing  
Company about Driver’s Ratings 
 
Image 6-9: Compliments and Badges Are Always 





Image 6-10: Driver’s Account Deactivated for Low  
Ratings with Potential for Reinstatement 
 
 
Image 6-11: Driver’s Account Temporarily  
Suspended for Cancelling too Many Rides 
 
 









Image 6-13: Instructions for a Shared Ride, Showing  
Driver has arrived and the Timer Counting Down 
 
 
Image 6-14: Nudge to Keep Driving  
When Trying to Sign Off 
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Conclusion and Future Directions 
 
 
In this dissertation, I have examined human-algorithm interactions, describing how 
workers accomplish their work tasks within an algorithmic workplace, and how they interpret the 
interactions with the algorithm. 
In my first empirical findings, presented in Chapter 5, I consider how workers interpret 
and make meaning of work in an organizationally sterile environment, in which the organization 
provides few cues. Focusing on the practices and perspectives of the two most salient features of 
this work environment—customers and technology—I explore how these interactions lead 
drivers in the ride-hailing industry to understand their relationship to their work as an alliance or 
as adversarial. Over time, these work practices and perspectives culminate in different expected 
psychological, emotional, and behavioral outcomes. 
In my second set of empirical findings, presented in Chapter 6, I find that workers 
navigate the tensions between organizational control and individual needs for autonomy by 
crafting a set of tactics—compliance, engagement, or deviance—in response to the algorithms’ 
nudges. Although these tactics appear to be at odds, drivers describe their responses as evidence 
of their personal autonomy, in that they allow them to maximize earnings and create a 
continuous stream of work from a discontinuous set of tasks. This autonomy, which is 
conditional on time and the work, demonstrates that although algorithms may be seen as an 





requesting consent from workers at each stage of the work process, algorithmic systems enact 
control without authority.  
 
Key Contributions to Long-standing Questions 
 
Organizational-Level Questions. This dissertation addresses many important theories in 
organizational studies, in particular, theories on control, one of the most-studied and fundamental 
theories within the field. One could say that studies of bureaucracy and its effect on control 
actually founded the field of organizational studies (Marx, 1847; Gouldner, 1954; Blau 1956). 
Specifically, this dissertation answers the question of how control operates and is interpreted in 
the context of new technology algorithms. In doing so, I find that organizational control is 
maintained through a reconciliation of centralization and decentralization, or what Sloan (1956) 
calls decentralization with coordinated control. One aspect of decentralization is schedule 
flexibility—drivers can choose when and where they want to work, in a car that is also of their 
choosing, as opposed to for an organization that sets fixed schedules. But without adequate 
organizational control, work could not be accomplished, leading to the constant tension between 
decentralization (autonomy) and centralization (control and coordination). Algorithms coordinate 
work through setting pay rates, assigning rides, and maintaining the evaluation system. Unlike 
Sloan’s examples of centralized decentralization on the production floor of General Motors, my 
findings are not a clear variation of the principal-agent problem, as the principal is not clearly 
defined, as the algorithm takes on different properties depending on the context. In their 
multivocality, algorithms can take on the form of a contract (e.g., the terms of agreements when 





of providing wide, instant pay). Thus, these findings can be taken as a case of a system that is 
coordinated through centralized decentralization with a multivocal principal.  
Work in the ride-hailing industry is an example of a pooled interdependence system 
(Thompson, 1967/2017) in that algorithms allow for work to be distributed across individuals, so 
that the organization’s goals are accomplished by each worker’s independent effort. One benefit 
of pooled interdependence is that it allows workers to have greater feelings of control, mastery, 
and autonomy over their work activities. At the same time, the organization has less need for any 
particular individual worker and, correspondingly, less need for workers to exert autonomy on 
behalf of the organization, as workers are interchangeable. In contrast to the assembly line— 
where one worker could stop production entirely—ultimate control and authority rest in the 
hands of the organization and the algorithm which are coordinating the work. Thus, while pooled 
interdependence can foster an individual worker’s sense of autonomy, it may actually inhibit 
group-level autonomy expressed in collective action, such as petitions, demonstrations, 
organizing, and strikes, that could facilitate actual change. 
As this study is worker-centric, focusing on algorithms and work, it is intriguing to 
consider how these findings speak to the reverse: algorithms and an organization’s control 
system. In a process called sedimentation, Edwards (1980) theorizes that when new control 
systems come into form, they layer over and change prior control systems. In the algorithm 
workplace, I observed all three layers of control: direct observation by electronic surveillance 
and telemetric tracking, technical control by the timers and routing directions, and bureaucratic 
control in the specification of labor and driver support systems (namely who drivers can and 
cannot easily communicate with). Some elements of the algorithm exert multiple types of 





control. Other parts of the algorithmic system, which rely on the interactions between drivers and 
customers (e.g., adjusting ride prices, customizing incentive quotas, and escalating sanctions), 
suggest that algorithms may be a new form of control. This study provides the first piece of 
empirical evidence that hints at these possibilities, which may allow us to address whether a new 
era of control is upon us. Further research could continue to develop this idea by comparing 
potential algorithmic control systems with prior control systems. 
Individual-Level Questions. Understanding autonomy within the confines of a tightly 
coordinated work environment is always a paradox. Originally coined “false consciousness” by 
Marx (1847), Burawoy (1976) advanced the conversation, recognizing that workers did, in fact, 
have some autonomy (though, presumably, in the wrong direction, as it was supporting a 
capitalist system), calling the process “manufacturing consent.” This belief that even though 
workers feel autonomous, they are, by the very act of working, being duped and, at times, 
exploited, remains the rule (e.g., Barker, 1993; Burawoy, 1976; Mazmanian et al., 2013; Michel, 
2011; Reich & Bearman, 2018; Vallas, 2016) rather than the exception. This study aims to bridge 
these two perspectives, understanding autonomy not as a mental trick to keep the hamster 
running on the wheel and the worker compliant within a system, but as something that is 
experienced mentally, emotionally, and physically in the body, and has positive benefits, while 
also keeping the work machine turning. 
 
Future Research Directions - Emerging Questions to Consider 
 
It is my sincerest desire that this dissertation contributes to the current discussion about 





al., 2016; Rahman, 2019; Rosenblat, 2018; Shestakofsky, 2018; Ticona, 2015), opening new 
lines of research and ways of thinking about the world of human-algorithm interactions and their 
collective consequences. Paraphrasing Neil Armstrong’s famous quote (1969), I find this line of 
research “one small step” for organizational researchers, and “one giant leap” for 
interdisciplinary social sciences, and a stepping stone toward many fruitful and impactful lines of 
research. 
This study examines not only how algorithmic systems work, but what happens when 
they don’t? Algorithms can misfunction in anticipated and unanticipated ways that may or may 
not be noticed by organizations or workers. Non-routine interactions offer unique opportunities 
to explore assumptions and to consider how repairs are undertaken (Feldman, 2000; Rerup & 
Feldman, 2011; Heaphy, 2013). This line of study could address questions such as: Who noticed 
the algorithmic misfunction and how does the information traverse to other organizational 
stakeholders? What did the misfunction cause to happen and what assumptions about the 
algorithm are revealed in light of a misfunction? How are algorithm misfunctions repaired? How 
is trust in the algorithm regained and what does this look like?  
While this study examines how algorithms are embedded into the everyday nature of 
work, whole systems of algorithms are increasingly being inserted holistically into organizational 
design and work processes. In the healthcare system, for example, algorithms are used 
throughout, assigning patients to physicians, diagnosing illness, suggesting treatments and 
follow-ups, and scheduling and monitoring (Burt & Volucenbaum, 2018), with similar changes 
reported in education (O’Neil, 2016). Similarly, at Stitchfix, an algorithm curates a weekly box 
of clothes for customers based on an assessment of the preferences, sizes, and buying patterns. 





design choices? How do designers decide where in the work process to implement an algorithm 
versus a human-overseen processes? What manifest and latent functions does the algorithm serve 
at each juncture in the work? What oversight systems are deployed?  And, at the individual level, 
how do workers and customer experience and respond to these new systems?  
Compared to traditional work on a shop floor or office space, algorithmic work has the 
potential to be socially isolating. Platforms like MTurk, Upwork, and HourlyNerd offer (worker-
maintained) online forums, but digital intimacy is fragile (Salehi et al., 2015). Lack of social 
contact with other organization members and limited physical organizational scaffolding make it 
more difficult for workers to learn organizational norms, rules, customs, and procedures. 
Questions this line of study could address include: How does socialization occur in primarily 
asocial environments? What routines, connections, and material objects do individuals draw on 
and how do these relationships change over time? How does one know if workers are socialized 
“enough?” 
Critics suggest that on-demand work and algorithms, in particular, can exert downward 
pressure on wages at the expense of human dignity (Kalleberg, 2009; 2011; O’Neil, 2016; 
Eubanks, 2018). Undoubtingly, we would expect workers to resist the erosion of their 
humanness—perhaps through taking unscheduled breaks (Roy, 1952), rate-busting (Burawoy, 
1979), making homers (Anteby, 2008), subverting standard operation procedures (Bernstein, 
2012) or, unconsciously, through physical breakdowns (Michel, 2011). Questions this line of 
study could address include: Given that work is highly atomized, do workers need to engage in 
collective action in order to resist? What are the lines between deviance, collective action, 
resistance, and a social movement? What does it mean to resist in a job that one can quit anytime 





algorithm itself, coworkers) and if, so, what does this look like? How do we assess the 
effectiveness of resistance tactics?  
I began this dissertation by noting that investigating how emerging technologies shape 
organizations, while not a new endeavor, is surely worthwhile. In the end, I do not offer a clear 
conclusion about the positive and negative aspects of the algorithmic workplace, but rather, I 
agree with Kranzberg’s (1985) first law of technology, that “technology is neither good nor bad; 
nor is it neutral.” The good news is that lower-skilled workers, who typically face the most 
precarity, abuse, and uncertainty in the workplace (Standing, 2011; Kalleberg, 2009, 2011), have 
unparalleled levels of autonomy. At the same time, control remains firmly within the hands of 
organizations, with the challenges of opacity and interpretability inherent to algorithms 
increasing the chances they will be used to exploit workers (Eubanks, 2018; Gray & Suri, 2019; 
O’Neil, 2016; Pasquale, 2015). Ever the realistic optimistic, I concur with Dr. Martin Luther 
King (1955) that “the arc of history [technology] is long yet it bends towards justice.” 
Governments, universities, and advocacy groups continue to call for greater transparency into 
algorithmic work, in ways that augment and support workers (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2015; 
Diakopoulos, 2015; Dwoskin, 2018; Rostain, 2019). By describing some of the conditions in 
whcih workers interpreted and made sense of their work, I hope this dissertation advances the 
conversation about how to build a more just and equitable world with algorithms in the forefront. 
And with that I wish you a fond farewell.27
                                                
27 “And with that, I wish you a fond farewell” was the last line of my grandmother’s 8th grade valedictorian speech, 
in 1922, which was the last year of school she completed. She repeated this line, ending with a curtsy, until a week 
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